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<g«^^«^//.=4% - 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



"^ GUIDE 

TO THE 

STUDY OF MORAL. EVIDENCE, 

OR OF THAT 

Species ot 3^ea»onCttg, 

WHICH RELATES TO 

MATTERS OF FACT AND PRACTICE. 

BY / 
Ret. JAMES EDWARD GAMBIER, Eng. 

WITH 

ILLUSTRATIVE JTOTES, 

BEING AN 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE 

TO THE 

Divine Origin of the Christian Religion, 
By JOSEPH A. WARNE, A. M. 

Pastor of the Baptist Church in Brookline, Massachusetts. 

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, 
AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON MORAL REASONING, 

By WILLIAM HAGUE, A. M. 

Pastor of the First Baptist Church in Boston, Ms^., 

|:<J^ xe7i 



BOSTON: 
PUBLISHED BY JAMES LORING, 

1834. 



o\ 



9<r, 



Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the Year 1834, 
BY JAMES LORING, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Massachusetts. 



/f^s: 



CONTENTS. 



Page 
tutroductory Essay on Moral Reasoning. By Rev. William 

Hague, A. M. 9 

Author's Preface 43 

Editor's Preface .49 

CHAPTER I. 

ON THE NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE, WHEREIN IT 
DIFFERS FROM DEMONSTRATION. 

Moral Evidence defined 55 

Differs from Demonstration 3 

1. As to its Subjects . 56 

2. As to tlie Method in which it is conducted ..... 56 

3. Because the Arguments on both Sides of a duestion 

should be considered ^ . . 56 

4. Because Propositions in Moral Evidence, though false, 

are not absurd 57 

5. As to the Kind of Assent which it produces .... 57 

6. Because it affords no Rule forjudging with Certainty , 58 

7. Because it admits of Degrees 58 

8. Because it admits an Accumulation of Proofs ... 59 

9. Because you cannot reason safely farther than one Step 59 

10. Because it does not compel the Assent 60 

11. Because it does not admit of as great precision in language 61 
Is inferior to Demonstration, yet not to be rejected, and why 62 
Two Extremes from not attending to the Difference between 

Moral Evidence and Demonstration 64 

1. Calling probable Proof Demonstration * 64 

2. Disputing probable Proof, because not demonstrative . 66 



IV CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER II. 

ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MORAL EVIDENCE^ 
WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE WEIGHT OF E4.CH. 

I. Personal Observation . , ♦ 67 

1. Of Things uniform 70 

2. Of Things various ..,♦».. ,k .. ^ . . 7S 

II. Testimony 79 

Remote Testimony S9 

III. Observation of others 90 

IV. General Notoriety ..."...»...,». 99 

V. Report 101 

Yl. Tradition . . 102 

Internal Evidence. Analogy . 103 

Inferences from Facts or Premises. Presumptions . , . 105 

Consistency of the Parts of a Relation « . . 109 

CHAPTER III. 

GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO MORAI* 
REASONING. 

I. Previous Qualifications 112 

1. Acquire fixed Principles of Evidence . . . ^ . . 112 

2. A Habit of inquiring after a Standard ...... 113 

3. A Habit of referring every Thing to its End .... 114 

4. Clear and precise Rules of Judgment ...... 115 

II. To determine whether we should engage in the Discussion 116 

1. Is the (Question worth investigating ....... 116 

2. Will it admit of free Examination 117 

3. Is it capable of a satisfactory Decision ...... 119 

4. Are we competent to its Discussion 119 

HI. When we have determined to investigate it, we should 

1. Examine if it be fairly and clearly stated . . . , , 120 

2. Form as clear Ideas of it as possible 120 

3. Consider of what Kind of Evidence the Subject admits 121 

4. Consider all the Arguments on both Sides 12^ 

5. Guard against the Fascinations of Expression . . . 122 



CONTENTS. V 

6. Guard against Mis-statement of Degrees ..... 123 

7. Probability, not Possibility, is to decide 124 

8. Force of Proof depends on Weight of Arguments, not 

on Number 126 

9. Determine the Weight of each Argument, sum up, and 

balance 126 

10. If both Sides be equal, suspend the Judgment, not 

otherwise /. 127 

IV. To determine the weight of an Argument, or the Prob- 
ability of an Event 127 

The Degree of Probability 129 

Cautions 

1. Make Observations on as large a Scale as possible . . 131 

2. Take Care that the Circumstances are similar . . . 133 
How to proceed in Cases of extraordinary Importance . . 134 

Compound Probability 136 

How to judge by the general Appearance of a (Question . . 138 

How to regulate our Choice 140 

1. State all Advantages and Disadvantages 140 

2. Consider remote Consequences 141 

3. See that all Advantages and Disadvantages are fairly 

stated .142 

4. On contingent Advantages and Disadvantages . . . 143 

5. To determine on the Pursuit of an Object ..... 145 
How to regulate our Advice to others ^ . , 148 

CHAPTER IV. 

SPECIAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO EACH KIND OF 
MORAL EVIDENCE. 

1. Personal Observation and the Observation of others . . 149 

1. Are you qualified to observe the Subject ..... 149 

2. Consider the Circumstances under which your Obser- 

vations were made 150 

3. Do not draw Conclusions from too few Subjects . . 151 

4. In Subjects which are various, how to ascertain what 

is probable, and the Degree 152 

5. Subjects which are various, do not admit constant 

conclusions 152 



VI CONTENTS. 

Farther. On Observations of others ; 

1. Do their Facts and Processes warrant their Conclusions 153 

2. Do their Observations coincide with your own . . . 153 

3. Are they likely to have related them fairly .... 154 

II. Testimony 155 

1. Is the Thing credible 155 

2. Are the parts of the Relation consistent with each 

other, and with known Circumstances .... 162 

^ 3. Does it agree with subsequent Circumstances ... 163 

4. Is the Witness competent to judge of the Fact , . . 165 

5. Could he recollect it clearly 166 

6. Is he a Man of general Veracity 167 

7. Did he speak his real Judgment ........ 168 

8. Is he a Man of general Integrity . . - 170 

9. Is he interested in the Decision of the Question . .170 

10. On a Testimony against the Interest of the Witness . 171 

11. On the Manner of his giving his Evidence .... 172 

12. On the Occasion on which the Testimony is given . 173 

13. Does the Evidence rest on the Testimony of only one 

Witness, or more 173 

14. Would the Account be easily confuted, if false . . 174 

15. A vague Account not as credible as a particular one . 176 

16. When the Witness speaks positively of some Things, 

and uncertainly of others 177 

17. Of ancient Facts ; what Reception did they meet with 

at first 177 

18. On the Omission of a Thing pretended to have been 

public . 186 

19. On contradictory Testimonies * 186 

20. On Testimonies agreeing in Part, and contradictory 

in Part 187 

Remote Testimony . 189 

III. General Notoriety 189 

IV. Report 191 

V. Tradition . 192 

VI. Analogy 492 

VII. Inferences. Presumptive Evidence 193 



CONTENTS. Vll 



CHAPTER V. 

ON THE KINDS OF EVIDENCE OF WHICH DIFFERENT 
SUBJECTS ADMIT. 

Mathematical Subjects 196^ 

Moral Maxims. and Proverbs 197 

Properties and Effects of Subjects of Natural History . . . 197 

Effects of Substances on Mankind ......... 198 

Facts respecting the Constitution of Nature 200 

Present Facts 201 

Hand-Writing 201 

Effects of Peace, War, &c .202 

Knowledge of Men's Motives and Intentions ..... 203 

Knowledge of Human Nature 206 

Transactions with Men 207 

Transient Facts 210 

Recent Events, Subjects of Law-Suits 212 

Recent Public Events 213 

History .214 

Memoirs 220 

Ancient History 222 

Parliamentary Reports 222 

Authenticity of Books 225 

Miracles . 229 

Review of Chapter 232 

Conclusion . 233 

Appendix. On disputing for Victory, and not for Truth . 237 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 

ON 

MORAL, REASONING. 

BY WILLIAM HAGUE, A. M. 



The reasoning power, is one which g;ives to 
man a high pre-eminence in the scale of being. 
Jt is this which constitutes him the * prince of 
creatures ;' the lord of this lower world. 

* All else is {)ror)e, irrational, and mute, 
And unaccoimtal)!ej by instinct led ; 
But uian was made of annuel form, erect, — 
With reason high to balance right and wrong,' 

to judge of w^hat is true and what is false, 
and to make new discoveries in nature and 
in morals. 

It is true, we have heard it questioned, 
whether brutes have not in some instances 
developed the faculty of reason. We have 
from our infancy been familiar with stories 
respecting the sagacity of the horse and the 
elephant, which have led us to doubt whether 
the opinion that brutes were governed only 
by instinct were founded in fact ; and w^hether 
the difference between the human and the 
2 



10 INTRODUCT^ORY ESSAY. 

brute creation, does not consist in the degree 
of mental power, rather than in the nature 
of their facuUles. As says an old poet, 

' Tell me why the ant, 
Midst summer's plenty, thinks of winter's want 1 
Tjy constant journies careful to prepare 
Her stores, and bring home the corny ear ; 
By what instruction does she bite the grain, 
Lest hid in earth, and taking root again, 

It might elude the foresight of her care? 

Evil like us they shun, and covet good, 
Abhor the poison, and receive the food ; 
Like us they love or hate, like us they know 
To joy the friend, or grapple with the foe. 
With seeming thought their action they intend, 
And use the means proportion'd to the end. 
Then vainly the philosopher avers, 
That reason guides our deeds and instinct theirs. 
How can we justly different causes frame. 
Where the effects, entirely, are the same 1 
Instinct and reason, how can we divide 1 
'Tis the fool's ignorance, and the pedant's pride.' 

Although we were to admit that the poet was 
right in this assertion, still we might with suc- 
cess insist on the distinction between the hu- 
man and the brute creation, as to the nature 
of their faculties, particularly in regard to con- 
science, the power of abstraction, and the feel- 
ing of the mysterious. 

But a strict analysis of the operations of 
instinct and reason, may lead us to believe 
that Prior, whose words we have quoted, 
rashly leaped to his conclusion that they ' en- 
tirely are the same.' Instinct denotes the 



TNiTRODtTCTORY ESSAY. M 

^ataral, uniform tendency of a voluntary agentj 
to do any thing without previous deliberation. 
The efforts of the new-born infant to procure 
its food are instinctive. Such too^ are its at- 
tempts to facilitate the operation of cutting 
teeth, by pressing a hard substance against 
the gum. It knows nothing ^bout the nature 
of teeth, or the mode of quickening their 
growth ; but acts fn)m impulse, without the 
t^ontemplatioii of motives. Reason, how^ever, is 
that power by which the mind compai^s known 
truths, so as to ascertain their rolations, and 
reach those which were unknown. Thus, 
men saw the paper-shelted nautilus spreading 
its thin membrane to the breeze, and by the 
impulse of wind and the force of its arms, 
moving on the surface of the water ; and when 
a storm arose^ they saw it contract its mem- 
brane, fill its shell with water, and sink to the 
bottom. Hence reason inferred that a vessel, 
of less specific gravity than water, might by 
means of an expanded sheet, be made to move 
upon the surface of the ocean. After the 
first rude attempts were made, new ideas were 
obtained and compared, new principles de- 
veloped, and so the art of navigation reached 
a lofty pitch of perfection. Reason could thus 
take a hint from instinct, and by its power of 
progressive improvement, reach some distant 
and unseen result. Man could thus become 
with profit the disciple of nature, 



12 INTRQDUOTOIIY ESSAY. 

His arts of bulletin g from the bee i^eceive, 

Leara of the mole to ploiii^li, the vvoini to weave^ 

Lreuni of the little nautilus to sail,, 

tjpread the thin oar, anc^ catch the driving gale. 

But instinct can never ha improved. It is only- 
adapted to the present exigencies of the crea- 
tures which act from its impulse. The present 
race of Nautili know no more of navigation 
than did the first parents of the species. So 
too, the present generation of bees and bea- 
vers, know no more about architecture than the 
first of their several races knew ; and unless 
their nature change, not one of their species 
ever will know more. 

Here, then, is a strongly marked distinc- 
tion between Instinct and Reason. The first 
is not susceptible of improvement, while the 
latter is infinitely progressive. From the most 
simple principles^ she ascends step by step to 
tbe most splendid results, till she herself stands 
amaz^ed at the extent and grandeur of her 
(Jiscoveries. From observing the fall of an 
apple. Sir Isaac Newton derived the law of 
gravitation, which extends from this to distant 
worlds. To the progress of reason, we can 
S:et no limits. Naught but eternity and an 
onbounded universe furnish full scope for her 
exercise. 

Again, instinct needs no training, while rea- 
son is scarcely developed without cultivation. 
The bird that has been nurtured in a cage, 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 13 

and then permitted to fly forth, will construct 
its nest with an accuracy which human art 
cannot imitate ; — just as if it had . been reared 
under the tuition of its mother. But a man 
who had spent his early years in seclusion 
from society, would know nothing of the mode 
of providing for his own comfort. Thus Pope 
very justly asks. 

Bay, where full instinct is the unerring guide. 
What Pope or Coimcil can they need beside 1 
Reas )n however able-, cool at best, 
Cares not for service or but serves when prest y 
Stays till w-e call, aad then not often near. 
But honest instinct comes, a volunteer ; 
Sure ne'er to over«hoot, but just to hit, 
While still too wide or short is l)uma« wit. 

This leads us to observe that instinct differs 
from reason in the superior accuracy of its 
results. An architect may err in adjusting 
the form and size of a building ; but the bee 
forms her cell with wondrous skill and uner- 
ring precision. McLaurin, a celebrated ma- 
thematician, calculated the exact angle at 
which the three planes which form the basis 
of the cell of a honey-comb must meet, in 
order to possess the greatest degree of strength, 
and make the best economy of labor and 
material. This problem he solved by a pro- 
cess in fluxions ; and when he came to mea- 
sure the angle, found it to accord with his 
calculation most minutely. Now if this be the 
result of reason in the becj then she possesses 



14 K^RODUCTORY ES^AY; 

it in a greater degree than the majority of the 
human family. If it be instinct, then in her 
operations^ we must admire the handy -work 
of the Deity^ 

' For, reason raise o'er iastj»ct as we can, 
liQr this 'tis G:Od that works, in that 'tis man.' 

Reasoning consists in a comparison of pro- 
positions. Commencing with those which we 
see to be true by intuition, that is, those which 
our constitution compels us to take for grant- 
ed, we compare them with others which are 
related to them and those again with others, 
till we arrive at results which we could not 
have reached, without the intervention of these 
intermediate ideas. It is thus in both of the 
great departments of reasoning, the moral and 
the demonstrative. The demonstrative is that 
which respects oiily abstract subjects, and theiic^ 
necessary relations, such as the properties of 
numbers^of mathematical figures, extension, du- 
ration, weight, velocity and force. It is partic- 
ularly valuable to every man, from its tendency 
to strengthen the mind, to impart to it habits of 
accurate discrimination, to inspire it with a 
love for truth, and thus to prepare it for suc-^ 
cessful operation in the great business of moral 
reasoning. 

To this latter department, belong the sub-^ 
jects on which we are daily called to employ 
Qur thoughts ; the various relations, the duties; 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 15 

and the rights of men, the important themes 
furnished by history, the constitution of soci- 
ety, politics, law, theology, political economy, 
and all that may be denominated matters of 
fact. Obviously, therefore, every man is obli- 
ged every day to carry forward in his mind 
processes of moral reasoning : and on the 
mode in which he habitually does it, will de- 
pend, in a great degree, his course of conduct, 
the complexion of his opinions, and the tone 
of his character. 

While it must be admitted that an attention 
to mathematics greatly assists the mind in the 
conduct of moral reasoning, yet it is true that 
an exclusive attention to the former, unfits a 
man for the latter. The influence of mathe- 
matical studies on the habits of the mind has 
been often undervalued, and doubtless it has 
been sometimes overrated. There have been 
known men, who have devoted almost all 
their time and energy to mathematical pursuits, 
men who could hold distinctly before their 
minds the long details of a difficult demonstra- 
tion, and commencing with axioms, go from 
step to step to some remote result with most 
marvellous precision, who in the ordinary af- 
fairs of life evinced a lack of common sense, 
which would have discredited an untutored 
peasant. The entire devotion of the mind to 
demonstrative reasoning, seems to be as ef- 
fectual in debilitating the judgment as the taste ; 



16 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

and the effect which it has upon the latter, 
may be learned from the well-known story of 
the mathematician, who, having read Milton's 
Paradise Lost, sagely asked in the tone of an 
objector, what the poem had proved ! 

The reason of this influence is obvious 
from the nature of the case. In demonstra- 
tive reasoning, a man becomes possessed of 
the most absolute certainty ; but in moral rea- 
soning, he can reach only what is called moral 
certainty, or a commanding probability. Thus, 
in reasoning on the question whether the 
square of the hypothenase of a right angled 
triangle, is equal to the sum of the squares of 
the two sides, as he compares one idea with 
another, he sees the truth at every step by 
intuition ; and w^hen he reaches the result, he 
knows that it cannot possibly be otherwise ; 
that the opposite position would be absurd. 
But in reasoning on such questions as these, 
' is the practice of war right or wrong ?' ' is a 
national tariff beneficial or injurious ?' ^ is the 
conduct of the United States towards the In- 
dians just or unjust ?' much would depend on 
a man's early association of ideas, the state of 
his moral feelings, the degree in which his in- 
terests might be affected by the result of the 
inquiry ; and even when he had reached a 
correct decision, he could not say that the op- 
posite were philosophically absurd, but only 
that the weight of evidence was on the other 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 17 

side. In order, therefore, to be a skilful moral 
reasoner, it is necessary that the judgment be 
trained to accuracy, in estimating the relative 
worth of different kinds of evidence ; to dis- 
cern amidst intricate and distracting inquiries, 
where the commanding probability appears, 
and to submit to it as readily as to mathemat- 
ical certainty. 

From this view of the subject, it is obvious 
that in many instances, a man's opinions on 
moral subjects may be regarded as sure tests 
of his character. The reason is, that such 
opinions are greatly modified by the state of 
the moral feelings. This is a fact too often 
overlooked ; and thence, men have been led 
to plead for the innocence of error. ' To 
affect belief,' says one, ' you must affect the 
subject of it, by producing new arguments or 
considerations. The understanding being pas- 
sive, as to the impressions made upon it, if 
you wish to change those impressions, you 
must change the cause which produces them. 
You can alter perceptions only by altering the 
thing perceived. Every man's consciousness 
will tell him, that the will can ao more modify 
the effect of an argument upon the understand- 
ing than it can change the taste of sugar to 
the palate, or the fragrance of a rose to the 
smell ; and that nothing can weaken its force 
as apprehended by the intellect, but another 
argument opposed to it.' Now all this is un« 



18 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

doubtedly true within the sphere of demon- 
strative reasoning. There the evidence is of 
such a nature, as to sway aUke all minds which 
contemplate it, whether rude or refined, wheth- 
er vicious or virtuous. There, pride and prej- 
udice, and passion and selfishness, are of no 
avail. But within the sphere of moral rea- 
soning, these elements work wonders, in giving 
to opinions their colour and complexion. Sup- 
pose for instance, that you would fain persuade 
a man who is making a fortune by the traffic 
in ardent spirit, to abandon his pursuit, and 
take a decided stand under the banner of the 
Temperance Reform. You present before 
him, perhaps, a cloud of witnesses composed 
of the most reputable physicians in the world, 
all attesting that alcohol is a poison, and that 
any quantity taken by a man in health, does 
him injury rather than good ; you prove from 
official documents, that it is the cause of three 
fourths of the pauperism and crime that exist 
in the land, that it is the most powerful of all 
temptations in leading youth astray from the 
path of virtue, that it is the great bane of do- 
mestic happinctss ; and you urge him by all 
that is endearing in his relation to his family, 
to his country, and to society around him, by 
all that is affecting in the tears and groans and 
woes of the more than widowed mother weep- 
ing over her helpless children, of the fond sis- 
ter lamenting the ruin of a once lovely brother, 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 19 

and of the yet youthful wife mourning over 
the wreck of her most sacred hopes, you urge 
him by all that is ennobling in philanthropy, 
and all that is imperious in moral obligation, 
to forsake at once and forever, a business so 
fraught with death and destruction. The ar- 
gument is to you most convincing ; and so it 
seems to every unbiassed mind. Yes, to such 
it is not merely convincing ; it sheds a blaze 
of light, intense and overpowering. But this 
man perchance will calmly reply, that he is 
not convinced ; that you have a right to your 
opinion ; but for his own part, he believes 
that ^ a little will do a man good,' that he 
means to use it moderately himself as long as 
he lives, and to manufacture it as a proper ar- 
ticle of trade. Now why is not this man con- 
vinced ? Is there any want of light, any defect 
of evidence ? Must a new array of arguments 
be brought forward to sustain your position ? 
No. Change now, the man's circumstances. 
Suppose that instead of acquiring wealth by 
the traffic in alcohol, he were sure of making 
a fortune by an alliance with the cause of 
Temperance. Then the first argument you 
presented would be sufficient to convince him. 
Then, not only would his opinion accord with 
yours, but he would probably express his won- 
der that any man of sane mind and common 
humanity could come to a different conclusion. 
From the very nature of mor^l reasonings 



20 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

therefore, it is well adapted to man's present 
condition as a state of probation. It does fur- 
nish a test of character. The light which 
irradiates the path of duty, may seem to the 
man of honest heart as clear as that of the 
unclouded sun, while to the man of another 
spirit, it may appear as dim and feeble as ' the 
pale moon-beam's sickly ray.' * 

The modes of moral reasoning are three ; 
analogy, induction, deduction. 

I. Analogy. By this is meant a similitude 
in the relations of things. It supposes a har- 
monious uniformity in the laws of nature, which 
w^e are all. led to admit, not so much from 
deliberately weighing the results of past expe- 
rience, as from the dictates of our mental con- 
stitution. We all believe that the sun will 
rise to-morrow, not so much from estimating 
the worth of our experience on the subject, 
or the testimony of history that it always 
was so, as from the natural tendency of our 
minds to confide in the constancy of nature. 
We are conscious of just such a tendency to 
trust in reasoning from analogy, which supposes 
that any general principle which pervades one 
part of the natural or moral universe, which 

* The cause of the difficulty lies not in the thincrs, 
but in ourselves. For as the e3'es of bats to day-light, 
so is the human mind to objects which are in their own 
liature the clearest of all.— »^r«>^ Metaph. lib, 2, cap 1. 



INTRODtrcTORY ESSAY. 21 

falls within the sphere of our observation, per- 
vades also those parts which are beyond that 
sphere, where the circumstances are similar. 
Thus, as we look over the earth, we perceive 
a most wise and beneficent adaptation of the 
laws of nature to promote the happiness of 
animated beings hke ourselves. Then, as we 
look up to the heavens, and contemplate the 
planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and 
Saturn, we are struck with the view of just 
such an adaptation there. Like the earth, 
they revolve around the sun, and receive their 
light from him ; like the earth, several of them 
are known to turn around their axis, and 
thence have the alternations of day and night ; 
hke the earth, they receive lunar light in the 
absence of the solar, and all are subject to the 
same law of gravitation. Thence to a mind 
conversant with the laws of the universe, the 
inference is natural and almost resistless, that 
they are the abodes of rational beings. 

We reason analogically, from the natural to 
the moral world thus. When we see that the 
Author of the universe acts upon a general 
principle in the natural world, we take it for 
granted that he acts upon the same principle 
in the moral world, wliere the nature of the 
case will admit its application. For instance, 
w^e see in the natural world, an adaptation of 
means to ends, and an inseparable connexion 
established between them, so that if a man 



S2 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

would gain any physical blessing, such a^ 
health, strength or wealth, he must use the 
appointed means; exercise and temperance, 
industry and economy. So in the intellectual 
and moral world, if a man would advance in 
knowledge and virtue, and enjoy peace of 
mind, he must use the appropriate means ; 
decision of purpose, persevering effort, self* 
denial, the disciphne of the passions, and obe* 
dience to the dictates of conscience. 

So fitted is the human mind to be swayed 
by analogical reasoning, that often it will be 
effectual, where every other kind of argument 
will fail. Especially, is this the case, among 
the less informed classes of society. Suppose 
that in travelling through some of the ruder 
parts of our country, you should find an honest 
yeoman, prejudiced against the education of 
children ; saying that they would become bet- 
ter men and citizens, if they v/ere permitted 
to grow up under the simple tuition of nature 
and common sense, than they would if their 
characters were moulded by any of your artifi- 
cial systems of education now in vogue : if 
you should endeavour to convince him of his 
error by explaining the nature of education, 
and the various benefits which it is thence 
adapted to impart, you would probably not 
succeed. But if you should point him to his 
corn-field, his orchard, or his garden, and ask 
him whether he could derive any fruit from 



INTRODtfCTORY ESSAY. 23 

them without cultivation, whether, if left to 
itself, the soil would not be overrun with weeds 
and briars, he w^ould doubtless give you a cor- 
rect answer. Then reply, if such be the law 
of nature, is it possible that the human mind 
can yield its riches, and present to view such 
a scene of beauty and order as it is capable of 
exhibiting without cultivation and without care ? 
And he would probably acknowledge by 
words or by silence, the force of your appeal. 

Hence, we can easily perceive, how well 
adapted were the instructions of onr Saviour 
to the wants of the common people. For 
these, he felt a special care. These ' heard him 
gladly.' To these he chiefly addressed him- 
self, not merely in apothegms and precepts, 
but also in parables, which were marked by 
the most beautiful simplicity, and which de- 
rived much of their force from the analogy 
between the material and the spiritual world. 

The object of analogical reasoning is two- 
fold ; 1st. to lead the way in the discovery of 
new truths ; 2d. to establish those already 
known. 

The principle on which it leads to the dis- 
covery of truth we have already stated ; name- 
ly, that the Author of the universe governs it 
by general laws, so that if we discover a law 
which governs one part of the universe, we 
may suppose it to exist every where in like 
circumstances. Analogy thus becomes the 



24 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, 

pioneer of science. We see this illustrated in 
the train of thought, which led the mind of Sir 
Isaac Newton to one of the grandest results it 
ever reached. * As he sat alone in his garden, 
he fell into a speculation on the power of 
gravity ; that as this power sensibly diminish- 
ed, at the remotest distances from the centre 
of the earth, to w^hich we can rise, it appeared 
to him that this power must extend much fur- 
ther than is usually thought. Why not as 
high as the moon, said he to himself: and if 
so, her motion must be influenced by it ; per- 
haps she is retained in her orbit thereby ; and 
if the moon be retained in her orbit by the 
force of gravity, no doubt the primary planets 
are carried round the sun by the like power.'* 
Thus was he enabled, by the aid of a far- 
reaching analogy, to strike out a brilliant path 
of discovery, and to give to the world an in- 
terpretation of nature's laws so lucid and so 
wonderful, that it seemed almost like a revela- 
tion from heaven. 

Not only is analogical reasoning, a guide to 
the discovery of physical, but also of moral 
truths. This it was which led Socrates and 
his disciples to confide so strongly in the doc- 
trine of the immortality of the soul. They 
saw that every object in the world around them 

* Dr. Pemberton's preface to the acconnt of Sir Isaac 
Newton's discoveries ; as quoted in Dr. Wayland's 
discourse on the Philosophy of Analogy. 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 35 

was made perfect in its nature ; every blade 
of grass, 

* And herb and flower, 
With numerous beasts of every kind, and fowl 
Of every wing, and every tuneful note, 
And all the fish that in the multitude 
Of waters swam,' 

the whole animate creation seemed to have 
upon it the impress of perfection, and to attain 
in its present state of existence the end for 
which it had been formed. But man, endowed 
with far nobler powers than any of God's crea- 
tures on the earth, capable of boundless progres- 
sion in knowledge and moral excellence, during 
his present state of being just begins to expand. 
His soul develops itself just enough to give 
some faint idea of its vast capacities, and then 
it is summoned away from this theatre of ac- 
tion. It does not come nigh the high and 
glorious end, for which from its nature it seems 
to have been designed. Now it would be 
against all analogy to suppose that the Creator 
hath made man so much in vain as he must 
have done if there be no future state, where 
the faculties of the human spirit can be devel-^ 
oped to their full extent. ' Made in the divine 
image, man must be immortal, or else, the 
noblest of all the Creator's works must be more 
imperfectly formed than the meanest reptile ; 
an incredible anomaly in a universe which is 
all order and regularity,' 

In analogical reasoning, great caution must 
3 



^6 INTRODUCTORir ESSAY* 

be cherished, lest we should unwarily take it 
for granted, that an analogy exists where there 
is none, or that a principle w^hich we have 
found to exist in one case, extends to other 
caseSj where the circumstances are not really 
similar. A mistake here has given rise to 
many capital errors. Tt may not seem at the 
first glance to be prolific in great evils, but so 
indeed it is. Take an illustration from physi- 
ology. The ancient anatomists, under the 
influence of ignorance or superstition, were 
not accustomed to dissect human bodies, but 
confined their investigations to those animals j 
which appeared, in their structure, most nearly 
to resemble man. They sought to establish 
important principles, by reasoning analogically 
from the latter to the former. But the cases 
were not similar ; and thence they were led 
into the most egregious errors. 
. Take an illustration from metaphysics. When 
a man is engaged in dehberating on any course 
of conduct, or on any important question, consid- 
ering all the facts and truths which may guide 
him to a right decision, it is common to say 
of him, that he is weighing arguments, weigh- 
ing motives or results. We have already used 
this expression incidentally in the course of 
this essay. This phrase arises from the re- 
semblance which there is, between a man's 
mind while in such a state of suspense, and a 
pair of balances, in which the weights^ placed 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 27 

alternately in the opposite scales, counterpoise 
each other, till at last, an accumulation on one 
side, turns the beam decisively. Now here, 
the image is vivid. The analogy is clear in 
regard to two points ; namely, suspense, and 
subsequent determination. Yet such is the 
difference between the natures of matter and 
spirit, that we cannot reason at all from the 
one to the other, respecting the mode of its 
operation. The ancient schoolmen, however, 
unmindful of this difference, asserted that when 
a mind is addressed by opposing motives of 
equal strength, it cannot possibly be determin- 
ed ; and even, that if a hungry ass were placed 
between two bundles of hay equally inviting, 
he would stand still and starve to death ! 

Take an illustration from politics. The 
leading champion of Nullification in South 
Carolina, in one of his publications on that 
subject, relies chiefly on an argument drawn 
from the analogy between the government of 
the United States, and the agency of a com- 
mercial firm. The General Government he 
regards as the authorized agent of the twenty- 
four Sovereign States, which constitute the 
political firm of the Union. Now he supposes, 
that as in private business, a principal may 
overrule his agent, and in case he transgress 
his instructions, may nullify his acts, so in case 
the General Government of the United States 
should transgress its instructions contained in 



28 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

the Constitution, a principal has the right to 
nuUify its acts, and disavow responsibihty. 

Now here, an analogy is imagined to exist, 
where there is none. For, in the first place, 
it is not true, that in private business, a prin- 
cipal may make null and void the doings of 
his agent, unless he can prove against him an 
intentional fraud. If the principal had failed 
to select an agent, properly qualified for his 
duty, or if he had not made his instructions 
plain, he alone, must bear the consequences 
of such a failure. And in the second place, 
even if this were true, yet in case of a joint 
concern, each principal has the same right ; 
and if one of the number be dissatisfied with 
the proceedings of the agent, instead of imper- 
iling the character of the firm, by publicly 
disavow^ing responsibility, or attempting to en- 
force his own construction of the agent's pow- 
ers, it is his duty, to present the subject to the 
attention of his fellow-principals, and be guided 
by the united expressions of their will. A 
principle such as the argument for nullification 
involves, if introduced into private affairs, would 
prostrate order and destroy confidence through- 
out the commercial world ; nor would its adop- 
tion in pohtics be fraught with less disaster. 

Take another illustration from theology. 
The inspired writers, in order to denote the 
moral insensibihty which characterizes men as 
sinners, speak of them as involved in a state 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. ^ 29 

of spiritual death, ^ dead in trespasses and sins.' 
The phrase takes its rise, from the single point 
of resemblance, between a sinful man, and 
one that is physically dead, namely, insensibil- 
ity. Thus we say of a cruel man, that he is 
dead to all the appeals of humanity ; or of the 
miser, that he is dead to every emotion of pity. 
Many, however, overlooking this one point of 
analogy between the two cases, have reasoned 
thus : A dead man can do nothing ; it is 
useless therefore to speak to him of obli- 
gation, for he is not a proper subject of it. 
So it is in vain that you speak to a sinner of 
his duty to repent, for he cannot perform it ; 
that you address to him God's commands, for 
he has no power to obey them ! 

There is an analogical sophism now in vogue 
in some parts of our country, which has accom- 
plished its author's purpose, with multitudes of 
minds. He first broached it, to show that faith 
in the gospel, however much it may affect a 
man's character, yet alters not his state in the 
sight of God. It is in substance as follows : I 
was born a subject of the king of Great Britain. 
While in my native country, 1 heard credible 
testimony respecting the government of the 
United States, the privileges and immunities of 
its citizens. I cordially believed it ; but what 
good did my faith do for me ? Did it change my 
state ? Did it make me a citizen of this repub- 
lic ? No, But I crossed the Atlantic, eind com- 



30 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

ing to this land was told to go to yonder court- 
house, and take the oath of allegiance to the 
government of this nation. I did so ; and then 
was my condition altered ; then, from having 
been an ahen, I became a citizen. So when 
a subject of Satan's empire hears the scripture 
testimony, respecting the kingdom of Christ, 
what though he beheve it with his heart? 
Can his faith change his condition, or his re- 
lation to Christ ? No. But let him at once 
come forth, and in the appointed rite of bap- 
tism, let him avow his allegiance to the King 
of Zion ; then, and not till then, from having 
been an alien, does he become a fellow citizen 
of the saints and of the household of God. 

To some, this argument may seem plausible, 
but throughout the whole of it, the pecuHarity 
of Christ's kingdom as internal and spiritual is 
entirely overlooked ; and thence it is plainly 
denied, that an internal and spiritual exercise 
can constitute a man a subject of it ; thence the 
necessity of an overt act in order to the change 
of a man's condition is earnestly defended. 

We have been rather copious in our illus- 
trations of this principle of erroneous reasoning 
from analogy, because its practical develop^ 
ments are so numerous and so deplorable. 
Most of the errors which men defend by an 
appeal to the Bible, derive all their plausibility 
from the abuse of figurative expressions ; and 
th^t abuse wses from the want of a clear per-- 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 31 

ception of the precise points of analogy which 
render tropes appropriate. 

We have mentioned that one important use 
to be made of analogy is, to aid us in defending 
the truths we believe, against the assaults of 
error. This it accomplishes chiefly, by wrest- 
ing the weapons of our opponents from their 
hands. It goes to show, that the same objec- 
tions, which are urged against the truth which 
we seek to establish, may be urged with equal 
force against other truths which are by all 
acknowledged. This argument the immortal 
Butler has wielded with signal skill. The 
spirit of his reasoning may be thus exhibited. 
Suppose you were arguing with an infidel, 
who was rejecting the doctrine of the resurrec- 
tion of the dead ; saying that all natural ap- 
pearances were against it ; that it was impos- 
sible, after the human frame had crumbled into 
dust, and its particles had been scattered to 
the four winds of heaven, that these should be 
restored to their primitive place, and the whole 
appear in a new form of beauty and of loveli- 
ness. Pointing to the chrysalis of a moth, a 
silk-worm or a dragon-fly, you might say, 
behold that inert mass I What sign of hfe is 
there ? Who would suppose that within that 
little coffin lies entombed a creature, yet to 
come forth, fitted to mount aloft in air, and 
delight the eye by the splendor of its hues, 
and the grace of its movements ? Yet thus it 



32 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

is ; and if nature displays such wondrous trans- 
formations, ' why should it be thought a thing 
incredible that God should raise the dead ?' 
that from the ruins of this frail body, another 
should spring forth, in heavenly beauty, and 
immortal youth ? 

Butler's work on the analogy between nat- 
ural and revealed religion, is one of the richest 
offerings which human genius has ever placed 
upon the altar of Christianity. It should be 
studied for the sake of acquiring his style of 
reasoning. It will often present itself as an 
effectual guard against the wiles of error, over- 
throwing many a frowning argument, and de- 
veloping the fallacy of many a sophism. 

II. The second mode of reasoning which 
we mentioned is induction, by which we 
mean, the inferring of general principles from 
particular facts. Our confidence in this, arises 
from the constitutional tendency of our minds 
to trust in the uniformity of nature's laws. 
Thus, if I perceive in several instances, that 
the loadstone attracts steel filings, I infer that 
magnetic attraction is a general law. If I per- 
ceive that in passing a certain place where a 
friend once resided, his image is always recalled 
to my mind, I infer that contiguity in place, is 
one of the laws of mental association. This is 
a way of arriving at general truths so very 
natural, that we can readily imagine, that a 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 33 

man of common sense would say, on first hear- 
ing it, ' why this formal announcement of a 
thing so obvious ?' General truths must of 
course be learned by the examination of par- 
ticulars ; in w^hat other w^ay can they be as- 
certained ? Yet it was not in this way that 
the world was formerly accustomed to philos- 
ophize. They delighted to seize the general 
principle first ; to form their theory and to find 
their facts afterwards ; and then would gener- 
ally mould them to suit their purpose. Thus 
error became exalted in the schools of philos- 
ophy and religion, honoured with the sanction 
of great names, and adorned with all the dig- 
nity with which learning and genius could 
invest it. It is only within comparatively a 
recent period, that the claims of the inductive 
system have been acknowledged. Lord Ba- 
con, who arose in the fifteenth century, has 
the honour of being called its father* At six- 
teen years of age, he became dissatisfied with 
the reigning philosophy, and then commenced 
the workings of his pav/erful mind to devise 
some better way. The great principle which 
he struck out and defended in his immortal 
work, called the New Method, was one which 
a child might comprehend, but one which the 
world had not thought much of before ; which 
was, instead of seizing the general principle 
first, and then reasoning from it, to admit 
nothing as a general truth except from the 
4 



34 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

careful induction of particulars ; and thus in 
the study of facts to lay the foundation of a 
philosophy, which should stand by its own 
strength, and mock all controversy. 

Such was the authority of Aristotle in the 
schools, that the new method made its way in 
the world with great difficulty, until at last 
the achievements of the Newtonian philosophy 
exhibited the grandeur of the principle, in a 
blaze of light, to an admiring world. 

But though the name and the system of 
Bacon are in the present age highly lauded, 
yet the spirit of his school has not been suffi- 
ciently cherished. Men are still too easily led 
astray by novelty, or awed by authority, or 
fascinated with the glare of paradox. There 
is too much of vain speculation in natural and 
moral science. To this, some men of exalted 
genius are constitutionally prone. They have 
active reasoning powers, and brilliant imagina- 
tions ; but lacking judgment, patience and 
industry, they choose rather to ' compass them- 
selves about with sparks of their own kindhng,' 
than to be guided by the steady, sober light 
of truth. In such a man, as says the author 
of the Natural History of Enthusiasm respect- 
ing the heretic by temperament, 'There is 
more of intellectual mobility than of strength : 
a ready perception of analogies gives him both 
facility and felicity in collecting proofs, or rath- 
er illustrations, of whatever opinion he adopts. 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 35 

So copious are the materials of conjectural ar- 
guments which crowd upon him, and so nice 
is his tact of selection, and so quick his skill of 
arrangement, that ere dull sobriety has gath- 
ered up his weapons, he has reared a most 
imposing front of defence. Pleased and even 
surprised with his own work, he now confi- 
dently maintains a position, which at first he 
scarcely thought to be seriously defensible. 
Having convinced himself of the certainty of 
the new truth, and implicated his vanity in its 
support, deeper motives stimulate the activity 
of the reasoning and inventive faculties, and 
iie presently piles demonstration upon demon- 
stration to such an amazing height, until it 
becomes in his honest opinion sheer infatuation 
to doubt. Then modesty, caution, hesitation, 
seem treasons against conscience and heaven.' 
In inductive reasoning, great caution is nec- 
essary, lest a general truth be inferred from 
too small a number of facts. The two great 
parties in geology furnish an illustration of this. 
One class, contemplating the formation of 
primitive rocks, and other phenomena which 
the crust of the earth presents, declare that 
the interior of it, is all water. Cordier, how- 
ever, penetrating into mines, and the deepest 
recesses, finds that heat increases in the ratio 
of one degree for every forty-six feet ; thence 
infers that at the depth of sixty miles, rocks 
must be melted ; and then, as he looks over 



36 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY* 

the surface of the globe, and observes two 
hundred volcanoes spouting forth burning lava, 
feels confident that the interior of the earth is 
all fire. The learned world, moreover, have 
not yet forgotten Capt. Symmes' lucid ar- 
gument to prove that the interior of the globe 
is perfectly hollow. Now if one of these the- 
ories be true, the others must be false, and 
each can present a splendid array of facts in 
its defence. A prudent man, therefore, will 
hesitate to give his full assent to either, until 
he sees that a sufficient number of facts have 
been compared, to furnish strong ground to 
rest upon. 

Phrenology has but of late attracted the 
world^s attention. If its truth shall ever be 
fully established, it must be by an extensive 
and rigid induction. A few individuals have 
already placed the science upon an eminence, 
where it receives general respect ; but as yet 
too few have been engaged in pursuing the 
inductive process, to bring forth such results, 
as shall command the entire and universal 
assent of unbiassed minds. 

Our practical judgments of men and things, 
if of any considerable worth, must be founded 
upon induction. Yet every careful observer 
of the ways of the world, has doubtless been 
struck with the rashness with which men form 
their general opinions ; their estimations of 
each other, of states and of nations. Enghsh 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 37 

travellers, who have visited our country, seem 
often to have reasoned a priori^ rather than 
from observation ; that is, to have judged be- 
forehand from our circumstances what kind of 
a people we must be, and then to have declared 
that we are just such a people. One perhaps 
has imbibed in his youth the old sentiment, 
that ' a cold climate makes cold hearts ;' and 
then, on visiting New England, has written in 
his journal, ^ the New Englanders are a cold- 
hearted people,' all facts to the contrary not- 
withstanding. And how prone are we our- 
selves to judge of the character of a nation, 
which has poured forth among us a vast amount 
of the dregs of her populace, by the specimens 
which she has been forced to send us. How 
common a sentiment is it among Americans, 
that the Irish are base and degraded beings, 
while in truth, there walks not upon the earth 
a race of men, who have nobler stamina of 
character than the native Irishman. 

The application of the inductive system to 
the study of theology, is of all things else, in 
this age of religious controversy, ' most de- 
voutly to be wished.' The great question 
which every man must settle at the outset is, 
Has the Bible a divine origin ? He who ex- 
amines this question with right feelings, will 
doubtless see upon the book the impress of 
God's signature. Then let him ^search the 
scriptures' with the most perfect docihty. Let 



38 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 

him sit at Jehovah's feet and learn of Him. 
Let him study the great facts of revelation, 
and when he has classified them, he will have a 
system of theology, and all the system that any 
man needs. But let him receive his opinions 
first, and construct them, as he may think, into 
a scheme of perfect symmetry, and then come 
to the Bible to seek evidence in its support, 
and probably he will find as much as he de- 
sires ; he may strengthen and adorn it in every 
part, by detached passages which he calls * the 
true sayings of God ;' and yet after all, he may 
find out at last, that though he had had much 
light, yet it was not that which ^ cometh from 
above ;' that though he were wise indeed, 
yet that he had been ' wise above that which 
was written ;' and that the glow of beauty 
which his system possessed, was that which 
his own imagination had thrown around it, and 
not that imparted by the inspiration of the 
Spirit, 

III. We have now only to glance at the 
third mode of reasoning which has been men- 
tioned, which is, DEDUCTION. By this we 
mean the deriving of a particular truth from a 
general principle. This general principle may 
be one which our constitution compels us to 
take for granted, which we perceive by intui- 
tion, or as a simple dictate of conscience, or it 
may be one which we have reached by a pre- 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 39 

vious induction. But in whatever way we 
obtain the general truth, when we have got it, 
we are then prepared for the use of the syl- 
logism. Aristotle defined several forms of 
syllogisms, but they all range under this one 
great principle ; ^ Whatever may be affirmed 
or denied universally of any idea, may be 
affirmed or denied universally of any number 
of particulars, comprehended under that idea,' 
For instance : ^ We hold this truth to be self- 
evident ; all men are born free and equal f 
Africans are men : therefore Africans are born 
free and equal. Arguments which rest upon 
general principles, may be easily reduced to a 
syllogistic form. 

Time was, when the syllogism was deemed 
the chief instrument to be used in the discovery 
of trutTi, That time has passed away. It 
was an age of darkness and of doubt, and yet 
of keen scholastic disputation. The syllogism 
is now regarded only as a convenient mode of 
stating truth, after it has been discovered. We 
may well rejoice, that intellectual and moral 
science are now established upon a firmer basis 
than they then possessed. Only let us live 
worthy of our high advantages. Let us divest 
our minds of ^every evil prejudicag. And as 
the compass of the mariner, in the dark and 
dreary night, when the winds howl and the 
ocean roars around him, directs his eye to the 
pole-star^ and guides him safely on his course^ 



40 INTRODUCTORY ESS AT. 

SO shall the love of truth for the truth's own. 
sake, guide us securely amidst all the strife of 
parties and the clashing of opinion. 

The application of the principles of moral 
reasoning to the evidences of Christianity, is 
one of the noblest uses to which the science 
can be turned. No question can be more mo~ 
mentous than this, Is the Gospel of Christ a 
revelation from God ? On such a subject^ 
doubt must be painful ; and in order to reach 
a correct decision, it is necessary that the in- 
quiring mind should, clearly, see what kind of 
evidence it is, which the case admits. An. 
error on this point may be fatal. No one 
should expect mathematical demonstration^ 
The argument is evidently ^cumulative ;' and 
when calmly surveyed in all its length and 
breadth and depth and height, will indeed 
appear to be a well-based and lofty structure,, 
radiant in every pai"t with the impress of God. 
The w^ork which is now before the reader, is 
not designed to present this. evidence in all its 
extent, but rather to suggest hints respecting 
the manner in which the subject should be 
studied ; to bring to view important principles 
which should be w^ell remembered,, and faith- 
fully applied. These principles are such as 
commend themselves to the common sense of 
the worlds and such as every wise man would 
act upon in the common affairs of life. Their 



INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 4| 

simplicity enstamps them with the greater 
value, and yet, on that very account, there is 
danger of their being depreciated. There is 
no subject which we would more earnestly 
commend to the attention of young and inquir- 
ing minds. The study of it will furnish an 
excellent intellectual discipline, and will also 
exert a salutary influence upon the heart. 



AUTHOR^S 



PREFACE. 



To form a habit of reasoning justly, is one of the 
most important objects of education. Much has been 
done to promote this object by writers on logic, and 
on the human understanding. Their writings, how- 
ever, relate principally to reasoning on subjects of 
pure science, and abstract truths, or the necessary 
relations of ideas. Little, comparatively, has been 
written, to teach us how to reason on practical sub- 
jects ; but that little is highly valuable. Mr. Locke, 
in his Essay on the Human Understanding, has treat- 
ed briefly on Probability ; and the author of the Port 
Royal Art of Thinking, has, at the latter end of his 
work, introduced two or three chapters on the appli- 
cation of reason to the events of human life. Both 
of these writers furnish useful observations on these 
subjects. Dr. Watts, in the second part of his Trea- 
tise on Logic, and his book on the Improvement of 
the Mind, has laid down many important rules to di- 
rect the judgment on practical questions. In the 



44 AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 

Encyclopaedia Brittannica, also, under the head of 
metaphysics, there are some just remarks on the 
theory of observation, and testimony. And Dr. 
Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, has ex- 
plained at considerable length, the theory of moral 
evidence. 

Were young men willing to take the pains of col- 
lecting from these, and other authors, all that they 
could meet with on the subject of moral evidence, 
they might form, for themselves, a system sufficient 
to answer every desirable purpose. But this is 
scarcely to be expected. For, in the course of edu- 
cation, the principal use of reason is in subjects 
purely scientific. It is not, therefore, surprising 
that students should bestow their chief attention 
upon that use of it, and neglect, to a great degree, 
all those principles and rules of argumentation, which 
they have then no occasion to apply. Hence, it 
may naturally be expected, that, however well qual- 
ified they may be to argue on scientific subjects, 
they should be incapable of reasoning justly on hu- 
man events. When their education is finished, it is 
scarcely to be supposed, that they would recur to 
those books, which they had formerly studied, to 
collect from them such information as they had hith- 
erto neglected ; but which they would now find of 
the greatest use in the conduct of life. Probably, 
very few men take this trouble ; and this is one 
cause, why so few reason correctly on questions 
which admit of no higher evidence than probability. 

It is, however, obvious, that that use of reason, 
which teaches us how to regulate our judgments. 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 45 

expectations, and conduct, must be much more im- 
portant, than that, which relates only to science. Of 
course, it ought to be studied with greater attention. 
But, this it never will be, unless it be studied pro- 
fessedly, as a separate system. 

It may be thought, perhaps, that a man, who has 
formed a habit of reasoning justly on scientific sub- 
jects, will be capable of applying that habit to mat- 
ters of probability, without studying any system of 
moral evidence. That the study and practice of 
demonstrative reasoning will be found of great use 
towards acquiring skill in moral evidence, is true. 
It is not meant, therefore, to discourage an applica- 
tion either to logic or to mathematics. On the con- 
trary, an application to both, is strongly recommen- 
ded, as the best possible means of acquiring an 
ability of thinking closely and correctly, and of rea- 
soning conclusively. But, then, it is true also, that 
this study will rarely be found sufficient to enable 
a man to reason justly on probable subjects ; both 
because the principles in demonstrative and moral 
reasoning differ much ; and, because the mind that 
has been accustomed to yield its assent to demon- 
stration only, generally finds great difficulty in being 
satisfied with a lower species of evidence. Hence 
arises that tendency to scepticism, which has been 
imputed to the study of mathematics. And, hence 
it is, that the transition, even from pure to mixed 
mathematics, is often attended with a want of that 
satisfaction, which had hitherto been enjoyed. Both 
these are occasioned by not considering, that differ- 
ent subjects admit of different kinds of evidence ; 



46 AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 

and by the mind's not being accustomed to yield its 
assent to that kind of evidence, of which the subject 
admits. 

He who has not attained the knowledge, and ac- 
customed himself to the use of correct and fixed 
principles of decision, on the weight of evidence for 
matters of fact, must engage in the investigation of 
many important questions, such, for instance, as the 
truth of Christianity, with great disadvantage. The 
principles, on which he will be required to decide, 
being new to him, will probably appear to have been 
framed merely for the occasion, and will therefore 
be suspicious. But had he pursued this study with 
due attention, these principles would be familiar to 
him: he would have been accustomed to apply them 
to various subjects, and to see that they lead to cor- 
rect conclusions. To him, therefore, they would af- 
ford both a safe and satisfactory ground of decision 
on the question proposed. 

This study will, also, be a means of preservation 
from many errors in the. ordinary occurrences of life. 
Few practical questions call for our decision, on 
which we are not previously interested on the one 
side, or the other. The having to search for our 
principles of judgment, while under the influence of 
interest, must be an inlet to delusion, in addition to 
the danger of misapplying them. But, if we have 
been accustomed to the use of certain fixed princi- 
ples of evidence, they will naturally present them- 
selves to our minds, when occasions for their appli- 
cation arise ; nor shall we be able to decide incon- 
sistently with them, without being conscious of do- 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE, 47 

ing wrong". It would, therefore, be useful to acquire 
a knowledge of the principles of moral evidence, aa 
well as of those of demonstration ; and, perhaps, to 
pursue the study of these different kinds of evidence 
at the same time. 

The Author's motive for engaging in the discus- 
sion of this subject, was, his having observed per- 
sons of ability and education delude themselves as 
to the truth of facts, of importance to their moral 
conduct, by applying to them principles of reason- 
ing, unsuited to the nature of the case. With the 
principles of demonstrative reasoning, they were 
well acquainted ; but of those of moral evidence they 
had not a sufficiently clear and settled knowledge, 
to put them on their guard against the delusions of 
inclination or interest in themselves, or the sophistry 
of others. Hence, even their knowledge of morality, 
and the general rectitude of their intentions, became 
of little avail to direct their conduct ; for, an error in 
the fact, is as fatal to virtue, as an error in the prin- 
ciples of morality. 

As there is no book written, professedly, on this 
subject, (at least as far as the author of this work 
can learn,) these hints are offered ; but not as new 
thoughts. For, in the present advanced state of 
science, little that is new, can be expected on a sub- 
ject of this nature. Nor are they proposed, as com- 
prising a complete system, but merely as an intro- 
duction to the study of moral evidence. 

To the learned reader, if any such should honour 
this work with a perusal, an apology may be neces- 
sary for the discussion of subjects, which may appear 



48 AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 

too obvious to need explanation or proof. But, it 
should be observed, that this work is intended for 
the use of those who are only beginners in the sci- 
ence of moral reasoning ; and that, for their informa- 
tion, it was necessary to explain, and prove, even 
such points as would be perfectly obvious to the 
more experienced reasoner. This appeared to be 
the more requisite, because, however obvious those 
points may be, many of them are too frequently ne- 
glected in practice, and that, by persons whose char- 
acter gives great weight to their example. Hence 
it was desirable, that the beginner should be furnish- 
ed with a weight of proof, calculated to counterbal- 
ance such authority. 

To most readers, it will be necessary to apologize 
for the dryness of the book. Something of this must 
be attributed to the nature of its subject ; for a trea- 
tise on the principles of reasoning, can scarcely be- 
otherwise than dry. Yet, some of the blame may, 
perhaps, be due to the author, for not having inter- 
spersed his work with a greater number of quota- 
tions, and interesting anecdotes, to relieve the fa- 
tigue of his reader. He would have done this, had 
it been in his power. But the nature of his situa- 
tion, and his constant engagement in an employ, 
which nearly engrosses his time, precluded his col- 
lecting, either from reading or conversation, such 
quotations or anecdotes, as would suit his purpose. 



PREFACE. 



One of the most important privileges secured to 
Us by the Constitution, is, Trial by Jury. No citizen 
in this country can be charged with an evil and pun- 
ished for it, until the charge shall have been substan- 
tiated according to established rules of evidence. 
But it is the jury who are to determine when an al- 
leged fact is proved ; and, of course, they and not 
the counsel only, ought to be familiar with the rules 
of evidence. And yet, how small a portion of those 
who may be called, in the jury-box, to decide ques- 
tions involving the lives and property of their fellow 
citizens have ever received one bourns direct instruc- 
tion on the Science of Evidence ! Our schools have 
their 'Political Class Book,' by which to initiate 
youth into the principles of our National and State 
Governments, and it is well ; our Colleges take am- 
ple care to discipline the minds of our young men in 
the science of demonstration, and in those of Logic 
and Metaphysics ; this also is well : but neither one 
nor the other of these, covers one portion of the field 
of general education which needs to be occupied. 
Neither Politics, nor Mathematics, nor Logic, nor 
5 



50 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

Metaphysics, engage much of the attention, nor form 
any part of the education, of thousands who are lia- 
ble, every day, to be called to decide questions of 
vital interest to their fellow-citizens and the State, 
in the halls of justice. It is truly surprising that it 
has never occurred to those who give a direction to 
public sentiment on the subject of Education, that 
every child who may hereafter stand in a jury-box 
to decide on a question of fact ' according to evi- 
dence,' ought to be instructed in the laws of evi- 
dence ; so that he may know for himself when a fact 
is proven ; and that this instruction ought, in its ele- 
ements, and some of its details, to be imparted even 
in the common school. With a hope that this hith- 
erto neglected, but highly important branch of edu- 
cation may receive a merited degree of attention, 
the following treatise is introduced to the notice of 
the public. To facilitate the application of the prin- 
ciples of Moral Evidence to the thousand subjects 
which are established by testimony, the Editor has 
made choice of one, — The Divine Origin of the 
Christian Religion, — and has shown the applica- 
bility of these principles to that subject. 

The religion of the Bible is not one which forbids 
those to whom it addresses itself, to examine its 
claims ; it does not profess that they are not to be 
ascertained by the ordinary modes of investigating 
truth ; but, on the contrary, it comes to us invested 
with just such evidences of its truth as are seen to 
invest other truths of a similar nature ; i. e. other 
moral truths ; and the principal difference is in the 
degree of the evidence of Revealed Religion. This 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 51 

is incomparably greater than that which establishes 
any other moral truth whatever ; and we are justified 
in expecting that it should be so : for Christianity 
comes to us professing to be not only true^ but di- 
vine ; to be directly from God, and coming with such 
pretensions, it is reasonable that they should be sus- 
tained by a correspondent degree of evidence. 

But we ought always to bear in mind that Chris- 
tianity, in common with all moral truth, does not 
admit of any but moral evidence in its support, and 
consequently, that the greatest possible amount of 
that evidence can only produce, in our minds, a mor- 
al certainty ; we can never, strictly speaking, have a 
demonstration of its truth, because that kind of evi- 
dence which, alone, produces demonstration, (viz. 
mathematical evidence, or the evidence of abstract 
truth,) is not applicable to moral subjects. Christi- 
anity is a religion founded on facts ; if they are true, 
that is true also. The question to be settled is, 
whether the alleged facts are true ; and this is to be 
settled, like all other questions of fact, by evidence. 
The principles, according to which all other ques- 
tions of fact are settled, are applicable to this ; all, 
therefore, that is necessary to qualify a candid inquir- 
er to arrive at the truth on this important subject, is 
to be acquainted with the science of Moral Evidence 
in general, and to apply its principles to the evidence 
in favour of Revealed Religion, in particular. 

The following treatise, as originally written, was 
designed as an ' Introduction to the study of Moral 
Evidence ;' but was merely general in its applica- 
tion : or rather, was without any application at all ; 



52 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

it was a synopsis of the principles of the science. 
But the beauty, and utility, and force, of a principle, 
is never so clearly seen as in its application ; and it 
is the object of this work, as now presented to the 
public, to make such an application of the principles 
of the science of Moral Evidence to the credibility 
of the Christian Religion ; and thus to show that the 
facts on which it rests are as credible as any matter 
of fact whatever, being supported by the same kind 
of evidence ; and more credible than they, as being 
supported by di greater degree of the evidence which 
establishes them, than any other facts can boast. 

When the Editor first entertained the idea of 
presenting this work to the American public, he 
thought of appending to each chapter or section, such 
thoughts of his own as should constitute an applica- 
tion of the principles of the science of Moral Evi- 
dence to this subject ; and thus to graft his own re- 
marks on the original work, yet so distinguished as 
to make it obvious which portions of the volume be- 
longed to the original work, and which were the 
productions of the editor's pen. But the very nu- 
merous portions of the text which need remark, and 
the brevity, which, in many instances, should char- 
acterize the remarks made, presented, to his mind, 
considerable difficulty in the way of carrying his 
purpose into effect. Either some parts, which need- 
ed a few words of notice, must be entirely disre- 
garded, or considerable repetition of matter previ- 
ously discussed, must mark his additions, or the 
whole work must be re-written, and converted into 
a mere application of tlie principles of Moral Evi* 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 53 

dence to the credibility of the Christian Religion. 
The desire to render the work useful forbad the dis- 
regard of any thing whieh might contribute to its 
utility, and therefore prevented the adoption of the 
first course, — the manifest impropriety of needless 
repetitions decided him on the rejection of the sec- 
ond, and it appeared not morally honest to adopt the 
third, inasmuch as, thereby, the author of the original 
work must have been deprived of the reputation, or 
at least a portion of it, which is his due ; and, more- 
over, the reader would not have been put in posses- 
sion of the principles of the whole science, and thus 
the general utility of the work would not have been 
secured. The only course therefore which lay open 
to him was that which he has adopted, viz. to give 
the original work entire, and to make the applica- 
tion of the principles of the science to the subject of 
revealed religion in Notes. These notes make no 
great pretensions to depth, or value, to the Divine, 
or the Student in divinity ; they are designed espe- 
cially for the general reader, the Sabbath School 
Teacher, the member of the Bible Class, and the 
simple, unlettered Christian, who knows little of the 
contests of the polemical arena, but yet desires to 
know how to give an answer Ho them that ask of 
him a reason of the hope that is in him.^ Should 
this end be answered, the Editor will be more than 
satisfied, for the time and labor which the prepara- 
tion of the work has cost him ; and in the hope that 
it may be the means of attaining this object, it is 
committed to the favourable regards of the public, 
and to the benediction of Heaven, 



MORAL, EVIDENCE. 



-i-«e>|<bt^— 



CHAPTER I. 

THE NATURE OP MORAL EVIDENCE I AND WHEREIN 
IT DIFFERS FROM DEMONSTRATION. 

Moral Evidence is that species of proof, 
which is employed on subjects, directly or 
indirectly, connected with moral conduct. 
It is not, however, confined to such subjects ; 
but is extended to all those facts, and events, 
concerning which we do not obtain the evi- 
dence of sense, intuition, or demonstration, 
and to all the general truths, which are de- 
duced from observation. In these it still re- 
tains the name of moral evidence, a denom- 
ination which it seems to have derived from 
its being employed on subjects connected 
with moral conduct ; because they form the 
most important class of subjects, to which it 
is applicable. 



S6 NATUilE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 

It differs from demonstration in severs! 
particulars. 

1. They differ as to their subjects. De-' 
monstration is employed about abstract truths^ 
and the necessary relations of ideas. The 
subjects of moral evidence are matters of 
fact, and the connexions, whether constant or 
variable, which subsist among things which 
actually exist. 

2. They differ as to the method in which 
they are conducted. In demonstration, we 
proceed from known truths, to those which 
are unknown, by steps, each of which is nec- 
essarily connected with that which precedes 
it. In a moral proof, there is no such neces- 
sary connexion between its parts. It generally 
consists of arguments, v/hich are wholly un- 
connected with each other } and where there 
exists a connexion between the arguments, 
that connexion is not a necessary, but only a 
probable one. Or, to express this differently, 
a demonstrative proof consists of one series, 
each part of w^hich is dependent on that 
which precedes it } but a moral proof gener- 
ally consists of a number of independent ar- 
guments. 

3. In demonstration, it is not necessary to 
consider more than one side of a question ; 
for, if by a demonstration justly conducted, 
any proposition is proved to be true, it is of 
no consequence what may be urged against 



NATURE OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 57 

il ; for whatever is offered as proof on the 
opposite side, must be a mere fallacy. But, 
in moral evidence, there are generally, if not 
always, arguments of some weight on both 
sides ; and therefore, before we can decide, 
w^e must examine both sides of the question, 
and give our assent to that on which there 
appears to be the greatest weight of evidence. 

4. Propositions, contradictory to those 
which are established by moral evidence, are 
merely false : but those which are contra- 
dictory to such as may be demonstrated, are 
not only false, but absurd also. Thus the 
assertion, that there is no such city as Pekin, 
though false, is yet not absurd, for there was 
a time when it was true. But the proposi- 
tion that ' the three angles of a triangle are 
not equal to two right angles,' is not only 
false, but also involves in it an absurdity. 

5. There is a difference also in their force, 
or in the kind of assent which they produce. 
As, in demonstration, there is a necessary 
connexion between each successive step of 
the proof, the ideas compared are perceived 
to agree or disagree. But, in moral evidence, 
their agreement or disagreement is only pre- 
sumed ; aqd that on proofs, which are, in 
their nature, fallible. The one, therefore, 
produces absolute certainty, the other only 
probable judgment, or at most, moral cer- 
tainty. The probability may, indeed, rise SQ 

6 



58 NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE!. 

high, as to exchide all reasonable doubt ; still, 
however, it falls short of absolute certainty. 

6. As moral evidence does not produce 
tertainty, no rules of moral evidence can be 
given, which will direct us how to form an 
infallible judgment in any particular case. 
The utmost that can be accomplished, is to 
give such rules as will in most, though not in 
uU cases, in which they are fairly applied, 
lead to a right conclusion. This is another 
difference between moral evidence and de- 
monstration. For, as demonstration admits 
of certainty, so rules are laid down, which in 
all cases capable of demonstration, will lead 
lo truth. 

7. Demonstration does not admit of de- 
grees ; for certainty is the only assent, w4]ich 
can be produced by it; but moral evidence 
may produce a variety of degrees of assent, 
from suspicion to moral certainty. For here 
the degree of assent depends upon the degree 
in which the evidence on one side prepon- 
derates, or exceeds that on the other. And, 
as this preponderancy may vary almost infi- 
nitely, so likewise may the degrees of assent. 
For a few of these, though but for a few, 
names have been invented. Thus, when the 
evidence on one side preponderates a very 
little, there is ground for suspicion, or con- 
jecture. Presumption, persuasion, belief, 
conclusion, conviction, moral certainty, doubt, 



NATlJ^K OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 59 

wavering, distrust, disbelief, are words which 
imply an increase or decrease of this prepon- 
derancy. Some of these words also admit 
of epithets, which denote a further increase 
or diminution of the assent. 

8. Moral evidence admits of an accumu- 
lation of proofs, and each independent argu- 
ment increases the weight of evidence on the 
whole. Thus the testimonies of concurrent 
witnesses serve to increase the credibility of 
each other ; and the evidence of circumstan- 
ces may confirm that of the witnesses. But 
demonstration admits of no accumulation of 
evidence ; for one just demonstration as ef- 
fectually proves the truth of a proposition as 
many. If recourse be had to another, it is 
only to ascertain that the former includes no 
false step, but has been regularly and cor- 
rectly conducted, and not to supply its de- 
fects ; for if it be defective, it is no proof at 
all, but a mere fallacy. 

9. In demonstration, we may reason safe- 
ly, from a conclusion already established, and 
upon that conclusion establish a second. This 
too, will furnish ground for further reasoning, 
and another conclusion : and thus we may 
proceed to any extent that may be requisite. 
But in moral evidence, we can seldom pro- 
ceed with complete safety, more than one 
step : the second step will be more uncertain 
than the first ; and the third more uncertain 



60 NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 

Still ; and so on. For the first conclusion 
being not universally true, but true only in a 
certain proportion, out of a given number of 
cases, we are in danger of building our sec- 
ond process of reasoning on one of those cases, 
in wti'ch it rnay fail. In our third process, 
we run two risks of assuming a false groimd ; 
and in our fourth process we run three : and 
so on ; w^hence it is evident, that it cannot be 
completely safe to proceed more than one 
step. Or, to place this matter in a different 
light, the first conclusion is not certainly, but 
only probably true. The second will be pro- 
bable, only, on a supposition ; that the first 
should, in the event, prove true : i, e. it is only 
a probability of a probability. And the third 
conclusion will be probable only, on a suppo- 
sition, that both the former should prove true ; 
t. e. it is the probability of a probability of a 
probability. Thus, in the progress, the un- 
certainty of the conclusion is continually in- 
creasing. 

]0. Moral evidence does not compel our 
assent, as demonstration does. If a man dis- 
pute a proposition, which is demonstrated, it 
must be because he does not understand its 
proof. But on subjects, which admit of moral 
evidence only, there will generally be some 
ground to adopt either side of the question. 

Hence it affords an unfair opponent a plau- 
sible reason for dissent, and that in various de- 



NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 61 

grees, according to its different kinds. Thus, 
truths founded on experience, or general no- 
toriety, may always be disputed. It also af- 
fords an opportunity to eloquent men to rep- 
resent truth in the colours of falsehood, or 
falsehood in the colours of truth, so as to de- 
ceive all, who are not extremely careful to 
detect their fallacies. 

11. A further difference consists in the 
language which is used in them. In demon- 
stration, all the terms are accurately defined, 
and are used always in the same sense. But, 
as moral evidence relates to more popular 
subjects, so those subjects are treated of in a 
popular, and not in a philosophical, language. 
The terms are seldom accurately defined, and 
they are not always used in the same sense. 
Figures of speech are introduced, and all those 
rhetorical licenses admitted, which contribute 
more to ornament, than precision. Hence, 
in moral evidence, we can rarely obtain as 
distinct a view, either of the question, or of 
the arguments, by which it is to be proved, 
as in demonstration.*^ 

* From these distinctions between Moral Evidence 
and Demonstration, it is plain that the truth of the 
Christian religion can never be demnnsfraled ; it is, in 
the nature of* things, impossible. But, it is also true, 
that there is no shadow of justice in the assertion, that 
its truth cannot be proved. It becomerS us then to guard 
our expressions, relative to the proofs of the truth of 
our religion ; and, as nearly as possible, to detin© our 



62 NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 

From what has been said, it is manifest that 
moral evidence is vastly inferior to demonstra- 
tion. Hence, perhaps, some persons may con- 
clude, that the study of it will be of little use. 
But, however inferior it may be to demonstra- 
tion, it is not possible to avoid using it con- 
stantly. For it is the only light afforded us to 
form our practical opinions, and regulate our 
conduct. Without attending to it, we can nei- 
ther act, nor cease to act. We cannot even 
subsist without acting upon it; since it cannot 
be demonstrated that our food will not poison, 
instead of nourishing us. Instead, therefore, 
of contemning it on account of its inferiority, 
it becomes us to improve to the utmost, the 
light which it affords, by qualifying ourselves 
to apply it as correctly as possible on every 
occasion. This must be incumbent, not only 
on the student in science, but also on every 
man, whatever be his business or employment. 

Besides it may be observed, that the neces- 
sity of acting on this inferior species of evi- 

terms, and use them according to the definition. Oth- 
ervvise, we shall sometimes expose ourselves to the 
cavils of infidels, for our want of precision ; and, at 
others, by the strength and incorrectness of our express 
sions relative to the proof of its divine origin, shall 
excit:e to reaction the minds of those, who have been 
used to yield only to demonstrative reasoning ; and 
lead them to deny the proof of what is pot dcifiori" 
pirated, — Ei>t 



NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 63 

dence, is suited to the state^ in which we are 
placed : a state, in which all the faculties re- 
ceived from our Creator, are put to the trial. 
Now, the clear light of demonstration, would 
be ill adapted to the trial of our understand- 
ings, on practical questions ; because, it could 
scarcely fail of compelling us to a right judg- 
ment, even in spite of the most perverse in- 
clinations, or the greatest insincerity. But, 
being under the conduct of moral evidence, 

* How admirably adapted to our present state, (one 
of probation) is the kind of evidence by which the 
truth of revealed religion is established. It is not that 
vih'ich forces, but that which induces our assent. Man 
is in the best state for acquiring a knowledge of what 
is truth, when he is cordially disposed to embrace it, 
whatever it may be. A person in this state of mind 
will be at no uncertainty as to the origin of the Chris- 
tian religion, though it is incapable of demonstration; 
for he has ample evidence, and of the proper kind, to 
bring 'him to a satisfactory conclusion on the point. 
Were the truth of revealed religion demonstrated, there 
would be no room for the exercise of faith in the re- 
vealer. We should see and know, not only that it wag 
true, but that it could not he false; we should say to 
God, as the men of Samaria did, to the woman of that 
city, ^ We believe not for thy saying, for we have 
heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the 
Christ, the Saviour of the world.' Man could not be 
a moral agent in receiving a divine revelation, were its 
tritth demonstrated ; but, being proved only by moral 
evidence, he can err, if his heart be averse to the truth, 
though he need not, and will not. If the love of truth 
rule in his heart ; hence the nature of the evidence by 
which the truth of revelation is sustained, affords an 
admirable test of the moral state of those to whom it ii 
proposed. — Ep, 



64 NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 

our sincerity is continually put to the test. 
Hence, if a man wish to make his views of 
duty consist with his inclination, or present 
interests, he can seldom want a pretext for so 
doing. And. the greatest talents, natural or 
acquired, will not secure him against this de- 
lusion ; but, on the contrary, rather promote 
it ; for, they only furnish him with more able 
counsel to deceive himself and others. But, 
if he be sincerely desirous of knowing his du- 
ty, though he possess but ordinary abilities, 
he may generally attain the knowledge of it. 
For, notwithstanding the inferiority of moral 
evidence to demonstration, it is capable of af- 
fording sufficient proof to influence the judg- 
ment, and direct the conduct of any reasona- 
ble and honest man, who is disposed to make 
a fair use of his talents. For, experience 
shows that men err, not so much from the 
want of light, as because they are influenced 
by their passions and interests. 

Two extremes have been fallen into, from 
not duly attending to the difference between 
moral evidence and demonstration. On the 
one hand, probable proof has been called de- 
monstration. When a writer has produced, 
in favour of some important point, a variety of 
reasons, all of the probable kind, yet of great 
cogency, and has shewn, that all the objec- 
tions against it are either fallacious, or but of 
little weight, he often asserts that he has rfe- 



NAtURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 65 

monstrated his position. He may, indeed, 
have so far proved it, as to have excluded all 
reasonable doubt; yet he has, nevertheless, 
not demonstrated it. For, the highest degree 
of probability does not amount to a demon- 
stration ; and nothing can be a demonstration, 
where there is not an intuitive, and necessary 
connexion between every successive step of 
the proof. This practice has, probably, arisen 
from an inclination to magnify evevy thing 
important; and, from a disposition to the use 
of figures of speech. As demonstration is the 
highest species of proof, when we have so 
fully proved any point, as to have excluded 
all reasonable doubt, we say, by the figure 
hyperbole, that we have demonstrated it. 
This, however, is improper ; because things, 
which differ in their nature, ought to be dis- 
tinguished by different names ; and when dif- 
ferent names have been invented for them, it 
is wrong to confound the things by using the 
name of the one for the other. It has, be- 
sides, a tendency to defeat its own end ; for, 
with all, who have been accustomed to a more 
accurate use of words, it is calculated rather 
to weaken, than to strengthen, the force of the 
proof; inasmuch as it excites them to inquire, 
not whether the question has been proved by 
sufficient evidence, but whether there is an 
intuitive and necessary connexion between 
each successive step of that proof: and, as it 



66 NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 

is evident that there is no such connexion, 
doubts are raised in their minds. 

On the other hand, a position, for which 
sufficient probable evidence, is brought, is 
often denied to be proved.. This happens 
most frequently when an opponent demands 
our assent to some point, which seems unfa- 
vourable to our present interests. But, the 
word proof ought not to be confined to de- 
monstration, any more than the name demon- 
stration to be given to every species of proof. 
Lawyers have their proofs, as well as math- 
ematicians. And should a mathematician 
censure a lawyer, who had asserted that to 
be proved, for which sufficient evidence, ac- 
cording to the established rules of law, had 
been adduced, because it had not been de- 
monstrated, he would be considered as absurd. 
Divines, too, have their proofs ; and though 
they do not amount to demonstration, yet, if 
they be sufficient to exclude all reasonable 
doubt, they ought to be admitted to be proofs. 
In truth, wherever there is produced, in fa- 
vour of any proposition, the highest kind of 
evidence of which it admits, and in a sufficient 
degree to outweigh all that can be urged 
against it, it may properly b^ ^W to b^ 
proved^ 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 67 



CHAPTER II. 

ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MORAL EVIDENCE, 
WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE WEIGHT OF EACH. 

In this chapter, it is proposed, to inquire 
into the different kinds of moral evidence ; 
the degree of credit which is usually given to 
each kind ; and the influence which each 
may reasonably have on our judgment. 

The first kind is, observation or experience. 
The observation of a specific fact, or what, 
perhaps may, in strict propriety, be called 
experience, does not belong to this subject, 
but to a higher species of evidence. For, if 
I can recollect that J observed a certain fact, 
I have the evidence of certainty for its having 
existed, and not that of probability. But, 
the observation or experience here intended, 
consists of the general conclusions which 
have been deduced from various subjects of 
the same kind. It is also personal observa- 
tion ; i. e, it consists of the conclusions which 
a man has deduced from his oivn observation."^ 

* It is ratlier inference from observation or experi-e 
ence, than observation or experience itself, which the 
author has in his mind. Thus, the apostles had the 
evidence of experience or personal observation, of the 
reality of the n^irf^cle? of Christ j — this ie evidence of $i 



68 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

The specific facts, which are the subjects 
of our observation, are all of them individuals; 
and taken separately, furnish us with no other 
knowledge, than that of their own existence. 
But, when we compare together the observa- 
tions which we have made, on dilSFerent facts 
of the same kind,* we are enabled to draw 

higher kind than moral evidence, and produces abso- 
lute certainty, as to the facts themselves. But the 
miracles led them to infer the Me.«siahship of him who 
wrought them ; seeing? they were wrou«ihl to confirm 
his claims to that office. But of this inferred truth, 
even the apostles could possess only moral evidence. 
The Messiahship of Jesus was only a moral, jmd not 
an absolute certainty to them ; i.e. that Jesus is the 
Messiah, was their * inference from the observation' 
they had made, or the experience ihey liad hud, of his 
miracles. But we have not the evidence they had, 
even of the reality of the miracles ; it is not an abso- 
lute, but only a moral certainty, to us, that they were 
performed, and of course our belief of tbe Messiahship 
of Christ (so far as it is derived from belief in the real- 
ity of his miracles) is an inference from a moral, and 
not from an absolute certainty, and must of course be 
weaker than that o^ apostles. For as an inference from 
absolute certainty, can produce i nly moral certainty ; 
inference from the latter, must produce a less complete 
conviction than that from the former, unless equals 
taken from unequals should leave the remainders equal, 
which is absurd, — Ed. 

* Thus when the witnesses of our Lord's miracles 
compared his cures with those of Physicians, ihey drew 
the general conclusion that he was divinely commis- 
gioned, or spoke the words of God : and vvlien he open- 
ed his comuiission and declared his character, they fur- 
ther drew the particular conclusion that he was * the 
Christ, the Son of the living God.' — Ed. 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 69 

from them general conclusions, which are 
applicable to particular cases. The nature 
of those conclusions, the way in which they 
are deduced, and the manner of applying 
them to particular cases, varies according to 
the nature of the subjects observed. 

On comparing together different facts of a 
similar kind, they appear to have been some- 
times uniform^ at other times various.^ Thus, 

* It is sometimes objected against tie miracles of 
Christ, th.it he did not always produce effects without 
the use of mocins, and that, therefore, we are not war- 
ranted, in such cases, in ascribing to him the exertion of 
truly miracvhus powers, as in the case of the maq 
whose eyes he anointed with clay, or his, whose ears 
he opened by puttinir his own fingers in them. Also, 
that in some cases his cures were, at first, imperfect, 
as in the case of the man who at first saw men as trees 
walkinflf, and afterwards perceived objects distinctly. 
All such rases, hr)wever, are included in this sentence 
of our author. There was diversity in tlie mode of our 
Lord's procedure, but M"^/(;rm^7y in the rc5M/f^. These 
were ahoays miraculous; and indeed the means he 
employed were such as, in their nature, are utterly in- 
efficacious, or positively preventive of the effect which 
actually followed. Will earth, put into the eyes, restore 
sight t(> the filind .•* Will it not rather produce blindness 
even in those who can sec .^ And what deaf man was 
ever restored to hearing, as a natural consequence of 
thrusting the physician's finger into his ear.'' but espe- 
cially, who ever heard of this operation as a remedy 
for statninerinir, or any other impediment in speech. 
Mark 7 : 32: As, therefore, the effects were uniformly 
miraculous, the inference from the miracles, though per- 
formed ill a variety of modes would be the same ; and 
the evidence of all would be direct, in support of the 
Saviour's Messiahship — Ep. 



^0 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

the common operations of nature, as, the 
ebbing and flowing of the tides, are perceived 
to be uniform. The same uniformity is ob- 
served in the properties of substances ; as 
the ductility and malleability of gold, the 
melting of lead in fire, and its sinking in water. 
But the state of the weather, the direction of 
the wind, the effects of many articles of food 
and medicine, the success of most of the plans 
and operations, in which men engage, are all 
observed to be various. Again, facts of some 
kinds will appear to be either uniform or va- 
rious, according as our observation of them 
is more or less extensive. Thus, the moon, 
if observed, during the space of only a few 
days, will exhibit great variety, both in the 
time of its rising, and in the form in which it 
appears ; and thence may be called, as it has 
been by poets, 'the inconstant moon.' But 
if the observation be extended to a longer 
period, these changes will appear to take 
place uniformly. Hence, facts of this kind 
may be properly considered as uniform. 
Thus, then, the subjects of our observation 
may be reduced to two classes, viz : those 
which are uniform, and those which are va- 
rious. 

First. In things that are uniform^ general 
conclusions are drawn, by collecting those 
points in which the uniformity is observed, 
neglecting those, in which they have been 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 71 

perceived to differ, and making those uniform 
points the predicate of a proposition, of which 
the things themselves are the subject.* Thus, 
on comparing our observations of the sun, we 
find that every day it rose and set, sometimes 
involved in clouds, at others shining with 
splendor. Neglecting, then, the circumstan- 
ces in which it differed, and attending to those 
only, in which it was uniform, we deduce this 
general conclusion, that the sun rises and 
sets every day. Or, recollecting that all the 
masses of gold, which we have ever seen, 
however various their forms, were yet yellow, 
and very heavy ; neglecting the varieties of 
their forms, we infer, that a yellow colour, 
and great weight, are properties of gold. 
This species of reasoning is called by logi- 
cians, an induction of particular facts of the 
same nature. f 

* For the information of those who are wholly unac- 
quainted with logic, it may be necessary to observe, 
that a proposition is a sentence, in which any thing is 
affirmed, or denied of another thing. That the subject 
of a proposition is that, concerning which any thing is 
affirmed or denied ; and that its predicate is that which 
is affirmed or denied of the subject. Thus, ' Plato was 
a philosopher,' is a proposition, of which Plato is the 
subject, and Philosopher is the predicate. 

t Thus the witnesses of the miracles of Christ would 
place his wonderful works among things uniform; for 
he never failed of performing what he undertook. They 
would neglect the varieties of sometimes going to the 
patient, and sometimes healing at a distance ; some- 
times uttering his mandate, and at others healing in 



72 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

The conclusions, thus drawn front) uniform 
subjects, are general truths. Thus, it is a 
general truth, that night succeeds day, and 
day night ; that Spring, Summer, Autumn, 
and Winter, follow each other in regular suc- 
cession, that iron sinks in water, and that wax 
melts in fire. 

In applying these general conclusions, they 
teach us what to expect in every particular 
case : and the expectationS7 founded upon 
them, are attended with a high degree of 
moral evidence. 

But it should be remarked, that the more 
frequently we have repeated our observations 
of uniform subjects, and the more various the 
circumstances are, under which they have 
been made, the more correct will our conclu- 
sions be, and the more safely may they be 
applied to particular cases.* 

silence ; sometimes employing applications to the bod- 
ies of the diseased, and at others, curing without any 
such application, &c. and seizing only on the results, 
would see that these, being truly miraculous, all tes- 
tified that he was what he professed to be, — th.e Christ, 
or Anointed of God. This would be the general tiiith 
to which the observation or experience of his miracles 
would lead the witnesses. — Ed. 

* Hence we perceive the confidence we are warrant- 
ed in placing in the conclusions of the Apostles relative 
to the reality of our Lord's miracles: for they witness- 
ed the performance of vast numbers of them. (John 
21 : 25) and imder every variety of circumstances, and 
their uniform testimony is, to the unquestionable reality 
of the wonders he performed. Matt. 4 : 23,24 ; 9:35; 
12:15. Acts 2 : 22.— Ed. 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 73 

It will, perhaps, be objected to this theory, 
that it is a rule amongst pfiilosophers, that 
one correct experiment is sufficient to estab- 
lish a 2;t'neral truth. Whether this rule be, 
or be not, just, it will, when duly considered, 
be found not at all inconsistent with what has 
been advanced. We are here speaking of 
the conclusions, which a man may be able to 
deduce from his own personal observation, 
unassis cd by any information derived from 
others. Tlieir rule supposes the experiment- 
alist to be possessed of much previous infor- 
mation, derived, not only from his own expe- 
rience, but from the general observ^atiqn of 
mankind. When a philosopher draws from 
experiment a general conclusion respecting 
the properties of any substance, he presumes 
that thai identical substance, on which he 
tried his experiment, possessed exactly the 
same qualities with all others which are con- 
sidered as of the same nature. Thus, if he 
woidd determine the speci6c gravity of pure 
gold, he must presume that the gold, which 
he uses for the purpose, possesses the same 
properties with all other [)ure gold. Now, 
on what is this presumption founded ? A 
man, just cngMging in researches into nature, 
and unncquairited with the discoveries of 
others, could not safely prestmie this. He 
could not yet know, that such is the uniform- 
ity of nature in her operations, that the same 
7 



74 THE DIFFERENT TCINDS 

qualities would be found in pure gold, at all 
times, and in every part of the world. But 
since, by the experience of many ages, the 
fact of this uniformity of nature has been 
established, the philosopher assumes it as the 
basis of his reasonings, and draws his conclu* 
sions from it, with perfect satisfaction. The 
conclusion, therefore, drawn from a single 
experiment, is not, strictly speaking, depend- 
ent on that experiment alone, to the exclusion 
of all other information on the subjects of 
nature. On the contrary, it pre-supposes an 
experience of vast extent, derived from the 
general observation of mankind. 

As no man can be supposed to be at this 
time entirely unacquainted with the general 
experience of mankind, it may be asked, of 
what use it can be to lay down directions 
applicable only to a state of ignorance ? I 
answer, that in order to understand rightly 
the subject of personal observation, it is nec- 
essary to consider it simply, as it is in itself, 
unconnected with the information derived 
from other sources. When it is clearly un^ 
derstood in this simple state, it will be under- 
stood, with greater ease, and correctness, 
when combined with that information. It 
will then be more easily perceived for what 
part of our knowledge we are indebted to our 
own unassisted efforts ; and also, in what 
manner we must proceed in those inquiries, 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 75 

which must be conducted by our own per- 
sonal observation. 

That subjects, which have been observed 
to be uniform, do, in fact, excite an expecta- 
tion of the continuance of the same event, 
under the same circumstances, is confirmed 
by experience. It is evident, that they pro- 
duce this effect even in children, and that in 
their earliest infancy, when, if they exercise 
reason at all, it must be only in the slightest 
degree. It is by this effect of experience, 
that they must learn the meaning of words. 
For, as there is no natural connexion between 
things, and the names by which they are 
called, it can be only by observing, that the 
persons, who surround them, constantly con- 
nect a certain sound with a certain object, 
that they can learn to regard that sound as 
its name. This information cannot, at first, 
be conveyed to them by words ; because they 
are, as yet, unacquainted with the words nec- 
essary for that, purpose. Experience oper- 
ates in the same way, also, upon brutes 5- and 
by this means dogs, for instance, are taught 
so far to understand the meaning of certain 
sounds, as to be able to execute the commands 
of their masters in various particulars. As 
to the existence, then, of the fact, there can 
be no doubt ; but the principles upon which 
this fact depends, have never, as far as the 
author of this tract can learn, been satisfacto- 



76 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

rily assigned. Some have attempted to ac- 
count for it on the principle of association. 
But it does not appear that the association of 
ideas naturally excites an expectation ot our 
finding their objects always connected togeth- 
er. Having met a friend at a certain inn, 
J have associated the idea of the inn, with 
that of my friend ; but this association ex- 
cites in me no expectation of my alwa3^s 
meeting with him there ; or even of my 
meeting him there at any particular time, 
unless I have some other reason to expect it. 
The fact seems to proceed on the presump- 
tion, that what has been observed to be uni- 
form, depends on some established law of 
nature : and the evidence, which we have for 
the existence of these laws of nature, is the 
general experience of mankind. 

Secondly. The other class of facts, are 
those which have been observed to happen 
variously. Conclusions are drawn from our 
observation of these, by collecting together, 
into one sum, all those instances in which we 
have perceived them to exist in a certain way, 
and, into another sum, all those in which w^e 
observed them to exist in a different way; 
ajid then, compajing these sums together, to 
determine the ratio which they bear to each 
other. If the instances on each side be equal 
in number, we conclude, that the general 
nature of the fact is uncertain. When they 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 77 

are unequal, we conclude, that that is the 
more general nature of the fact, which is 
conformable to the side on which the excess 
lies ; and our conclusion heconies so much 
the stronger, in proportion as the instances 
on the one side, are found to be more nu- 
merous thaft ihose on the other. 

In a()p]ying these conclusions to particular 
cases, where the instances on each side have 
been observed to be equal in number, we 
form no expectation at all in what way the 
event will happen in any proposed case; but 
regard it as a matter of equal chance, or per- 
fect indifference. But, when the instances 
on one side have been observed to exceed 
those on the other, we naturally form some 
degree of exjiectation, that they will happen 
in each proposed case, as we have most fre- 
quently observed them. And the greater the 
ratio is, which those on the one side bear to 
those on the other, the stronger is this ex- 
pectation. 

Thus, for example, if out of a great num- 
ber of instances, in which men had eaten of 
a certain fruit, those in which it had proved 
harmless, were exactly equal in number with 
those, in which it had proved injurious, it 
would be considered as a matter of absolute 
uncertainty^ whether or not it would injure a 
person, who was going to eat of it. If rather 
more had been' injured by it, than not, it 



78 THE DIFFERENT KINi)B 

would be considered as probable, that it would 
injure him. But, if very fevy out of the 
number bad escaped injury, it would then be 
regarded as highly probable that he would be 
injured by it. As the ratio, which the in- 
stances on each side bear to each other, may 
vary almost infinitely, so may the degrees of 
expectation or probability vary almost infi- 
nitely, from the confines of moral certainty, 
to those of absolute uncertainty. 

In forming our expectations from facts, 
which we have observed to be various, we 
presume, that the event is directed by some 
cause, known, or unknown, which, though it 
be not sufficiently powerful, always to control 
the event, but may sometimes be overcome 
by some unknown circumstances, yet always 
tends to make it happen one way, rather than 
the other. 

Before we quit this part of the subject, it 
may be remarked, that we often recollect the 
general conclusions, which we have deduced, 
when we have forgotten the particular sub- 
jects, from which we deduced them. This 
happens especially when the subject had in it 
nothing new, or surprising, and was attended 
by no circumstances, which, by association, 
had fixed themselves in our minds. Thus, a 
man who had rarely seen a certain phenom- 
enon in nature, or curious experiment in 
chemistry, would not only recollect it, but 



OF Moral evidenck. 79 

also the circumstances of time, place, and 
persons, which accompanied it. Whereas, 
he, who had frequently seen such things, 
might recollect little of those circumstances ; 
though he clearly remembered the general 
conclusions, which he had deduced from 
them. The one he would treasure up in his 
memory, as of importance to be recollected ; 
while the other he would neglect, as of no 
consequence. 

The second kind of moral evidence, to be 
considered, is Testimony. 

Testimony, is either divine, or human. 
Divine testimony, when evidently such, pro- 
duces perfect certainty. For, whatever God 
says, must be true. It, therefore, belongs to 
a higher species of evidence, than that which 
is the subject of this tract. But then, it must 
be ascertained, that, what is affirmed to be 
the word of God, is really God's word : and 
this inquiry must be conducted on the prin- 
ciples of moral evidence. On these princi- 
ples, the authenticity of the Bible has often 
been investigated, and proved, with an accu- 
mulation of evidence, of which no other fact 
in the world ever admitted.* 



* Miracles are evidently divine testimony: (Heb. 2:4) 
and of course ihey produce, in those who witness them, 
perfect certainty of the truth of that, for the attestation 
of which they are wrought. But they produce this cer- 



80 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

Human testimony, is the evfdenre of a 
person, who declares that he himself observed 
a certain fact or event. 

It is the evidence of one witness, or of 
more. Each separate witness, if he be really 
an independent or original witness, strength- 
ens the evidence. But before it be achnitted, 
that the evidence is thus confirmed, it should 
be- ascertained that they are really indepen- 
dent witnesses. For, if the second witness 
did not observe the fact himself, but assented 
to it only on the testimony of the former, his 
evidence should be disregarded, and the sub- 
ject rests on the testimony of the first. But, 
on the contrary, if they should both be found 
to be original witnesses of the fact, the evi- 
dence would then be strengthened in a muc h 
greater proportion than that of two to one ; 
for the coincidence of their testiniony is to be 
takea intO; the account, as well as the separate 

tainty in none others than those who wivne-^s them ; and 
other!!: carvonjy, at most, arrive at moral certainty, (see 
Bote on [>M<r« (57.) Tlvc witnesses ari^ lf> tif^ examined 
as. other wilness(«* are, tfierr alte«refl ins|>ira»ion not- 
withstanding; for ^/izVis another mirach^ and requires 
itself to be proved, before it ran he admitted in proof 
of the trnlh nf the inspired witnesses' testimony. — 
Hence, not naly the anthenlieity, (as onr author ob- 
serves) but the ifenwrneness. the nneoiriipted preserva- 
tion, and es^peejally, the inspiiation of the saered ora- 
cles require to be proved. Therff<»re the inspiration of 
the .sa<red writers is set aside in these inquiries, and 
their writings are exajnined as mere human testimony. 



OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 81 

weight of each. And indeed, in many cases, 
in which either of the two evidences, taken 
separately, would produce scarcely any con- 
viction, their concurrence, if they be known 
to be independent witnesses, might produce 
nearly moral certainty. The same observa- 
tion applies, and with greater force, as the 
number of independent concurrent witnesses 
increases. For it is more extraordinary, that 
many should coincide in their observation, 
and account of the same fact, than that two 
should ; and that in a much greater degree, 
than in the proportion of their numbers.* 

* Now there are eight independent witnesses, whose 
testimony concurs in attestation of the truth of the 
Christian religion; viz. the writers of the New Testa- 
ment, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul, James, Peter, 
and Jude ; four times as many as was, by divine ap- 
pointment, made necessary to settle questions of life 
and death under the law (Deut. 17 : 6) : it is therefore 
morally certain that that religion is divine, even were 
the case decided by the number of the witnesses only. 
But we are to take into the account the concurrence 
of their testimony ; and when this is considered, the ev- 
idence is amazingly strengthened. Our author is aware 
of the impossibility of saying, definitely, how greatly 
concurrence in the testimony of witnesses strengthens 
the probability of its truth ; — he contents himself by 
saying that it is ' in a mueh greater proportion than 
two to one.' Let us endeavour to approximate correct 
views of the probability of the truth of the Christian 
religion, as shown by the concurrent testimony of eight 
independent witnesses, by supposing that concurrence 
between two, augments the probability of its truth only 
in the proportion of tico to one. The concurrence of 
eight persons, in their testimony to a fact which they 
8 



82 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

Testimony may, also, be either direct, or 
incidental. Direct testimony, is the evidence 
which is professedly delivered on a certain 
subject. Incidental testimony, is that which 
is casually introduced on one subject, in the 
course of an evidence, or discourse, profess- 

vvitnessed, therefore, would be, to one testimony to the 
same, as the eighth power of two to unity, i. e. as 356 
to 1, their concurrence, therefore, enhances the value 
bf their testimony as much as an addition of 356 — 8 = 
348 to the number of witnesses would have done. But 
this calculation supposes them to have testified only to 
one miracle,wrought to confirm the truth ofChristianity: 
but if they witnessed (as doubtless they did, and even 
more) a hundred such miracles, then is their concur- 
rence in this testimony, to the testimony of one to the 
same, as the one hundredth power of348x2^ to unity: 
a number so great, that should we present it in figures 
to our readers, we should be utterly at a loss for words 
to express their numerical signification ! It would take 
about 280 places of figures to express it ! ! And yet 
this mighty sum would not fully express, it would only 
approximate^ the probability of the reality of the mira- 
cles, to the performance of which they testify; and of 
the consequent truth of Christiamty as supported by 
miracles. 

For the satisfaction of the curious in such matters, 
we will just present to them the tenth power of 348, 
tnultiplied into the eighth power of 2 (356). It is thus 
expriessed \ 

6.271.914.180.891.841.094.567.532.544 
Or six octillions, two hundred and seventy-one septil- 
lionsj nine hundred and fourteen sextillions, one hun- 
dred and eighty quintillions, eight hundred and ninety* 
one quadrillions, eight hundred and forty-one trillions, 
ninety-four billions, five hundred and sixty-seven mil- 
lions, five hundred and thirty-two thousand, five hun* 
dred and forty-four. — Ed. 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 83 

edly delivered on another. It is of greater 
Weight than direct testimony, because, being 
casually introduced, it is less susceptible of a 
deliberate intention to deceive.* And, it is 
of the greatest weight when the subject, cas- 
ually introduced, is spoken of as known by 
the person, to whom the discourse is address- 
ed, and an inference, or further information, 
is grounded upon it ; because it is improbable, 
that a man would speak of a fact, which he was 
conscious was false, as known by the person 
whom he addressed ; since he could not ex- 
pect it to be believed, but must be sensible 
that he should thereby weaken the force of 

* Indirect and incidental testimony, is that which is 
especially valuable and weighty, in proof of the genu- 
ineness of the apostolical epistles, and the authenticity 
of the evangelical narratives and the Acts of the apostles. 
The student of the science of Moral Evidence, with 
reference to the authenticity and genuineness of the 
Christian scriptures, does himself no trifling injury, and 
is criminally unfaithful to the study before him, if he 
fail to read and study Faley's Horae Paulinae. We can- 
not, in this note, give more than this passing notice to 
the work ; it must be read and studied, in order to ex- 
emplify, fully, the truth of our author's principle in the 
above paragraph ; — but whoever shall give it such a 
perusal as it demands, will rise from it with a convic- 
tion, nevor to be shaken, that so many and various un- 
designed coincidences between the epistles of Paul, and 
the Acts of the apostles, could never have existed, 
unless the latter had befin a faithful record of real facts, 
and the former, the genuine letters of the great apostle 
of the Gentiles. We repeat, that he has not studied the 
subject of incidental, or indirect testimony, who has not 
digested Paley's Horae Paulinae. — Ed. 



84 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

the rest of his discourse, if not provoke a 
public exposure. 

Further, testimony is either simple, or 
confirmed by oath. The former is the only 
testimony which the ordinary events of hu- 
man hfe afford. And, though many of these 
events may be of the highest importance, yet 
they admit of no other. On this we form 
our judgment of almost all facts, past or pre- 
sent, which do not admit of personal obser- 
vation. Testimony, confirmed by oath, is 
nearly confined to judicial proceedings. Be- 
sides the ordinary weight of evidence, arising 
from the competency and presumed veracity 
of the witness, it introduces a solemn appeal 
to God, as a witness of the truth of what is 
affirmed, and implies a sort of self-execration, 
if it be false. The effect of this solemnity 
upon the minds of all, who are not in an un- 
usual degree void of religion, the superior 
guilt of perjury, to a common lie, in the judg- 
ment of all mankind, the punishment which 
it incurs if detected, and the infamy"^ with 

* This infamy has probably as much influence on 
men, as all the other causes together ; for, excepting 
our immediate interest or gratification, and often not 
excepting even these, the chief principle of human con- 
duct is, as Mr. Locke observes, the Law of Reputation. 
Hence it is to be lamented, that such distinctions should 
have obtained, respecting the nature of oaths, as tend, 
in some cases, to lessen the infamy of perjury. In 
regard to those oaths, on which the security of the 
property and lives of men depend, that infamy contin- 



OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 85 

which it is followed, all combine to confirm 
an evidence delivered upon oath. Thus an 
oath for confirmation is to men an end of all 
strife. 

Lastly, testimony is either spoken or writ- 
ten. In some cases written testimony is of 
greater weight than unwritten. Thus, an 
account, in writing, of words spoken long ago, 
if written near the time when they were de- 
livered, is more likely to be correct, than one 
given from memory. So also any intricate 
subject, consisting of a variety of circumstan- 
ces, is likely to be stated with greater accu- 
racy, if it were committed to writing soon 
after it took place, than if trusted to recollec- 
tion. The terms of a written contract, also, 
may be more safely relied upon, than those 
of a verbal one; because, if any of those 
terms happen to be forgotten, men are too 
apt to entertain opinions, favourable to their 
own interests, in their stead : beside^, that 
an unforeseen change of circumstances often 
makes a change in their interests, which they 
are too apt to favour in the account of their 
engagements. In some respects, however, 
viva voce evidence is entitled to greater credit 

ues unimpaired, and therefore produces beneficial ef- 
fects. But, in respect to Custom House, Excise, and 
Election Oaths, it seems much diminished ; conse- 
quently, in those cases, the Law of Reputation checks 
the commission of perjury only in a slight degree, 



86 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

than written : as, because it does not admit 
of so much contrivance to deceive : because 
it is subject to cross-examination : and be- 
cause the countenance, voice, and manner of 
speech of the witnesses, affords some indica- 
tions of their veracity or falsehood. Added 
to all this, in written evidence it is requisite 
to ascertain, that it is really the writing of the 
person, to whom it is attributed. 

Testimony"^ seems to operate, at first, by a 

* On the principle on which credit is given to testi- 
mony, see Encyclopaedia Brittannica, vol. ii, p. 532, 
Art. Metaphysics. There, the opinions of Hume, 
Campbell, and Reid, are mentioned, and a farther solu- 
tion offered by the author of the Article. Hume's 
opinion is, that experience is the sole ground of faith 
in testimony. To confute this, Campbell contends, 
that experience is the foundation of diffidence, rather 
than confidence, in testimony ; for infancy is credulous, 
and old age distrustful ; and maintains that testimony 
has a natural and original influence on belief. Reid 
says, that there are two principles implanted in our na- 
ture which correspond with each other : first, a propen- 
sity to speak the truth; and secondly, a disposition to 
eonfide in the veracity of others. To speak truth, he 
considers as natural and instinctive, and as requiring 
no art, inducement or temptation, but only to yield to 
a natural impulse. Lying, on the contrary, he regards 
as doing violence to nature, and as never practised, 
even by the worst of men, without some temptation. 
The author of this Article in the Encyclopaedia, cen- 
sures the representing of the speaking of truth as in- 
^tinctive ; because, as words are arbitrary signs, no 
instinctive connexion can ever have been formed be- 
tween such signs and ideas. His opinion is, that, though 
there be no natural connexion between words and ideas, 
yet that vy^ords are so strongly associated to ideasj that. 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 87 

sort of instinct. Great part of our knowledge 
is, in childhood, obtained by testimony. We 
then believe almost every thing that is told 
ys by our parents, or our nurses. This, 
though liable to abuse, is nevertheless a wise 
provision ; as it is a means of furnishing us 
with information, which we could not other- 
wise obtain, but which may be necessary for 
our security then, or as a preparation for fu- 
ture improvement. At an early period, we 
find, that not all that is told us is true, which 
tends to weaken our implicit reliance on tes- 
timony. This, at first, extends only to par- 
ticular things, in which we have been deceiv- 
ed. Then, perhaps, it applies to particular 
persons, whose falsehoods we have had fre- 
quent opportunities of detecting. But, as in 
our progress, we find, that instances of de- 
ception are not confined to particular subjects, 

without a violent effort of the speaker to the contrary 
they must always be in conformity with each other: 
that, hence, it is impossible, but that a man should, 
without some effort, speak any thing but truth : for the 
ideas, of what he has seen or heard, are not of his own 
manufacture, but are generated by external objects ; 
and till they be effaced from the memory, they must 
always, by the law of association, make their appear- 
ance there with all their mutual relations, and in their 
proper dress. Jt may, however, be remarked, that this 
author has not distinguished between the intention to 
speak truth, and the means, or icords, by which that 
intention is to be executed. Though the latter be ar» 
l)itrary j yet, the former may be instinctive. 



88 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

or particular persons, we gradually learn to 
suspect testimony more and more. Still, as 
we grow older, we become even more suspi- 
cious of it, and learn by experience, that it is 
necessary to restrict our belief in it by certain 
rules. Thus, as our ability of obtaining 
knowledge, by other means, increases, our 
instinctive (if it may be so called) reliance 
on testimony gives way to a more rational 
belief in it. But, though our disposition to 
credit it be in some measure controlled by 
experience, it is seldom regulated by it suffi- 
ciently. For notwithstanding the suspicions, 
which frequent deceptions occasion, that dis- 
position is still so strong in most men, that 
they cannot help giving more credit than is 
due, even to those who are known to allow 
themselves to deviate from truth ; the incon- 
veniences of which they often feel. On the 
other hand, there appears, in a few men, a 
strong disposition to discredit testimony, at 
least on certain subjects. But, an implicit 
belief of testimony, and a determined rejec- 
tion of it, are both extremes ; between which 
there is a just mean to be observed. There 
are rules, which, if carefully applied, will 
generally enable us to determine, with toler- 
able accuracy, when it may safely be credited, 
and when not. These rules must be sought 
from experience. In our intercourse with 
mankind, we observe that they generally 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 89 

speak the truth, except when they are influ- 
enced by prejudice, interest, or passion ; but 
that, when they are under the influence of 
either of these, they frequently attempt to de- 
ceive. Hence, if we may reasonably pre- 
sume, that in the testimony, which a witness 
gives, his mind is wholly unbiassed ; he may 
generally be regarded as worthy of credit, 
but not otherwise.* 

Thus, it appears, that though the credibility 
of testimony is not originally derived from 
experience, it is yet restricted by it to certain 
circumstances, and under these circumstances 
is confirmed by it. 

We are often informed of things, not by 
the person who observed them himself, but 
by one who was informed of them by the ob- 
server ; and frequently the information passes 
through several hands before it reaches us. 
If all the persons, through whom the infor- 

* This is especially true when a witness testifies to 
that against which he is known to have had a strong 
bias. Such testimony, borne even by a single witness, 
produces almost moral certainty of the trutb of what 
he affirms. Now this is precisely the case with the 
testimony ofthe apostles relative to the resurrection of 
Christ. They were all incredulous respecting it, even 
after it was declared to have occurred ; and, ()rior to 
the event, the clearest predictions of it by the Lord him- 
self, were not understood to refer to a real resurrection ; 
but it is, again and again, said, ^ they understood not 
that saying,' and that ' they questioned among them- 
selves what the rising from the dead should meav,.^ 
Mark 9 : 10, 32.— Ed. 



90 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

mation has passed, be known, this, for the 
sake of distinction, may be called Remote 
Testimony; but, if they be unknown, it is 
mere Report, The weight of this kind of 
evidence is less than that of immediate testi- 
mony ; and the greater the number of persons 
is, through whom the information has passed, 
the less credit does it deserve. Because, 
there is then so much the greater danger of 
their having misunderstood each other ; and 
because the risk of misrepresentation, or of 
intentional deception, which are common to 
all testimony, is repealed as often as the in- 
formation passes from one person to another. 

The third species of moral evidence, is of 
a mixed kind, possessing partly the nature of 
personal observation, and partly that of testi- 
mony. It is that, by which we learn from 
others, those general conclusions which they 
have deduced by the observation of a variety 
of facts of the same kind. It differs from the 
first kind ; because that relates to the general 
conclusions which we deduce by our own 
personal observation. And, it differs from 
testimony ; because that relates to the specific 
facts which our informer has observed, and 
not to the general conclusions which he has 
deduced. 

Here, also, it should be noticed, that the 
subjects observed, may haye been perceived 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 91 

to be either uniform or various ; and nearly 
the same remarks may be made upon each, 
which have been made already, under the 
head of Personal Observation. 

A very considerable part of the knowledge 
of men, even of good education, is thus ob- 
tained. For, human life is too short, and the 
opportunities of most men too few, to furnish 
them with sufficient knowledge, by personal 
observation. 

The weight of evidence to be attributed to 
the information thus obtained, depends on 
several circumstances. 

The nature of the subjects is one of these ; 
many subjects are level to the capacity of 
every man. Here, no doubt can arise on 
account of the difficulty of making the obser- 
vations. Of subjects, not as obvious as these, 
some are capaple of more accurate observa- 
tion than others. Thus, general truths in 
chemistry may be more easily ascertained, 
than in agriculture ; because the circumstan- 
ces of the experiments admit of being regu- 
lated at discretion in the one, but not in the 
other ; and, because the experiments in the 
former are terminated in a shorter space of 
time, than those in the latter. 

Much also depends on the character of the 
observers. Our knowledge of the ability of 
our informer, of his care and accuracy in 
forming his judgment, and his usual regard tQ 



92 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

veracity, will greatly influence our reliance 
upon his information. The members also, 
of some professions, are, from their education 
and habits, more capable of accurate obser- 
vation, than those of others. Thus, chemists 
are more able observers than farmers. The 
relations of the one are also more worthy of 
credit, than those of the others ; both because 
there is a connexion between accuracy of 
observation, and fidelity in relation ; while 
they who judge at random, generally either 
speak at random, or supply the defects of 
their observation by invention ; and because 
a misstatement in subjects, which admit of 
greater accuracy, is more easily detected, 
and attended with greater disgrace, than in 
those which are more vague. 

The number of our informers, is another 
circumstance, by which the credibility of their 
information is regulated. This depends, not 
only on the principle which regulates belief 
in testimony ; but also, on its being less prob- 
able, that several persons should be mistaken 
in the general conclusions, which they have 
drawn from their observations, than one. 
This remark, however, supposes that the 
subject is such, that the observers are com- 
petent judges of it ;"^ otherwise, the informa- 

* The evidence of the Messiahship of Jesus, which 
those who attended on his personal ministry, and wit- 
nessed his miracles^ derived Ironi their mutual commu? 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 93 

tion of one person, whose skill and general 
veracity are known, is more worthy of belief, 
than of many, of very inferior capacity and 
credit. 

When the same information is delivered 
by all, as far as we can learn, who have had 
opportunity of observing the subject, we have 
then the strongest proof, of which this species 
of evidence, taken alone, can admit. This, 



nication to each other, of conclusions to which the sight 
of his miracles led them, was of this mixl kind ; and 
was of the most unexceptionable character whicli this 
kind of evidence admits. * They said, when Christ 
Cometh, will he do more miracles than these which 
this man doeth ?' John 7 : 31. Here was a communi- 
cation to each other, of general conclusions, on a par- 
ticular subject, derived from observations of many facts; 
and these facts of such a nature as enabled them to 
judge accurately respecting them ; being subjected to 
the evidence of their senses, and such as their senses 
were entirely competent to judge of. 

The evidence afforded by the woman of Samaria, to 
the men of her city, was also of this mixt kind, but less 
perfect than the former ; inasmuch as only a single wit' 
ness, (viz. the woman herself) could testify to the 
Lord's knowledge of her past conduct. Her language 
(John 4 : 29) is an exhibition of thii conclusion to which 
she had come respecting Jesus, from a consciousness 
that her heart was open before him ; and, upon this ev- 
idence, the men of the city gave much credit to the 
pretensions of Christ. But this credit was such as ad- 
mitted of increase from personal observation, as our 
author observes in the next paragraph ; and accordingly, 
when they had made that observation, they said ' Now 
we believe not because of thy saying, for we have 
heard him ourselves, and know, that this is indeed the 
Christ, the Saviour of the world.' ver. 42. — Ed, 



94 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

however, is capable of being increased, by 
our own personal observation. For when, 
by this means, we have deduced the same 
conclusions, which we have learnt from oth- 
ers ; we are more fully convinced of their 
truth, than if we had received them upon 
their information alone. For instance, he, 
who has tried experiments in chemistry, nat- 
ural philosophy, or electricity, has a firmer 
conviction of their truth, than he who has 
only read of them. Thus, these two species 
of evidence, when they concur, very much 
confirm each other. And, when our own 
personal observation has been both constant 
and extensive, and also coincides with the 
experience of all, whose observations on the 
subject we have ever known, we have the 
highest degree of proof, of which moral evi- 
dence can admit; and our assent rises to 
moral certainty. For, whatever coincides 
w^ith our own constant and extensive experi- 
ence, and that of all other men, as far as we 
can learn, we may conclude, to happen ac- 
cording to some established law of nature ; 
and therefore, not to be subject to those con- 
tingencies, to which other events are liable. 
It is thus, that we are satisfied of the truth of 
certain propositions respecting the common 
operations of nature, and the properties of 
substances ; as, that the sea ebbs and flows, 
that the sun rises and sets, that lead sinks in 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 95 

water, and melts in fire. That these propo- 
sitions are true, no doubt can be entertained. 
Yet, even this evidence, great as it is, falls 
short of demonstration ; and that, whether 
the propositions affirm the properties of their 
subjects as general truths, or their events in 
particular cases. If they affirm the properties 
of their subjects as general truths, the evidence 
depends on my own observation, and that of 
others. Now, my own observation, however 
constant, must necessarily be very limited. 
My inference must, therefore, be drawn from 
a very small number of cases, compared with 
those which actually exist ; consequently, it 
is possible, that the subject may not be con- 
stant ; though I have never seen it otherwise. 
The same may be said of the othel* persons, 
whose observations coincide with mine, both 
severally and collectively. For the subjects, 
which have been observed by all the persons, 
whose judgment I have been able to collect, 
must be but a small part of those of the same 
kmd, which exist. Added to this, their ob- 
servations have been communicated to me 
by testimony ' and it is possible, that their 
testimony may be false. For such a propo- 
sition, therefore, I cannot attain certainty ; 
consequently, the evidence falls short of de- 
monstration. A remarkable instance of fail- 
ure in a proof of this kind occurs in the well- 
known case of the king of Siam, who rejected 



96 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

the evidence of the Dutch Ambassador, for 
the existence of ice. His own constant ex- 
perience, and that of all others, as far as he 
could learn, were in direct contradiction to 
the Ambassador's assertion. He had, there- 
fore, as strong reason for disbelieving him, as 
the most constant experience could aflford ; 
yet he was mistaken. 

This evidence is, also, inferior to demon- 
stration, if the propositions afiBrm the event 
of things in particular cases : for, as it was 
observed, the conclusion, which my own 
constant experience, and that of others, af- 
fords, respecting these events, is, that they 
happen according to some established law of 
nature. Now, the laws of nature depend 
upon the will of God. But, we cannot be 
certain, that it is his will, that they should 
always continue the same. He may have 
been willing to suspend them on certain oc- 
casions, where it seemed fit, to his infinite 
wisdom. He may even determine that they 
shall be totally changed or abolished.^ Hence, 
we cannot be certain, that events, which de- 
pend on these laws, will always continue the 
same. Consequently, the evidence, which 

* No proposition, founded on constant experience, 
can be better established, than that the sun will rise to- 
morrow : yet, he who believes in Revelation, must 
admit that a day will come when even this proposition 
will be false. 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 97 

we have for these events, is inferior to de- 
monstration. 

It should be remembered, that the will of 
God is both the foundation of the conclusions 
deduced from constant experience, and the 
limit to them. As it secures their truth 
against the efFects of human caprice, and other 
contingencies; so it excludes their truth in 
all cases, in which it may be his will, that the 
events should be contradictory to experience. 

As personal observation, when it coincides 
with the accounts which we have received of 
the experience of others, confirms them ; so, 
when it is contradictory to them, it lessens 
their weight ; because, it then induces a be- 
lief, that what has been delivered on the sub- 
ject, is only a popular error. And, as such 
errors have prevailed, a reasonable suspicion 
of fallacy may be entertained on the point in 
question. Such a suspicion may arise, es- 
pecially, where the subject requires extraor- 
dinary skill and dexterity, or peculiar accuracy 
of attention to all the circumstances, under 
which the event is to be observed. For, 
then it may be presumed, that there has been 
some defect in these requisites in former ob- 
servers. But, then, it is necessary, that the 
person, who thus relies on his own experi- 
ence, in opposition to general opinion, should 
be satisfied, that he possesses these qualities 
in an extraordinary degree, and has properly 
9 



98 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

exercised them : otherwise, he ought rather 
to suppose, that there has been some error in 
his experiments. 

In some cases, personal experience would 
lead to false conclusions, which could be 
corrected only by the experience of others. 
Thus were we to conclude, that what we had 
observed in the manners, opinions, and char- 
acters of men, were general truths, depending 
on some permanent cause, our conclusion 
would be erroneous. For men have differed 
much in all these respects, in consequence of 
the various circumstances in which they have 
been placed. But, these differences we learn, 
not from our own experience, but from the 
experience of others : and thus, their expe- 
rience shows, that what we might conclude 
to be uniform, was really various. On the 
other hand, there are facts, which would, on 
personal observation, appear to us to be vari- 
ous ; but which the experience of others 
would show us to be uniform. Of this nature 
are comets, which appear at too distant peri 
ods for any individual, unacquainted with the 
observations of others, to determine to be 
uniform. Eclipses, also, would scarcely be 
discovered to be uniform by the insulated 
observations of an individual ; and, indeed, 
history furnishes us with instances of even 
nations who w^ere ignorant of their uniformity. 
Thus, we are told that the Lydians and Medes 



OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 99 

were induced to. put an end to a war, which 
had lasted five years, by an eclipse of the 
sun, which happened while they were engaged 
in a doubtful battle ; evidently from an igno- 
rance of the uniformity of eclipses, and, prob- 
ably, supposing that this eclipse manifested 
the anger of the gods against their contests. 
And the inhabitants of Jamaica were, by a 
similar ignorance, prevailed upon to renew 
their supplies to Columbus, by his foretelling 
a total eclipse of the moon, with the time 
when it would happen, and which he pre- 
tended was a mark of the vengeance of the 
Great Spirit against them, for refusing to 
support his servants. 

General Notoriety, is a fourth kind of 
moral evidence.* 

* A remarkable instance of the weight of the evi- 
dence of general notoriety, even where prejudice, and 
interest, and authority, are all united against it, appears 
in the case of the Jewish Sanhedrim, relative to the 
healing of the impotent man, by Peter and John. AH 
their prejudice, and all their malice, and all their pow- 
er, as the highest ecclesiastical court in the nation, 
could not furnish to them sufficient effrontery to deny 
the miracle ; though their language intimates that, if 
possible, they would gladly have done it. And yet 
what prevented ? The notoriety of the miracle^ and 
this alone : ' A notable miracle hath, indeed, been done 
by them, which is manifest to all them which dwell in 
Jerusalem.* Thus we see that the truth of the Chris- 
tian religion may he shown, even to moral certainty; 
and this, upon the mere general notoriety of miracles 
wrought in its confirmation, — l^u. 



100 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

When we find that a thing is fully believed 
by all men, as far as we can learn, it is then 
said to be a matter of general notoriety. This 
kind of evidence relates both to specific facts, 
and to conclusions drawn from observation. 
It agrees with testimony, inasmuch as the in- 
formation is received from others ; but it 
differs from it, because we have not here the 
evidence of any particular individual, who 
pretends, that he himself personally observed 
the fact. And, it differs from general obser- 
vation, because our informers do not pretend, 
that they deduced the conclusion from their 
own observations. 

Most men have no other evidence than 
this, for a great, perhaps the greater, part of 
the facts and general truths, which they be- 
lieve. They have neither observed those 
facts themselves, nor have they received them 
on the testimony of those who did observe 
them. But, they believe them, because they 
find them generally believed, and disputed by 
none. So, also, as to the general conclusions, 
which they hold. They have neither de- 
duced them by their own observation, nor 
have they been informed of them by those, 
who did deduce them ; but they find them 
universally maintained, and never doubted; 
therefore, they also admit them. Even truths, 
capable of demonstration, are received by a 
great part of mankind, on no higher evidence 



OF MORAL EVIDENCE. 101 

than this. For they have neither demon- 
strated them themselves, nor been informed 
of them by those who have ; but they admit 
them because they are universally received. 
The weight of this species of evidence, 
depends partly on a presumption, that if the 
assertions were not true, they would not be 
universally believed, but would be contradict- 
ed ; and partly, perhaps principally, on ex- 
perience ; for, though we are in the constant 
practice of believing them, and acting upon 
them as true, we have seldom found ourselves 
mistaken^ 

A fifth kind of moral evidence, is Report. 

The word has various significations, which 
it is not necessary to mention. It is here 
used to signify a rumour, or account of certain 
facts or events, more or less believed. If the 
account be fully credited, it then belongs to 
the article last mentioned. We are here not 
only without the testimony of any individual 
who professes to have observed the fact in 
question, himself; but we do not even know 
the channel through which the information 
came ; for, if this be known, it is not a sub^ 
ject of mere report ; but of remote testimony. 
Tlie weight of this species of evidence is 
much less, tlian of either of the preceding.^ 

^ According to the penpe in which our anthor uses 
the term * Re|)ort,' scriptural Christianity rests in no 



10*-^: THE DIFFERENT KINBSf 

It depends, partly, on a presimiption, that if 
there were not some ground for the report, it 
would not have arisen; and partly on expe- 
rience,, which points ou:t the circumstances^ 
that render it more or less credible-. These 
circumstances will be more conveniently men- 
ttoned in a subsequent chapter. 

Tradition^ is a sixth kind of moral evidence* 
It is the relation of a fact or event, which 
happened some time ago, and which was not 
committed to writing by any person who ob- 
served it, but was communicated from one to 
another, for a certain period of time. To 
this is to be attributed almost all the informa- 
tion, which we have of the history of nations 
in their infancy ^ and our knowledge of many 
circumstances belonging to particular persons^ 
or particular places, which are not recorded 
in history. But, the tendency of mankind to 
ex:ag;gerate, and to supply the defects of 
memory by invention, render accounts sa 
handed down, very uncertain. 

degree upon it. Christians, fn all" ag^^,^ t© tfie end of 
the world,, may, with the scriptuses in their hands, and 
with the evidence of their genuineness wi)icli we pos- 
sess, adopt the language of the apostle to the Hebrews, 
as theirs, and say, that the gospei they hold was ' con- 
firmed to us by them who. heard* the Lord Jesus him- 
self: i.e. their faith rests on the unquestionable tes- 
TiwoNY of eye and ear witnesses, and not on ' Uepoii* 
and far l^«^ oa Ttaditioa.— ^£i>^ 



OP MORAL EVIDENCfi. 103 

All the above kinds of moral evidence may 
be considered as external; because the evi- 
dence on which the proposed subject is be- 
lieved, does not arise from the subject itself, 
but from some external source. Besides 
these, there are other kinds, which, as they 
arise from the subjects themselves, may be 
considered as internal evidence. 

The first of these is analogy. This is 
when, from the resemblance, which tlie sub- 
ject in question bears to some other known 
subject, it is inferred, that they both had the 
same origin;* or both possess similar prop- 



** It IS from analogy, in part, that we cle<3uce tlj« 
proof of the apostle Paul's position that ' all Scripture 
is given by inspiration of God/ for^ supposing the proof 
of the genuineness of tlie Penteteuch, as the work of 
Moses, to be complei<i, and also, that of his moral hoti* 
esty, liis o\vn declarations, in that book, prove him to 
have b«en inspired, for he repeatedly records the de* 
claration ^ Thus saith the Lord ;' and with scarcely less 
frequency the command to loritc what was enjoined 
him. Now, if the Pentateuclr be inspired, an=alogy pre- 
sents the proof that the other scriptures are inspired 
also, from the similarity which one portion of the sa- 
cred volume bears to another, on all t^ssential points ; 
as, the nature of God, the principles of his government, 
the perfettion of his law&, the condition of man, the 
medium of salvation, the final states of men, &c., &e. 
Here are no conflicting statements; no contradictory 
revelations ; but, on all these, and many other kindred 
subjects, the inspired writers are truly one in their ei: 
hibitions. Analogy, then, infers tliat they were all 
under the guidance of one Spirit ; and that Spirit, i\ye 
same which dictated, to Moses, the Pentateuch* The 



X04 THE mFFERENT KINDS 

erties ; or, under similar circumstances, are 
likely to be affected in the same way ; or to 
produce the same effects. It is by this spe- 
cies of evidence that we are able to apply lo 
particular occasions, the greater part of the in- 
formation, which we have derived from person- 
?il observation, and the general observation of 
mankind. Thus, it is from the resemblance 
which a disorder, in a certain patient, bears 
in its symptoms to other disorders, which a 
physician has already observed, that he is 
able to ascertain its nature, and prescribe for 
its cure. 

The weight of the evidence by analogy, 
admits of great variety, according to the par- 
ticular nature of the subject, to which it is 
applied : and in every particular class of sub- 
jects, that weight must be determined by 
experience. For, experience will teach us, 
with what degree of safety, conclusions have 
been drawn in each class ; and therefore, with 
what degree of probability they may be drawr> 
ill future.. It should be, however, observed, 
that reasoning by analogy, is not as safe in 

triumphant, and unanswerable argument ofDryden is 
analogical : 

* Whence, but from heaven, could men, imskilled in arts^ 
Ih different ayes born, — in different parts, 
Weave such. agreeing truths? or how, or why, 
Should all conspire to cheat us with a lie? 
UnaskM their pains ; —- ungrateful their advice ; — 
§fl,arving their^ains ; — and martyrdom their price.' —^ Ep., 



OF MbHAl EVIDENCE. 105 

drawing general conclusions^ as in applying, 
to particular cases, the general truths already- 
established. 

Probable infere'ices, drawn from facts ^ or 
from premises, belong also to the head of in- 
ternal evidence. 

Inferences from facts are termed by hW" 
yers, presumptions ; and are opposed by them 
Xo positive proofs.^ These inferences are of 
greater or less weight, according as it is more 
or less probable, that the facts or circumstan- 
ces, already established, would not have ex- 
isted, unless the fact, which is inferred from 
them, had existed also.f 

* By positive proof is meant the evidence of testi- 
mony of men on oath, or of writings, or records. A 
just rule of iaw respecting presumptions is th-at they 
are to be relied upon only until the contrary b^ prov- 
ed. Blackstone, iii. 371. 

t In Gilbert's Law of Evidence, it is said, that * when 
the fact itself cannot be proved, that which combes near- 
est to the proof of the fact, is the proof of the circum- 
stances that necessarily, and usually attend such facts.' 
But, it should seem, that what affords a safe ground to 
infer the fact, is, not that, if the fact did exist, it would 
have been attended by such or such circumstances > 
but, that those circumstances would 4iot have existed, 
unless th^ panicular fact alleged had existed also. 
For, as there may be several different facts, which 
Would be attended by the same circumstances, the ex- 
istence of the circumstances affords no ground to con- 
clude which of those facts did actually exist. Just as, 
when a certain effect might be produced by several dif- 
ferent causes, we have no ground to infer by which of 

10 



106 THE DrFFERENT KINDS 

Thus, if on a remote island, a havel shouM 
' be discovered, it wauld naturally be inferred, 
that some human being had been there ; and 
this inference would ai^ount to a moral cer- 
lainty.^ Or, if a man be found dead in a 
house, with a bleeding wound, apparently 
made with a sword, and another man be ob- 
served running out of the house with a btoody 
sword in his hand, there being no other per- 
son found on the spot, a violent presumption 
would arise, that the fn^gitive was the mur- 
derer. For, though it be possible, that the 
deceased may have killed himself, yet, the 
hasty flight of this man, with the bloody 
weapon in his hand, are circumstances which 
|ive the inference considerable probability. 

those causes it was in reality proiluced. But, when 
there is only one cause which could have produced the 
effect, there we may safely infer the existence of the 
cja,use from that of tiie effect. 

* When the philosopher, Aristippus, who was cast 
away upon an unknown shore, beheld certain geomet- 
rical figures distinctly marked upon the sand, he was 
naturally led to conclude, with a degree of confidence 
BQt inferior to moral certainty, that the country was 
inhabited by men, some of whom were devoted to 
mathematical science. Now, had these figures been 
less accurately formed, and more like the work of 
chance, the preaamption, that the country was inhab- 
ited, would have been weaker ; and had they been of 
such a nature, as to leave U doubtful, whether the^y 
were the work of accident or design, the evidence 
wonld have been too ambiguous to serve as a founda^ 
tio.B fpt any opinipn^ 



OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 107 

So, also, a receipt for rent, clue at a certain 
time, affords a probable presumption, that the 
rents, which were due previous to that time^ 
had been paid. Thus, also, attempts to con- 
ceal, afford a presumption of guilt, and, on 
the contrary, openness* affords a presumption 
of innocence. 

Inferences from facts are deduced by anal- 

* How irresistible a presumption in favour of the 
reality of our Lord's resurrection is presented in the 
openness of the assertion made by his apostles that he 
was risen ! They were charged, on common report, 
with having stolen the body : now, on the principle 
laid down by our author, had they been guilty they 
would have concealed themselves, and said nothina: on 
the subject of the resurrection, at least, fur the time. 
They would moreover have left Jerusalem, if not Ju- 
dea ; and have endeavoured to obtain proselytes to 
the new faith in some remote and obscure place ; till, 
encouraged by numbers and the antiquity of the delu- 
sion, they miglit venture to hope either that no oppo- 
sition would be attempted when it should be promul- 
gated in Jerusalem, or that they had influence or 
authority sufficient to stifle it. On the contrary, they 
never left the city, till the descent of the Holy Spirit 
on the day of Pentecost ; nor even then ; though, very 
shortly, the storm of persecution beat fiercely upon 
them ; Acis 8 : 1, and so open were they in their asser- 
tion of the resurrection of their Lord ; and so certain 
that the fact was known to the rulers, that not only in 
Jerusalem, but in the very temple, and before the San- 
hedrim, they directly charge his murder on the rulers, 
and declare the fact of his resurrection. Impostors 
would not have done thus ; and the fact that they did 
BO, aff'ords strong presumption both of their innocence, 
and of the truth of what they asserted, viz; * that God 
had raised him [Jesus] from the dead.' Acts 2 : 24, 32. 
— Ed, 



108 THE DIFFERENT KINDS 

ogy. For, the presumption is founded on the 
resemblance which the fact in question bears, 
in its circurastancesj to other known facts. 

Tables, showing the probabilities of the 
duration of human hfe, are deductions from 
facts ; and the application of these tables to 
the assurance of lives, or the purchase of an- 
nuities, are probable inferences, drawn from 
the general truths laid down in them. 

So, also, the doctrine of chances consists 
of inferences from facts. That a die, for 
instance, has a certain number of sides, is a 
fact ; and that each side is as likely to come 
upwards, on being thrown, as any other, may 
be safely assumed. But the calculations of 
the chances of throwing an ace, or any other 
number, in one or more throws, are only prob- 
able inferences, drawn from these premises. 

But, as these subjects belong to the science 
of mathematics, rather than to that of general 
reasoning on matters of fact, it will be suffi- 
cient just to have mentioned them here. 

Of inferences from premises, it should be 
observed, that when they are intuitive and 
necessary, they belong to demonstration ; but, 
if they be only probable, they belong to moral 
evidence. 

~ Our conclusions from premises are safe, 
only when, and so far as, we have a clear 
and certain knowledge of the connexion or 
repugnance of their subjects and predicates. 



OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 109 

I say, only so far as we have this knowledge, 
because we may sometimes know that the sub- 
ject and predicate are connected, but be igno- 
rant of the nature and extent of that connexion ; 
and consequently we cannot safely draw a 
conclusion respecting its nature or extent. 
But, as this subject properly belongs to logic, 
and has been fully discussed by logicians, it 
will not be necessary to enlarge upon it here. 
Under the head of internal evidence, may, 
also, be mentioned the consistency of the 
parts of any relation of facts with each other ; 
the appearances of simplicity, or of art and 
contrivance, with which the relation is deliv- 
ered ; the candor or partiality, which appears 
in the relation ; the affording a fair opportu- 
nity* of detection of what might be false or 
erroneous ; or the studiously avoiding detec- 

* In commanding his disciples to commence the la- 
bour of evangelizing the world, at Jerusalem, our Lord 
Jesus afforded to his enemies every advantage they 
could desire, as it respects facility to refute the apostles 
if they asserted falsehood. They declared Christ to 
have risen, in the very city, where it took place ; within 
a few days of the event; and before the very persons 
who were most intensely concerned to disprove it, if it 
never occurred, and could have easily done so ; and, 
moreover, would have done so had it been in their 
power: for, to disprove this alleged fact, would repel 
the charge of bloodguiltiness laid against them, and 
prove that they had ordy lawfully condemned to death 
one who was proved an impostor by the falsification of 
his predictions that he would rise from the dead. — - Ed. 



110 OP MORAL EVIDENCE. 

tion, by an attempt to render the standard of 
truth,*^ upon the question, uncertain. 

The weight of evidence arising from these 
circumstances, depends on experience. For, 
it is by experience that we discover how far 
a person may have observed, correctly, some 
part of a fact, and incorrectly another part ; 
or what illusions of imagination he may have 
been subject to, during the progress of the 
event, which he relates. It is, also, by expe- 
rience, that we discover how far true relations 
usually differ from those that are false, in the 
other circumstances just mentioned. 

Upon the whole, it appears, that the two 
principal kinds of moral evidence, are Expe- 
rience and Testimony ; that the rest (except 
inferences from premises) are only combina- 
tions, or modifications of these ; and that the 
sphere of experience is greatly enlarged by 
testimony ; while, on the other hand, testimo- 
ny is restricted and confirmed by experience. 

* The apostles in their labours to establish Chris- 
tianity were open as daylight; and appealed to a stan- 
dard of truth, the authenticated ropies of which were 
in the possession of their enemies. Tliey preached 
first to Jews ; and, in all their addresses to thern, appeal 
to the writings of their own prophets. They assume 
the certainly of this standard, — one which their oppo- 
nents also admitted; and the openness, the frequency, 
the invariableness of this appeal (so entirely the reverse 
of an attempt to render the standard of truth uncertain, 
or to establish another standard) affords the most sat- 
isfactory, internal evidence of their honesty, and of the 
truth of their doctrines. — Ed. 



MOEAL REASOJ^mG, HI 



cHAPTfiR ni. 

'dJENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO MORAI. 
REASONING, 

Most of the directions, "here proposed, will 
fee found perfectly obvious; and therefore 
may be thought superfluous. But, obvious 
as they may be, to all who duly consider the 
subject, they are rarely attended to in prac* 
tice. And this is one reason why errors in 
judgment are so frequent. As they are-, 
probably, no where collected into one point 
of view, for the assistance of the student, they 
are here brought tt3gether for his use. It is 
to be wished, that in deciding on questions 
he would form a habit of reducing them to 
practice. SomB of ihem will appear not to 
relate immediately lo moral evidence, as de^ 
fined above. But, as the general questions 
to which they refer are most fretjuently of a 
mixed nature, involving in them matters of 
fact, or general truths deduced from observa- 
tion, as well as subjects of law, morality, or of 
some other art or science, and therefore re- 
quire a knowledge of moral evidence to their 
decision, it was thought useful to introduce 
them. 



112 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

The diirectKHis here proposedymay be more 
easily remembered, if they be collected under - 
separate heads, and methodically arranged. 
They shall be mentioned, therefore, in the 
following order^viz : First,, those which may 
be considered as a sort of previous qualifica- 
tions for tbie examination of questions in moral 
evidence. Secondly, those vvhicli should 
determine whether or not we ought to engage 
in the discussion of the question proposed. 
Thirdly, such as must be observed in the 
discussion of questions. And lastly, the prin- 
ciples on which the weight of any probable 
argument, or the probability of any event j 
ought to^ be determined. 

First. To qualify ourselves for the exam- 
ination of questions in moral evidence. 

1. We must acquire fixed principles of 
evidence,, and learn to apply them as steadily, 
and impartially, as possible. To this end we 
must acquaint ourselves with the sort of evi- 
dence, of which different subjects admit ; and 
form settled and steady notions of the weight 
of the different kinds of evidence, and of the 
eircumstaaces which contribute to weaken or 
confirm them. Thus, we shall engage in the 
discussion of subjects, with less danger of 
being biassed by interest, and, therefore^ with 
greater prababiitty of deciding justly. Noth- 
ing, perhaps^ has contributed more to the 
impartiality with which justice i^^ administered 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. US 

in our courts, than their having an established 
law of evidence, in which is laid down what 
evidence shall be admitted, and what rejected 
In private discussion, little progress seems ta 
have been made towards this important ob- 
ject. Hence, we see men attributing great 
weight to evidence in their favour, but very 
little weight to the same kind and degree of 
evidence, in opposition to them. Thus, dis- 
putants are like fraudulent tradesmen, who 
have two sets of weights, one to be employed 
in their purchases, and the other in their sales. 
2. We should acquire a habit of examin- 
ing, at the commencement of every discus^ 
sion, whether there be not some general prin- 
ciple, or some standard, by which the ques- 
tion must be determined. If there be, the 
discovery of it, will both direct our investiga- 
tion, and conduct us most speedily, and most 
securely to our deGision. But, if we neglect 
to discover it, we shall wander in our inquiry 
without an object, and, after all, seldom ar- 
rive at a just conclusion. For instance, ta 
determine whether a war were or were not 
successful, it should be ascertained at the 
outset, what constitutes a war successful. Sa 
also in deciding on the characters of men in 
any station of life, we should previously as- 
certain what are the duties of their station ;. 
and what are the qualities in which excellency 
ojf defect in thai line coasists, A cleat yiew 



114 GENERAL DIRECTfONS 

of these duties and qualities is also requisite 
to enable us to decide, whether a man be or 
be not fit for a certain employment. We 
must, however, be careful that the general 
principle which we assume, be both true in 
itself, and also, applicable to the point in hand ; 
and, to ascertain this, we should accustom 
ourselves to bring it forth to view, and to 
submit it to examination. This direction is 
the more necessary, because it is probable, 
that our decisions are often made upon latent 
principles, which if we were to examine, we 
should not suffer them to influence our deter- 
mination. 

3. We should acquire a habit of referring 
every thing, which will admit of it, to its end ; 
and of determining its value by its subservi- 
ency thereto. This will afford a just stand- 
ard on a subject, which would, otherwise, 
admit of none. 

Thus, in ascertaining what is the best style 
of writing, it should be considered, that the 
end of writing is to communicate ideas to the 
reader ; and therefore, that that must be the 
best style, which conveys them to him with 
the greatest clearness and force : compared 
with these qualities, ornament and dignity are 
but of little value. But, what that style is, 
which is most clear and forcible, must be de- 
cided by experience. If this rule be neglect- 
ed, decisions of questions of this kind, will 



DELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 115 

be left at the mercy of fashion and caprice, 
and therefore^ be generally erroneous. 

4. We must acquire clear and precise 
rules of judgment ; such as are capable of an 
easy application, and lead as nearly as possi- 
ble to certainty ; for they are valuable only 
as they possess these qualities. Rules, appa- 
rently precise, are often rendered vague, by 
some circumstance annexed to them, or by 
the introduction of indefinite limitations or ex- 
tensions. Thus, the rule, that the dealings of 
men with each other should be regulated by 
principles of equity, is both clear and precise 
in itself, and admits of an easy and tolerably 
certain application; because the value of eith- 
er property, or of services, may generally be 
estimated. But, if a provision be annexed 
to it, that one of the parties is to have rather 
the advantage, or according to the common' 
phrase, to have the turn of the scale in his 
favour, it then becomes indefinite, and very 
uncertain in its application. For, there is then 
nothing to direct the judgment, as to the de- 
gree in which the advantage is to be allowed, 
or how great a weight is to turn the scale. 

Such rules are generally worse than none ; 
because they induce men to attempt to decide 
by principles which cannot lead to a just de- 
cision. If they had no rule, they would either 
not attempt to decide at all, or would seek 
after some just principle, on which to ground 



116 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

their decision ; but having, what appears to 
be a rule, they proceed to decide, and are 
deceived. 

Secondly. To determine whether we ought 
to engage in the discussion of a question. 

1. We should consider whether the ques- 
tion be worth investigating ; and, to decide 
this, we should inquire of what importance^ 
the subject may be to us. Some subjects 
are important in themselves, or of importance 
to other men, while to us they may be of little 
consequence. Thus, many subjects in law 
or physic, may be of great moment to law- 
yers or physicians, but of little use to a divine, 

* Few persons, comparatively, enter on the study of 
the evidence by which tlie Christian religion is estab- 
lished, because there is a demand made on them of 
effort and labour in this study. But if the above rule 
were regarded, if young persons would but consider 
that there is no subject so important as this to them; 
for, thnt their eternal all is declared to rest on it, they 
would not leave all the study on this subject to minis- 
ters, and theological students, ar»d receive their dictum 
in relation to it, without personal examination. They 
would not be willing to leave entirely to the decision 
of a lawyer, the title to an estate in which they were 
interested : they would desire to know the principles 
upon which his decision was formed ; and this, because 
it involved their personal interest. Let them, then, 
consider whether the question of the truth of Christian- 
ity be not worth investigating; and we shall soon see 
them filling our Bible Classes; and by their earnest, 
pertinent, and modest inquiries, leading even our min- 
isters to a review of this subject, lest they should be 
at a^ loss to reply to them. — £d. 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 117 

a soldier, or a mechanic. And, should they 
employ in their investigation, the time which 
IS requisite to form a just judgment of them, 
they must neglect what belongs to their own 
station. But such subjects as belong to our 
peculiar line of life, or to our moral and re- 
ligious conduct, or health and happiness, are 
important to us ; and therefore, are worthy 
of our careful examination. 

2. Consider how far the question will ad- 
mit of being fully examined. Some subjects 
can scarcely be openly and fully discussed. 
The questions are already decided in the 
opinion of mankind, and their interest and 
prejudice forbid their examination. Argu- 
ments on one side, however weak, will be 
received with applause, while those on the 
other, however strong, will be heard with 
disgust. Thus, in a republic, arguments in 
favour of a monarchy, or in a monarchy, ar- 
guments in favour of a republic, will scarcely 
be duly examined. So also, when the cur- 
rent of popular opinion is in favour of war, 
arguments for peace will excite resentment ; 
or, when public animosities prevail, arguments 
in favour of the objects of general hatred will 
expose him who urges them to great odium. 

On such questions we should be extremely 
careful to divest ourselves of prejudice on 
either side. For truth does neither necessa- 
rily lie on the same side with the general 



118 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

opinion, nor on the contrary side. We must, 
therefore, examine such questions, as fairly 
as possible, on the ground of their own merits. 
But, in most cases, we should do this private- 
ly ; for a prudent man will be well assured 
that the duty of his station calls him to con- 
trovert the public opinion, before he exposes 
himself to the hatred of mankind by so doing. 
Sometimes the arguments which are nec- 
essary to the decision of a question, cannot be 
urged, without a violation of the respect due 
to persons in authority ; or without offending 
the person with whom we are discoursing, on 
account of the reflections which they must 
cast upon his conduct. Prudence must di- 
rect, whether the importance of the occasion 
will justify our incurring these evils or incon- 
veniences 5 or, whether it be not better to 
avoid the discussion altogether. For, it is 
evident, that if these arguments be not either 
urged at all, or not with due force, we cannot 
arrive at a just decision. In our private ex- 
aminations of such questions, we may, indeed, 
give every consideration its just weight, re- 
gardless of the discredit which it would throw 
on any person. This consideration, there- 
fore, can be no reason why we should not 
endeavour to form our private judgment of 
such questions, as correctly as possible. But, 
it is an important reason, why we should not 
debate them with others ; and that, not only 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 119 

on account of the evils above-mentioned, but 
also, lest, for want of a due consideration of 
the arguments necessary to a just decision, 
we become accessaries to their errors in judg- 
ment, and practice. 

3. Consider whether the question be ca- 
pable of a satisfactory decision. Some ques- 
tions cannot be determined, because the sub- 
ject admits of no standard, but is altogether 
of an arbitrary nature. Thus, matters of mere 
taste have, in general, no proper standard : 
and, therefore, according to the old adage, 
' de gustibus nil disputandum.' Others admit 
of no decision, because the subject, or pred- 
icate of the proposition, cannot be accurately 
defined. And others again do not afford suf- 
ficient evidence for a determination. From 
all such questions, it would be better to ab- 
stain. For, besides the loss of the time de- 
voted to them, which might be more profita- 
bly employed, their discussion has a tendency 
to confuse the judgment. 

4. We should consider whether we are 
competent to the discussion of the question. 
Incompetency may arise from a defect of 
abilities, or information ; or from our being 
too much interested in the decision. The 
last is, probably, the most frequent, as well as 
the most powerful source of incompetency ; 
for nothing blinds the eyes, and perverts the 
judgment, so much as interest. If the ques- 



120 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

tion, however, be such that, though interested 
in it, we are under a necessity of deciding it, 
we shall act prudently in taking the advice of 
some judicious friend, who is perfectly disin- 
terested. At any rate, our decision should 
be made with diffidence ; and we should be 
ready to listen to any objections which may 
fee urged against it. 

Tfeirdly . When we have determined to en- 
ter upon the investigation, we should examine, 
in the first place, whether the question be 
fairly and clearly stated, so as to bring the 
real point in dispute to an issue. Sometimes, 
through ignorance, and often by design, the 
statement of a question includes something 
taken for granted, which necessarily leads to 
a decision in favour of tire proposer. This 
amounts to begging the question ; and there- 
fore should not be admitted. Sometimes, 
the true point at issue is not expressed in the 
question, and then the discussion, however 
ably conducted, leads to no saitsfactory con- 
clusion. In this case, it would be proper to 
adopt the practice of special pleaders, and to 
ascertain all the points, in which we agree 
with our opponent, and those in which we 
differ from him. A new statement of the 
question may then be made, in which the er- 
rors of the former may be corrected. 

2. We should form as clear and precise 
ideas as possible of the proposition on which 



Delating to moral reasoning. 121 

Xve would decide ; and carefully distinguish 
It from all others with which it is in danger of 
being confounded. If it assert a fact, we 
should endeavour to understand clearly its 
nature and circumstances. This will enable 
Us to judge more easily and correctly of the 
weight of the evidence, which is brought to 
prove it. If it affirm or deny the nature or 
quality of any thing, we should gain as clear 
ideas as possible, both of its subject and pred- 
icate, as far as w^e undertake to judge of it. 
For instance, if a certain measure of admin- 
istration were asserted to be constitutional or 
unconstitutional, we should gain clear and 
precise ideas, both of the measure, and of the 
constitution, as far as can affect the question. 
For, without such clear and precise ideas, it 
must be impossible to form a just judgment 
on the subject. 

3. We should consider of what kind of 
evidence the proposed subject, under all its 
circumstances, is likely to admit ; and, if such 
evidence be produced in sufficient degree to 
counterbalance all that can be fairly urged 
against it, we should accustom ourselves to 
yield our assent. This direction is important, 
because we are often apt to expect stronger 
evidence, than the nature of the thing admits ; 
and thence, to feel dissatisfied, though the 
point be fairly proved. Thus, if in studying 
the evidence on any question of fact, we em- 
11 



122 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

ploy ourselves in examining whether there be 
not a possibility that it may be false, instead 
of considering whether there be not a suffic- 
ient probability that it is true, we shall cer- 
tainly raise strong doubts in our minds. But, 
then, we should not study the subject ration- 
ally.* Demonstration is the only species of 
reasoning, which, if even conducted correctly, 
can exclude the possibility of error. But 
facts do not admit of demonstration. They 
admit of moral evidence alone. The exam- 
ining, therefore, into the possibility of error is 
inconsistent with the nature of the subject, 
and an absurb practice. 

4. Since in most questions in moral evi- 
dence there are, as has been already observed, 
arguments on both sides, a view must be taken 
of all the material arguments on each side, 
before we proceed to a decision ; and this 
must be done with as much impartiality as 
possible. For, it is evident, that if we exam- 
ine one side with a prejudice in its favour, 
and the other with a prejudice against it, our 
decision is not likely to be correct. 

5. When the question to be decided is' 



* Infidels and skeptics are thus irrational. They must 
have demonstration on moral subjects (which is impos- 
sible) or they will not believe : i. e. they demand im- 
po^!sibilities, and yet claim the reputation of reasoners 
and philosophers ! How justly applicable to them is 
the language of the apostle, Rom. 1 : 22. — £o. 



tiELAl^lN(i to MORAL HiiASONlNG. ISS 

contained in any composition or treatise, or if 
we debate it with another person^ we should 
be upon our guard against the fascinations of 
expression. We are apt to be too much in- 
fluenced by elegance of language, or brillian-' 
cy of imagination.^ But, error is as often 
adorned with the flowers of rhetoric as truth. 
To judge correctly, we must divest every ar- 
gument of all its ornaments of style, and place 
it before us in a plain, simple dress ; for, then 
we shall be better able to estimate its real 
weight. 

6. Whenever the weight of an argument, 
or the decision of a question depends on de- 
grees^ we should examine whether those de- 

" We can scarcely too much admire the cool and 
unimpassioned manner in wliich the inspired writers 
record facts which are fundamental in the system of 
Christianity. In the poetry of the sacred volume there 
are some of the boldest flights of the muse, anywhere 
to he met with ; and in its narratives we cannot but 
admire the chasteness and elegance which guide the 
pen ; but never do the inspired writers suffer themselves 
to work on the scnsibililies of their readers, or make 
exhibitions of their own in their narratives. Even the 
record of the trial, condemnation, and crucifixion of 
Jesus is a mere record of tlie facts; and that, in lan- 
g«ag<». which might have been transmitted to Rome, as 
the State record of the official doings of the Procurator. 
Neither do the sacred writers utter a single invective, 
even against the traitor, Judas: but make a simple 
record of his doings, and leave the deeds themselves 
to awaken indignation against him. So safe are we 
from being influenced, in our belief x)f Christianity, by 
flowers of rhetoric, instead of the force of truth ! — Ed. 



124 GENKUAL DIRECTIONS 

grees be fairly staled ; and, we should exam- 
ine this carefully ; because their statement is 
too frequently fallacious. Thus, in questions 
respecting the comparative merit, or demerit 
of parties, whether public or private, the de- 
gree of virtue or vice is generally over-rated 
on one side, and under-rated on the other, ac- 
cording to the party espoused by the speaker. 

7. It should be remembered, that iheprob- 
ability, and not the possibility, of an event is 
the proper ground for our conclusions. The 
propriet} of this rule is too obvious to need 
proof. It has been, however, and is, too often 
disregarded ; as, when the prospect of a large 
prize in a lottery induces men to adventure, 
without a regard to the probability of success ; 
or, the fear of an injury induces them to pain- 
ful precautions, without considering the prob- 
ability of its happening. An instance of this 
kind is mentioned in the Port Royal Art of 
Thinking, of a princess, who, having heard 
that some persons had been killed by the fall 
of a roof, would never afterwards enter a 
house, without having it examined } and was 
so persuaded of the propriety of her conduct, 
that she deemed all those imprudent, who did 
not take the same precaution. This rule is 
also disregarded by those who offer to us pos- 
sibilities, as sufficient answers to arguments of 
probability ; a practice which is very common. 

It is of great importance, both to the ad- 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 125 

vancement of our knowledge, and to the hap- 
piness of our lives, to acquire a habit of dis- 
regarding, to a considerable degree, possibil- 
ities, and of forming our judgment, and regu- 
lating our hopes and fears, by the true proba- 
bility of the case. In some men, hope seems 
naturally to prevail, in others fear. The for- 
mer are apt to magnify a slight prospect of 
success into a strong probability ; and the lat* 
ter to increase too much the probability of 
dangers. The one dignify their rashness, by 
calling it a trust in providence : the others 
justify their timidity by naming it prudence. 
But, both of these dispositions need correc- 
tion, and both are capable of being regulated 
by a due attention to the principles of moral 
evidence. Notwithstanding this rule, when 
the event, if it should take place, is of vast 
importance ; and the line of conduct neces- 
sary to insure our safety, if it should happen, 
will be attended with no disadvantage, if it 
should not ; there its possibility may properly 
determine our conduct. Thus, for instance, 
if a house be on fire, its inhabitants should 
endeavour to effect their escape, even though 
there should be the greatest probability of 
their failing. Because, if they succeed, they 
save their lives ; but, if they fail, they suffer 
only what they would have suffered, had they 
made no attempt to escape ; and the smallest 
chance of success imaginable, is surely worth 



126 GfiNERAL UlRECTfON^ 

the pains and labour of the attempt. So afsd, 
the eternal judgnaent is an event of infinite 
importance. He, whose conformity to the 
directions of scripture, will insure his safety, 
if it should take place, will be no loser by 
that conformity, if it should not. Consequent- 
ly, the very possibility of an eternal judgment, 
is a sufficient reason to engage in a prepara- 
tion for it. This, however, is no exception 
to the rule, because, here the person h not 
supposed to draw any conclusion about the 
truth of the event. Decisions of questions of 
this kind, should proceed on a consideration 
of the importance of the event and its proba- 
bility combined, according to a principle ex- 
plained at the end of this chapter. 

8. It must be observed, that the force of 
proof does not depend upon the number of ar- 
guments on either side, but upon their weight. 
For, as in an account, there may be a num- 
ber of articles^ which amount only to a smal! 
sum altogether ; while there may be a single 
article, which greatly exceeds them in value ; 
so, a number of arguments may altogether 
weigh but little, while one single argument 
may be of great weight. 

9. When all the arguments on both sides 
have been fairly stated and examined, a judg- 
ment should be formed of the weight of each. 
Each side should then be summed up, and a 
balance struck ; and our decision should be 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 127 

on that side, on which the evidence prepon- 
derates. The necessity of attending to this 
rule is obvious. It is, however, often neglect- 
ed. The more usual practice is to consider 
the arguments on one side only. Often, men 
decide on the consideration of only one single 
argument on one side. Whence the frequen- 
cy of error is not surprising. 

10. If, upon examination, the evidence on 
both sides should appear equal, our judgment 
should be suspended ; but, if the evidence 
preponderates at all on either side, the assent 
must follow that preponderancy, and must 
also be regulated by the degree of it. As the 
degrees of preponderancy may vary almost 
infinitely, so the degrees of assent may vary 
almost infinitely too, as has been already men- 
tioned. If due care be taken to proportion, 
the degree of assent to the degree of prepon- 
derancy, it will prevent the errors, which 
would otherwise arise from precipitancy of 
judgment. Because, then, whenever any 
opinion is held on slight evidence, it will be 
held subject to further examination, and will 
be corrected, if further evidence on the sub- 
ject can be obtained. Besides, the person 
who so holds it, will probably be careful to 
express himself to others in such terms, as 
vyill convey to them a just idea of the degree 
of evidence, on which he has formed it.. 

Fourthly. To determine the weight of any 



r^S GENERAL BlRECTION^ 

single argument, or the probability of anj^ 
event. 

The chief difficulty consists in affixing a 
just value to each single argument ; but, if 
this be not done, it will be impossible to sunni 
up each side fairly, and of course impossible 
to strike a just balance. It may be thought 
impracticable to lay down any rules for the 
performance of this. And, indeed, no rules 
can be given, which will enable us to do it 
with certainty in any particular case ; other- 
wise, moral evidence would admit of Certain^ 
ty, as well as demonstration. But, if certainty 
cannot be obtained, it should be approximated 
as nearly as possible ; andj for this purpose^ 
we should avail ourselves of such directions, 
as will render us some assistance } though 
they be not capable of affording us all the 
help which we could wish. Now, the direc- 
tions for determining the probability of any 
event, or of any simple question, on which 
there is only one argument on each side, will 
be found applicable to the determination of 
the probability of single arguments in more 
complex questions. Such directions shall, 
therefore, be proposed. 

To determine the probability of an event, 
it should be considered, not nakedly, or by 
itself, but in all its circumstances* If all these 
circumstances be such as either never, or very 
seldom, have accompanied a falsehood, the 



ftElLATI^G to MOFvAL REASONING. 129 

€vent is to be regarded as probable; but, if 
tJiey be such as have usually accompanied a 
falsehood, it is then to be considered as im- 
probable. Or, that event, which, under sim* 
ilar circumstances, has more frequently hap- 
pened than Kot, is probable : and that, which 
under similar circumstances, has more fre- 
quently failed than taken place, is improbable. 
Or, again, that rule of judgment on subjects 
of the same nature with that which is propos- 
ed, which, in most cases, where it is fairly 
applied, leads to a right conclusion, is a just 
rule of probability ; while that, which most 
frequently leads to a wrong conclusion, is a 
wrong rule. All these rules amount nearly 
to the same thing } but they are given in these 
different forms ; because some subjects will 
admit of a more easy application of one, and 
others of another. They all require a refer- 
ence to experience, to determine what is pro- 
bable ; for, experience is the true criterion of 
probability. The more attentive we are to it 
in forming our judgments, the more correct 
they will be. And the larger our collection 
of experience is, whether founded on our own 
observation, or on that of others, the more 
capable shall we be of determining what is 
probable, and what is not. 

In many cases, we are not satisfied with 
knowing, in general, what is probable ; but 
we wish, further to know, in what degree it is 
12 



130 (GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

probable. This knowledge is important, when 
a question is to be decided by a comparison 
of opposite probabilities, or when there are 
arguments on both sides. Now, to determine 
tjiis, is a much more difficult thing than the 
former. It has, however, been done, and 
with sufficient accuracy, in some questions of 
as uncertain a nature, as any that can be pro- 
posed. Nothing, for instance, is more uncer- 
tain thim the duration of the life of individu- 
als. Yet, tables have been, formed to regulate 
the expectation of life at different ages, and 
with sufficient accuracy, to enable men to 
venture large sums of money in the purchase 
or sale of annuities, and insurance of lives 
with success. And, probably, if similar meth- 
ods were adopted, and applied whh as much 
care ta other subjects, the comparative prob- 
ability of many of them might be as correctly 
ascertained. These tables were formed by 
an application to experience. For, it was by 
observing how. rnany persons, out of a given 
number, died at each particular age, that 
their rules were laid down. In all cases, which 
admit of it, experience should be the founda- 
tion af our rules; aiid happily, a great part 
of the cases, which we have to decide, will 
adniit of that foundation. 

In con3ulting experience, we ^jre to. con- 
sider,, not merely how tliQ thing in question 
ba^ most frequency bapp^ened ; for, this will 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 131 

enable us to determine only in general, that 
it is more probable that it will happen so, than 
the contrary ; but, we are to consider, how 
much oftener it has happened so, than other- 
wise ; for, this will teach us in what degree 
the event is probable. For instance, if I had 
observed only, that out of a number of per- 
sons, who had eaten of a certain fruit, morjB 
had been injured by it than not, I could then 
pronounce only, in general terms, that it 
would probably be injurious to any person 
who should eat of it. But, if I had observed, 
that only one third of the number had escap- 
ed injury, I might then conclude, that the 
probability of its being injurious to any one 
who should eat of it, would be as two to one ; 
or, if I had observed, that only one in a hun- 
dred had escaped injury, I might conclude, 
that it would be as ninety-nine to one. 

Two points, however, must be attended to 
in forming our rules of probability from expe- 
rience, in ascertaining both what is probable, 
and in what degree it is so. 

The first is, to make our observations on 
as large a scale as possible. For, the more 
extensive the scale is, the nearer will the rules 
founded upon it approach to truth. Thus, if 
we had known of only two, or three persons, 
who had eaten of the fruit, we could not as 
safely trust to a conclusion drawn from this 
experience, as if we had known of ten j nor, 



132 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

if ten had been the number, could it be as 
safely trusted as if we had known of a hun- 
dred ; nor, if it had been a hundred, as if it 
had been a thousand, and so on. Because, 
when our observation is confined to a small 
number, there is a greater danger of the ope- 
ration of the cause being affected by unknown 
circumstances, than where it is larger. And, 
the larger the number is, it is less probable 
that the interfering circumstances should ex- 
ist, and yet be undiscovered ; and the more 
probable that the cause is connected with the 
observed effect, and regulated in its opera- 
tion, by some established law of nature. Be- 
sides, where our observation is extensive, we 
are enabled to determine better respecting 
.the energy of the cause ; and, whether there 
exist more or fewer circumstances which can 
prevent, or interfere with its operations ; and, 
perhaps, what those circumstances are. Thus, 
when the vaccine inoculation had been tried 
on only a few patients, though its success ex- 
cited the attention of inquiring men, yet they 
would not presume to decide whether the 
disease which it occasioned were mild and 
safe, and whether it would secure the patient 
from the infection of the small pox. But, as 
the instances of its success multiplied, their 
doubts have been gradually overcome. And, 
now that these instances are very numerous, 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 133 

their judgment of the propriety of the prac- 
tice is established. 

The other point to be attended to is, that 
the facts on which our rules are founded, 
have been similarly circumstanced with those 
to which they are to be applied. For, if this 
be neglected, w& shall be exposed to contin- 
ual errors. Thus, if an epidemical disease, 
which proved more fatal to persons of one 
age, than to those of another, raged in the 
city, from which tables of the expectation of 
life were formed ; and the observations were 
made at the time when that disease prevailed, 
they would lead to false conclusions ; and 
they, who acted on those tables, would fall 
into great, and perhaps ruinous mistakes. 
For, they would judge of the probability of 
the duration of human life in ordinary circum- 
stances, by observations made in extraordi- 
nary cases. 

To judge of the similarity of circumstances, 
it is necessary to distinguish those which may 
affect the event in question, from those which 
cannot; for the latter must be neglected, but 
the former carefully attended to. To make 
this distinction is often very difficult. For, 
many circumstances, which have been thought 
immaterial, have, upon a closer examination, 
and further discoveries, been found of great 
moment. No rule, however, but attention to 
experience, or engaging in a course of exper- 



134 GENERAL BiRECtlOxVS 

iments upon the circumstances, can be given, 
to make this distinction correctly. 

Some subjects, from their nature, are more 
capable of being reduced to the test of expe- 
rience than others. Of many, we have not 
sufficient opportunities of observation, to war- 
rant a general conclusion ; or those opportu- 
nities happen at too distant periods to enable 
us to make a fair comparison of the events ; 
or the facts are involved in too intricate, or 
perhaps, dissimilar circumstances, to afford 
any deductions. We ourselves, also, are too 
inattentive to them while passing, and recol- 
lect them too imperfectly afterwards, to form 
a correct judgment of them. But, if there be 
any particular subjects, on the probability of 
which it may be peculiarly important to us to 
decide, we must apply ourselves to them with 
more than ordinary care. We must avail 
ourselves of every opportunity of observing 
them ourselves, or learning the observations 
upon them of others. We must not trust to 
memory, but carefully write down the facts, 
and all the material circumstances with which 
they were attended. We must do this from 
time to time, as we make our observations. 
Thus we shall be continually collecting mate- 
rials, from which a comparison may be made, 
and a correct judgment formed. For exam- 
ple, if I were desirous of ascertaining whether 
men were more influenced by a prejudice in 



^iSLATiNG TO MORAL REASONING. 135 

fevour of t)ld t^ustoms, or by a love of novelty, 
I would Write dowii, under separate heads, 
every instance of the influence of either, with 
which I met, either by observation, or in con- 
versation^ or in reading; and, at the same 
time, set down all the circumstances attend- 
ing each particular case, as far as 1 could col- 
lect them. Or^ if I wished to ascertain, 
whether mankind ai^ move disposed to resist 
a lawful government, than submissively to en- 
dure a tyrannical one, 1 would collect, under 
separate heads, all the pertinent instances, 
together with their circumstances, with which 
I could meet. The greater part of these must 
necessarily be furnished from history; and 
therefore, in the course of my historical stud- 
ies, I should continually keep in mind, that I 
had such a collection in hand, that I might 
avail myself of every instance which occurred. 
Many such questions might be nrjentioned, on 
which evidence should be continually collect- 
ed in the same way. To so laborious prac- 
tice, few, perhaps, would be willing to sub- 
mit. But, it is obvious, that it would enable 
us to decide questions much more accurately 
than men usually do. For, a great many of 
the instances, which are necessary to be con- 
sidered, in order to a right decision, have 
passed by them unobserved; many which 
were observed, are forgotten ; and many are 
not in their recollection, when their determi- 



136 GENERAL, DIRECTl^IONK 

nation is made: and thus their decision h 
founded on a few instances,, which,, from in- 
terest or passion, or some peculiar circum- 
stances,, had fixed themselves in their mind. 
Decisions, upon so partial a view of a ques- 
tion,, must generally he erroneous. If ques- 
tions occur, on which we have made no col- 
lections, or if we cannot bring ourselves to the 
practice of so laborious a method as that 
which has been just mentioned, we ought to 
recollect,, as fairly and clearly as possible, all 
the instances af similar cases, which hav^e 
come to our knowledge i that oux decisions 
Hiay, as much as possible, be foimded upon 
experience. For, thus our judgment, having 
something to direct it, will be left less at the 
mercy of our interests and affections, nnd, 
consequently, its decisions will be more likely 
to he correct;. 

Although the reasoning upon conclusions 
already established by moral evidence, must 
become more and more uncertain, the farther 
we proceed ; yet,, as in some cases, it may be 
necessary, it will be proper ta give some di- 
rections relative to that procedure. In doing 
this, we have only to relate the principles 
which are laid down by mathematical writers 
iipon the doctrine of chances. They repre- 
sent certainty by unity ; and every probability 
by a fractioA„ whose numerator is the number 
of chances of th^ events happening, and whosQ? 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 137 

denominator is ihe number, both of its hap- 
pening and failing. Thus, if an event have 
three chances for its happening, and two of 
its failing, the sum of which being five, the 
fraction f will be the probability of its hap- 
pening, and f of its failing. Or, to express 
the same in other words, the denominator of 
the fraction expresses the whole number of 
the events observed, and the numerator the 
number observed to happen in a particular 
way. 

To render this more easy to persons who 
have never studied mathematics, or the higher 
parts of arithmetic ; suppose that out of 100 
persons, who had been known to eat of a cer- 
tain fruit, 75 had been injured by it ; then 
the probability of its being injurious to any 
person who was going to eat of it, would be 
expressed by the fraction yVoj which, being 
reduced to its lowest terms, is f ; consequent- 
ly, the probability of safety in eating of it is 
-J. This is the method of proceeding in a 
question, consisting of only one step. But, 
if a second step be necessary, then the same 
process must be repeated to ascertain its prob- 
ability, considered independently ; and, after 
that, both steps are to be combined by multi- 
plying together the fractions so found, for the 
second conclusion. Thus, suppose as before, 
75 out of the 100 had been injured by eating 
of the fruit J aod th^t out of every 10, who 



138 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

had been injured by it, 4 had died ; then, to 
discover what probability of death there was 
in eating of it, I must muhiply xVo? or rather 
I into y\, which will give ^-f , which is equal 
to Y%. Hence the probability of surviving the 
eating of it, will be expressed by -^q. In the 
same way we proceed for every other conclu- 
sion, always ascertaining the fraction, expres- 
sive of the probability of the given step inde- 
pendently, and then multiplying that fraction 
into the conclusion last established, for the 
next conclusion.^ 

Sometimes, without entering into a partic- 
ular examination of a question, a tolerable 
judgment may be formed of it from a general 
view of the fairness or unfairness with which 
it is treated. This general view, however, 
will not warrant a high degree of assent ; both 
because we may be mistaken in the appear- 

* An apology may, perhaps, be necessary for intro- 
ducing numerical calculations into a work of this na- 
ture, and proposing them as examples of the mode of 
reasoning on topics of moral evidence. But, if the ac- 
curacy of numbers be not attainable on the particular 
subject of our inquiry, the general plan liere given 
must be pursued, if we would arrive at a just conclu- 
sion. And, as this plan admits of being described 
both more clearly, and more correctly, by means of 
numbers, than by general terms, they afford the best 
standard for our practice. Indeed, such is the vague- 
ness of language on subjects of this nature, that terms 
can scarcely be found to describe the mode of proceed- 
ing with sufficient accuracy, and clearness, to afford 
&ny direction^ capable of l^ing reduced to practice/ 



RELATING TO MOHAL REASONING. 139 

ances ; and because a point which is really 
true, may be treated unfairly, through want 
of skill in those who maintain it, or from the 
uifluence of a bad habit ; but it may, not- 
withstanding, afford a considerable degree of 
probability. The principles on which this 
probability depends, are as follows : first, that 
truth is always consistent with itself; i. e. that 
one truth harmonizes with others ; and that, 
in order to its establishment, it can never be 
necessary, that any just principle of evidence, 
knowledge, or morality, should be set aside, 
or perverted ; and consequently, that no unfair 
practices can be requisite to maintain it. 
And, secondly, our experience, that when men 
maintain a cause, which they are conscious is 
just, they are desirous that it should evidently 
appear so to be; and, that this desire is so 
strong, that it always influences their conduct, 
except when it is prevented by some power- 
ful motive to the contrary ; and, on the other 
hand, that when they are conscious that their 
cause is unjust, they naturally shrink from fair 
examination. So constant is this experience, 
that it has become proverbial that openness 
is an evidence of innocence,* and secrecy, or 
a desire of concealment, an evidence of guilt. 
There are, indeed, some affairs of a nature 
so entirely private, involving only the interests 

* See Noto on pago 107, 



140 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

of the agent himself, or his particular connex- 
ions, that nobody else has any right to be ac- 
quainted with them. In these, every man is 
at liberty to be as secret as he pleases ; and 
his secrecy affords no evidence of guilt. But, 
in all other cases, the argument from experi- 
ence is well founded. For, experience shews, 
that an honest man is impatient of suspicion, 
and in order to free himself from it, will do 
all in his power to bring the cause w^iich he 
maintains, into as clear a light as possible. 

One part of moral evidence relates to the 
truth ,or falsehood of propositions : another 
respects things, as whether they are good or 
bad, eligible or ineligible ; or, when two things 
are proposed to our choice, which of them 
should be preferred. But, as when we speak 
of them, we make propositions respecting 
them, this latter part resolves itself into the 
former. Its importance, however, renders it 
worthy of a separate discussion ; and, indeed, 
some points in it require particular directions. 

To determine whether a thing proposed be 
good or bad, eligible or ineligible, we must 
state all its advantages on the one side, and 
all its disadvantages on the other ; and decide 
according to the preponderancy of the former, 
or the latter. The necessity of this arises 
from the mixed nature of things ; there being 
scarcely any thing entirely good, or entirely 



helating to moral reasoning. 141 

bad; entirely beneficial, or entirely prejudi- 
cial. Hence, if we consider only one side 
of the thing proposed, we cannot possibly 
form a correct judgment, or a judicious 
choice. 

In estimating advantages and disadvanta- 
ges, we must not confine our views to those 
which are immediate, but extend them to 
more remote and general consequences ; and 
take care not to over-rate those which are 
near, and under-rate those which are distant. 
For, immediate benefits are often productive 
of remote and general evils, and immediate 
disadvantages of remote and general benefits. 
Our choice, therefore, lies frequently, perhaps 
generally, between our present interest, which 
is comparatively small, and of short duration, 
and our future, but extensive good. Thus, 
youth cannot be well educated without a de- 
gree ol study, which is, at the time, extreme- 
ly painful, and to which, if left to their own 
choice, they would scarcely ever submit. 
Wealth can rarely be acquired without appli- 
cation to business, and the sacrifice of ease 
and pleasure. Health cannot be preserved 
without restraint of the passions and inclina- 
tions. Character cannot be established, with- 
out resisting the solicitations of interest. And 
virtue cannot be attained without opposing 
temptations, the compliance with which would 
produce immediate gratification or advantage. 



142 GEiNERAL DIRECTIONS 

Hence, virtue has been well described, as the 
sacrifice of the present to the future, and vice 
as the sacrifice of the future to the present. 
It is, therefore, of great importance both to 
happiness and virtue, to acquire a habit of con- 
sidering remote and general consequences, 
and to allow them due influence on our judg- 
ment. 

We should, also, be particularly careful 
that the statement of advantages and disad- 
vantages, be correct. For, in this we are 
exposed to great danger of delusion ; and, 
that the danger of that delusion is real, and 
not imaginary, is too evident from experience. 
We seldom find that things turn out in posses- 
sion, what we had represented them to our- 
selves in prospect. The great cause of this 
disappointment is, that if we happen to like 
the thing proposed, we give too much liberty 
to our imaginations to exaggerate its advanta- 
ges, while we suppress many of its disadvan- 
tages, and lessen others. On the other hand, 
if we dislike the thing, we over-rate its evils, 
and under-rate its benefits. Thus, our deter- 
minations are made by passion, rather than by 
judgment ; they cannot, therefore, be expect- 
ed to be prudent. So also, when other men 
would persuade us to the choice of any partic- 
ular thing, or to engage in any undertaking, 
they generally over-rate its advantages, and 
under-rate its disadvantages, or the trouble 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 143 

and expense necessary to insure success. 
We should, therefore, suspect the fallacies to 
which their statements are liable in these 
particulars, and examine them with the most 
rigid accuracy. Thus, people are often in- 
duced to engage in building upon a low esti- 
mate being given them of the expense, when 
they would not have engaged in it, had they 
known the real cost. 

What has been said, relates to those ad- 
vantages and disadvantages which constantly 
attend the subject proposed, and which, there- 
fore, may be considered as morally certain. 
With respect to such as are contingent,, the 
rule is, that we should form our expectation 
of them by a fair consideration of experience, 
and not suppose that our case will prove an 
exception to the general observation of man- 
kind. The degree, in which this rule is dis- 
regarded, and the mischievous consequences 
arising from that disregard, show that it eaa- 
not be too strongly impressed upon our mindsv 
We see men continually plunging themselves^ 
and those who are under their direction, into 
vice and misery i not because they are igno* 
rant of the general experience of mankind oa 
the point in question, but because they pre^ 
sume, that their case will be an exception to 
the general rule. Thus, men place their 
sons in lines of life, proverbially dissolute, or 
dishonest, and yet trust that they will resist 



J 44 General directions 

the temptations which have overcome, by far^ 
the greater number of those who have been 
exposed to thern,^ These are sad delusions* 

^ Experionce is disregarded in a similar way when 
men put a confidence in persons of certain lines of life, 
the members of which are known to liave been almost 
nniversally unworthy of confidence. In these cases, 
also, they err, not because they arc ignorant of the re- 
sult of experience, but because they suppose their case 
lo be an exception to the general rule. In defence of 
this disregard of experience, it is sometimes urged, tliat 
it does not foUotOy that because men in that station 
have been in general unworthy of confidence, the man 
in whom we confide is so too. But I ask, what is 
meant by this expression, it dors not follow? if it 
mean that it is not a probable consequence, the asser- 
tion is not true; both because it is probable that men 
in similar situations, exposed to similar temptations and 
under similar circumstances, will be afi^ected in the 
same way ; and because in almost every line of life 
there are certain modes of action established by cus- 
tom, and custom is by almost all men regarded as a 
law. But, if the expression mean that it is not a certain 
consequence, I answer, this is nothing to the point. 
For human conduct is to be regulated, not by demon* 
strative, but by moral evidence, vvJiich does not admit 
of certainty. A further defence of tins disregard of ex- 
perience is often grounded on the superior principles 
which, it is alleged, the person in whom we confide 
possesses beyond other men in similar situations. In 
deciding, however, on the existence of these superior 
principles, no allowance is made for the danger of de- 
lusion, arising from friendship, interest, or party : a 
danger which facts show to be extreme. Other men 
have known the general rule derived from experience 
as well as we. They, too, have determined their case 
to be an exception to it ; and in making that determi- 
nation they have been generally deceived. This shews 
that it is most probable, that we too shall be deceived 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 145 

In all cases, it is most probable, that we, and 
those under our directions, shall experience 
what most others, similarly circumstanced, 
have experienced. This is the only principle 
on which we can judge with safety, and, 
when we disregard it, we delude ourselves, 
and do not make a fair use of our talents. 

To determine whether it be prudent to en- 
gage in the pursuit of any proposed object, 
we should first consider, whether success in 
its pursuit be uncertain, or subject to no rea- 
sonable doubt. If that success be a moral 
certainty, then our decision must be made by 
a comparison of the importance of the object, 
with the trouble and expense of the pursuit. 

in following their example. It is in this way that ex- 
perience becomes of so little use to men in directing 
their conduct. I do not say, that there may not be 
exceptions to general rules. But I say, that wo cannot 
be too careful in examining whether or not our case 
be really an exception ; and that wo ought to have 
strong, positive, direct evidence that it is so ; other- 
wise, we are not justifiable in disregarding general 
rules. It is, however, observable, that when men are 
not influenced by interest, friendship, or party, they 
are rarely deluded by these pretended exceptions. 
Thus, few people disregard the general character of 
horse dealers in their transactions with them. They 
generally make use of all the skill which they possess, 
in examining the ho:se m hich they are going to pur- 
chase ; and yet, after all, they are frequently deceived. 
But, this is not because of the confidence which they 
repose in them, but because the skill of the dealer in 
concealing the defects, exceeds their skill in detecting 
them. 

13 



146 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

But, if it be uncertain, then the consideration 
of the probability of success must be com- 
bined with that of the importance of the ob- 
ject, and these two together must be compar- 
ed with the trouble and expense of pursuit. 
In general, too, another consideration is nec- 
essary. Since one object can seldom be 
pursued without relinquishing another, a 
judgment of the value of the object to be re- 
linquished, must be formed in the same way, 
and the comparison of the two must direct 
our determination. In like manner, the value 
of two or more objects proposed to us, out of 
which one is to be chosen, may be ascertained 
and compared, that we may decide which is 
to be preferred. For instance, should a man 
be in doubt whether he should bring up his 
son to the bar, or to agriculture, he should 
consider, on one side, the rank and fortune 
which successful counsellors usually obtain ; 
and combine this consideration with the prob- 
ability of success. As this probability is very 
small, it reduces, very much, the value of the 
expectation to be reasonably entertained. 
From this value he should make a suitable 
deduction, for the expensive education for the 
bar. On the other side, he should consider 
the fortune usually acquired in farming, and 
should combine this fortune with the proba- 
bility of success ; and then make a suitable 
allowance for the very little expense incurred 



RELATING TO MORAL REASONING. 147 

in the education of a farmer. The superior 
rank of the one may be considered as an 
equivalent for the more agreeable occupation 
of the other, and therefore, both may be ne- 
glected. The result of the consideration 
would, perhaps, be, that the superior fortune 
and dignity of the one, was more than com- 
pensated by the superior probabihty of suc- 
cess, and the small expense in the other.* 

* In subjects, which both admit and require greater 
accuracy, the following method may be pursued. 

To determine the value of a proposal : — If the attain- 
ment of the object admit of no reasonable doubt, then 
from the value of the object in itself considered, we are 
to deduct the expense and trouble of pursuit, and the 
remainder is the value of the proposal. Thus, if the 
proposed object be worth $1000, and the expense in- 
curred in the pursuit, together with a reasonable com- 
pensation for trouble and loss of time be $150, the 
value of the proposal is then $350. But, if the attain- 
ment of the object be uncertain, then the probability of 
success must be ascertained, by a consideration of how 
many, out of as large a number of persons as possible, 
engaged in the same pursuit, and similarly circumstan- 
ced with ourselves, have succeeded. The probability 
thus found, must he expressed by a fraction, as before 
directed. That fraction must be multiplied into the 
value of the object. From this product, the compen- 
sation for expense, trouble, and time, must be deduct- 
ed. The remainder is the value of the proposal. Thus, 
suppose, as before, the value of the object to be $1000, 
and that three out of every four persons engaged in the 
pursuit, under similar circumstances with ourselves, 
have stjcceeded : then multiplying 1000 by |, it pro- 
duces $750 ; from which deduct, as before, $150, and 
the remainder $000 is the value of the proposal. In 
like manner may be ascertained, the value of an object 
to be relinquished ; or the values of several objects 
proposed to us, out of which we are to choose one. 



148 GENERAL DIRECTIONS 

It is obvious, that all subjects do not re- 
quire equal care in regulating our choice ; 
but, that our care should be proportioned to 
the importance of the subject. And, if our 
determination will admit of no correction, but 
we must abide by our choice, w^iether wise 
or foolish, we can scarcely be too attentive 
to the examination of the grounds on which 
it is made, according to the old adage, ' de- 
liberandum est diu, quod semel statuendum 
est.' 

To regulate our judgment in the advice 
which we give to others, we must consider 
what is likely to suit their constitutions, abil- 
ities, finances, habits, feelings, taste, and other 
circumstances : for, as people differ much in 
these respects, the same advice cannot be 
suitable to all. The chief difficulty arises 
from the ideas of good and evil, which our 
own dispositions, habits, and circumstances, 
have impressed on our minds, and which are 
so strongly associated wMth their respective 
objects, that they can scarcely be separated. 
Hence, we can scarcely avoid making our- 
selves a standard for others ; and thus over- 
looking the difference of their circumstances,, 
which should make a correspondent difference 
in the advice w4iich we should give them^ 
But, when the subject of advice has any re- 
lation to morality, no circuiMStanceSy but tbos^ 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 149 

which make a part of the definition of the 
duty, and thus constitute an essential part of 
the moral nature of the subject, should make 
any alteration in our advice. For such im- 
material circumstances as feelings, habits, &c. 
make no difference as to moral duty. 



CHAPTER IV. 

SPECIAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO EACH KIND OF 
MORAL EVIDENCE. 

Personal Observations, and the observa- 
tion of others, coincide in so many particulars, 
that repetition will be avoided by treating of 
them together. 

" 1. Consider whether you are properly 
qualified to ascertain, by observation, the 
properties of the subject proposed. 

This rule is of especial importance in all 
such subjects, as require previous information 
or great skill, or a nice discernment in making 
the experiments. Thus, should any one, unac- 
quainted with the elements of chemistry, the 
accuracy requisite in chemical experiments, 
or the various ways in which fallacies may 
arise in them, engage in a course of experi- 



150 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS ^ 

ments he could not safely trust to their result* 
Incapacity for making observations correctly, 
may arise from other sources besides the 
want of talents, or of previous information. 
Religious or political prejudices may also dis- 
qualify a man for a fair deduction of general 
conclusions from an observation of mankind. 
And, in general, prejudice and interest, ren- 
der our observations suspicious. 

This rule applies equally to the observation 
of others. It teaches us not to trust to their 
observations, unless we may presume ihem 
to have been fair and capable observers. 

2. Be careful to ascertain the circumstan- 
ces under which your observations were made. 
For the events of things depend on circum- 
stances, and often on circumstances which 
might be thought incapable of influencing 
them. Their events, therefore^ under one 
set of circumstances, can aftbrd no rule for 
judging of them under another. Thus, in 
the case of the King of Siam, mentioned 
above, it was not considered that his obser- 
vations on water were made on degrees of 
heat, very different from those under which 
the Ambassador asserted that it would be 
converted into ice; nor was it considered, 
that though, in certain latitudes, the cold 
might never exceed a certain degree, it could 
not thence be inferred, that it might not ex- 
ceed it in other latitudes. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 151 

As it was remarked before, a distinction 
must be made between such circumstances, as 
can affect the event, and such as cannot ; and 
experience alone can teach us how to make 
this distinction. This rule, also, is equally 
applicable to the observations of others. 

3. Take care that your conclusions be not 
drawn from the observation of too small a 
number of subjects ; or rather, that the de- 
gree of your assent to them be proportioned 
to the extent of the materials from which they 
are drawn. For, though a very few obser- 
vations may warrant a conjecture, we cannot 
safely consider a general truth as established, 
without the observation of many subjects of 
the same kind. In this respect, however, a 
difference must be made in the different kinds 
of subjects, according as they are of a more 
uniform or a more various nature. For, 
fewer observations will warrant a general 
conclusion, on such subjects as minerals, 
earths, or vegetables, than on the effects of 
things on mankind. We are in too much 
haste to draw general conclusions, and are 
unwilling to wait, till we are possessed of nia- 
terials, from which they may be safely drawn. 

In the application of this rule to the obser- 
vations of others, there is some difficulty. 
For we are often incapable of knowing the 
extent of the subjects on which their obser- 
vations were made j and men are apt to speak 



152 SPECIAL DIRECnOBTS 

of them as more extensive than they were. 
We can overcome this difficuhy only by con- 
sidering their general habits of accuracy in 
observation, and correctness in statement. 
Our knowledge of these habits must be at- 
tained, either by an acquaintance with the 
character of the particular individual, with 
whose observations we are furnished , or, by 
a consideration of the general character of 
the profession to which he belongs. For, as 
was remarked before, the observations of the 
members of some professions, are more wor- 
thy of credit than those of others. 

4. In subjects which are observed to be 
various, we can know what event is probable, 
in any particular case, only by considering 
how it has most frequently happened. And 
we can ascertain the degree of that probabil- 
ity only, by collecting the number of cases, 
in which it has been observed to happen in 
each way; and, taking those numbers as the 
ratio, which the probability of its happening 
in one way, bears to that of its happening in 
the other. But, this point has been suffi- 
ciently discussed before. 

5. It is also to be remembered, that the 
utmost that can be accomplished in such 
subjects, is to ascertain, not what actually 
will happen in each particular case, but only 
what is most likely to happen ; or what may 
be expected, in a certain proportion, out of a 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 158 

given number of cases. Hence, he who as- 
sures a single life on the most correct princi- 
ples of assurance, may be a loser ; while, 
had he assured a thousand lives on the same 
principles, he might have been a gainer. 

A few further cautions may be given, to 
regulate the credit which should be given to 
the observations of others. 

1. If they state the facts, from which they 
deduced their observations, we should con- 
sider whether they had sufficient ground for 
their conclusions ; or, if they relate the pro- 
cesses of their experiments, we should ex- 
amine how far they were likely to afford an 
accurate result. 

2. We should consider how far the obser- 
vations of others concur with our own. If 
they coincide, our deductions are evidently 
confirmed ; but, if they differ, we should 
re-examine the ground on which we made 
our observations, and our ability to make them 
fairly ; and carefully inquire, whether we or 
they were more likely to be mistaken. 

It is a rule of evidence, that credit should 
be given to every man in his own profession. 
And, on the whole, this is a safe rule. For 
though erroneous opinions may be entertained 
by persons in most lines of life, and may be 
persisted in through prejudice, yet a certain 
degree of success does attend their judging 
and acting on the opinions which they hold : 
14 



154 SPECIAL DIRECTIONSr 

wherea% were the plans of inexperienced 
persons^ or those of speculative projectors 
followed^ very few of them would be found 
to succeed at all. Thus, were farmers, in- 
stead of being disposed to follow the practice 
of their forefathers, ready to adopt every new 
plan proposed to them as an improvement, 
they w^ould involve themselves in losses, and 
the public might be injured by a scarcity of 
grain. There is, however, a mean. A man: 
should be so far ready to adopt plans of im-^ 
provenaent, as to be willing to try them on a 
small scale y but he should pursue, steadily^ 
his old plans, till experience had sanctioned 
the new ones. If experienced men in any 
line shall have relinquished an old practice, it 
may be reasonably presumed, that they have 
done so on the authority of experience. 

3. We should consider how far they, who 
furnished 4is with their observations, were 
likely to relate them faithfully. Here, the 
nature of the subject must direct us; for, if 
it be connected with any parly-prejudices,, 
political, religious, or literary ; or be likely 
to promote any private interest, or gratify the 
vanity of the observer ; his fidelity in the re- 
lation is less deserving of credit, than it would 
otherwise be«. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 155 

To regulate the credit to be given to Tes- 
timony."^ 

It should be recollected, that Testimony 
relates to specific facts or events, and not to 
general conclusions, deduced from the obser- 
vation of a variety of facts of the same kind j 
and, that it is the evidence of a person, who 
declares that he. himself saw or heard what 
he relates, and not that he was informed of it 
by others. To determine whether his evi- 
dence be worthy of credit at all, or how far 
it is so, the following particulars must be at- 
tended to. 

1. It should be considered how far the 
thing in itself, and under its proposed cir- 
cumstances, is credible or incredible. f For, 

* Several of the leading ideas on this subject, are 
taken from Dr. Watts's Logic, part ii. chap. v. sec 5. 

t The following illustration of our ajithor's principle 
will both set his meaning in a clear light, and furnish 
an application of the principle to the evidence of the 
Divine origin of the Christian religion. Jesus several 
times distinctly predicted his own resurrection from 
the dead, as a testimony from God that he was the 
Messiah. (Matt. 17:9 and 26:32. Mark 9:9 and 
14:28.) Now a resurrection to an endless life had 
never been witnessed ; and perhaps many of the Jews, 
(and certainly those of other nations,) had never wit- 
nessed a resurrection at all. After the event, it was 
declared by his apostles to have actually occurred ; 
but there were many before whom the testimony was 
borne, who, * when they spake of the resurrection, 
mocked.' But up>n our author's principle (and it is 
doubtless a correct one) this was unwise. Two in- 



156 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

if it be absolutely impossible, no previous 
opinion of the competency and veracity of 
the witness, can procure belief. If what is 
related be possible but extremely improbable, 
the testimonies of a greater number of persons 
of unimpeachable character, together with the 
evidence of concurrent circumstances, are 
requisite to render it credible. But, if it be 
not improbable, the testimony of an ordinary 
and unsuspected witness, is sufficient to make 
it worthy of credit. 

These are the general principles on which 
the credibility or incredibility of the things 
attested should regulate our belief in testi- 
mony. But, as this subject is of great im- 

quiries here propose themselves to the consideration of 
these hearers ; First, Is the thing in itself credible ? 
Secondly, Is it credible under the alleged circumstancesf 
To the first, sound reason would have replied in the af- 
firmative ; for, in the case of every living man, we see 
matter alive which never lived before ; how then can 
it be incredible that matter which has lived once should 
live again ? To the second also an affirmative answer 
would be given, for the 'alleged circumstances' are not, 
that, in the ordinary operation of natural laws, he was 
raised from the dead ; but that he was so raised by the 
special interference of Divine agency. The apostles 
always say this, ' Him hath God raised up ;' VGod 
RAISED HIM from THE DEAD.' Thcse, then, being the 
alleged circumstances, and the fact^ mbreover, being in 
itself credible, ' Why should it be thought a thing in- 
credible that God should raise the dead ?' Similar 
remarks are applicable to other miracles ; and our 
author himself applies the principle before us to those 
of Jesus, prior to his suffering, in a following page. — Ed 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 157 

portance, it must be treated with greater par- 
ticularity. 

It should be observed, that the presumptions 
arising from experience, cannot be compared 
on equal terms with the probabilities arising 
from testimony, because they are not homo- 
geneal,"^ and no rule can be formed, similar 
to that of reduction in arithmetic, to bring 
them to the same denomination. In that 
class of subjects which has above been de- 
nominated various, the strongest presumptions 
may be overcome by the testimony of wit- 
nesses of ordinary credibility. For, as it is 
observed by Bishop Butler, (Analogy, part ii. 
chap. ii. sec. 3.) ' There is a very strong pre- 
sumption against common speculative truths, 
and against the most ordinary facts, before 
the proof of them ; which yet is overcome 
by almost any proof. There is a presumption 
of millions to one against the story of Caesar, 
or of any other man. For suppose a number 
of common facts, so and so circumstanced, 
of which one had no kind of proof, should 
happen to come into one's thoughts, every 
one would, without any possible doubt, con- 
clude them to be false. And the like may 
be said of a single common fact.' 

The general conclusions, deduced, how- 
ever, from the observation of subjects which 

* See Dr. Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles, p. 28t 



158 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

are uniform, cannot as easily be overcome by 
testimony. Thus, no man would believe that 
a cannon ball, thrown from a ship into the 
sea, floated, upon such testimony as was only 
sufficient to give credibility to the events of 
the life of a Cromwell or a Buonaparte, how- 
ever surprising those events may be. Yet, 
even these general conclusions may be sur- 
mounted by testimony, provided the witnesses 
be numerous, their characters unimpeachable, 
the facts level to their judgment, and the cir- 
cumstances under which they give their evi- 
dence, calculated to confirm it. For facts 
which contradict these general conclusions, 
ought not to be regarded as impossible. 
Strictly speaking, that only is impossible 
which involves in it an absurdity. It is only 
in a lower and incorrect sense, that those 
things are called impossibilities, which are 
contradictory to uniform and general experi- 
ence. Thus, that a man should be able to 
foretel clearly and distinctly remote events, 
to walk upon the sea, to heal diseases by a 
command, to raise the dead, though they be 
contrary to the ordinary course of nature ; 
yet as they involve in them no absurdity, they 
are not in themselves, and in the strict sense 
of the word, impossibilities. For the course 
of nature might, in these and in other respects, 
have been different from what it is, had it 
pleased the Creator that it should be so ; or, 



IIEI/ATING T© MORAL. EVIDENCE. 159 

as hais been already observed, it may have 
been suspended or altered, on particular oc- 
casions, and for important purposes. Facts 
of this nature, therefore, ought not to be re- 
garded as such, as no testimony can render 
credible ; though they certainly require ex- 
traordinary testimony, together with the evi- 
dence of concurrent circumstances, to procure 
belief. 

Besides these, there are other facts, on 
which we are in danger of exercising an un- 
reasonable incredulity. They are such as^ 
are more properly beyond our experience, 
than contradictory to it ;^ being such as nei- 
ther we, nor any other persons, as far as we 
can learn, have ever observed. Thus, if 
soon after the discovery of electricity, a per- 
son had travelled to a part of the world, un- 
acquainted with that discovery, and had r6- 



* When we distinguish facts as beyond, or contradict 
tory to experience, we must mean by the term experi- 
ence, the general conclusions deduced from observa- 
tion. For, if we mean by it tlie experience of a spe- 
cific fact, nothing can be contradictory to it, but what 
is asserted to have happened, and which we experi- 
enced not to have happened. But, understanding the 
word in the sense above-mentioned, that wax should 
not melt in fire, or lead sink in water, is contradictory 
to our experience ; but, that water should never be- 
come solid, was properly 6ei/onrf the experience of the 
King of Siam, and not contradictory to it ; because he 
had never seen it under those circumstances in which 
its freezing takes place. 



160 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

lated the extraordinary electrical phenomena 
which he had seen, his veracity would prob- 
ably have been disputed ; until he bad either 
shown some electrical experiments, or pro- 
duced the testimony of several other respecta- 
ble witnesses in confirmation of his assertions. 
However extensive our knowledge of nature 
may be, we cannot safely presume, that we 
are yet acquainted with the whole of it. As 
discoveries have already been made, which 
were altogether unlooked for by our prede- 
cessors, so farther discoveries may still be 
made, of which we can at present form no 
conception. The discovery of Galvanism is 
very recent. And, as it is obvious into what 
errors we should have run, had we on first 
hearing of its phoenomena, pronounced them 
false, we should learn to be cautious in de- 
ciding, that other extraordinary facts, which 
are related by competent witnesses, are un- 
deserving of credit."^ An acquaintance with 
philosophy will s-ometimes not only render 
credible certain phoenomena, the existence 



'"^ The fall of heavy bodies, of the appearance of 
stones, from the higher regions of the atmosphere, ac- 
companied by a luminous meteor, a hissing sound, like 
that of large slio.t, and a loud, explosion, has been gen- 
erally discredited. But, he who reads the evidence of 
these facts, which has lately been collected, will scarce- 
ly withhold his assent to their truth, however dissatis- 
fied he may be with the method of accounting for th-enx. 
See Edinburgh Review^ vol. Ui. p. 386. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 161 

of which we might have disbelieved, but also 
enable us to account for them on natural 
principles, when, by superstitious people, they 
are regarded as miracles or portentous signs. 
Thus, the various appearances of terrestrial 
bodies in the atmosphere, as of buildings, cat- 
tle, or even armies, which by some have been 
regarded as prodigies, announcing the ap- 
proach of awful events, and would, by most, 
be thought the mere illusions of the imagina- 
tion, or pronounced falsehoods, have been ac- 
counted for by philosophers, by the known 
laws of refraction."^ Many extraordinary 
facts are mentioned by Bishop Douglas, in 
his Criterion of Miracles, of the influence of 
the mind in the occasion and cure of diseases. 
These facts are of such a nature, that while 
some would be disposed to regard them as 
miraculous, most men would, probably, de- 
termine them to be incredible, yet they are 
supported by testimony, in itself unexception- 
able, and confirmed by various other similar 
cases, and therefore, as the Bishop observes, 
are worthy of credit. 

On the other hand, it would be equally un- 
safe to admit the truth of extraordinary facts 
on slight and suspicious evidence. In these 
cases, as in most, the mean is safer than either 
extreme. We shall be most likely to avoid 

* See Christian Observer, vol, iii. p. 6G9, 



162 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

error by requiring that the number and cred- 
it of the witnesses, together with the evidence 
of concurrent circumstances, should be, in 
some degree, proportioned to the improbabil- 
ity arising from the extraordinary nature of 
the facts attested. How we are to judge of 
the credit of witnesses, and of the circum- 
stances which tend to confirm their evidence, 
will be inquired presently. 

2. The consistency of the parts of a rela- 
tion with each other, and with known circum- 
stances, is another point to be attended to."^ 

* Strong evidence of the divine origin of revealed 
religion is afforded in the consistency of the histories 
of the inspired volume with themselves, vvith each oth- 
er, and vviili known circumstances. The first five books 
of the Bible are the work of one man, (Moses) and the 
relation is very long, circumstantial, and minute; yet 
is it entirely consistent in all its p^irts with itself, so 
that no suspicion can arise from its perusal, that it re- 
cords, as facts, events wliicli never occurred, how won- 
derful soever they may be ; since, with the same re- 
markable consistency which characterizes the general 
narrative, the writer refers all the miracles wliich he 
records, to special divini; interference. (See note f on 
p. 155.) Ir» like manner, succeeding writers pursue the 
narrative from near where preceding ones left it ; and 
sometimes tacitly, at others, explicitly, testify to the au- 
thenticity of the previous records; and always, on fun- 
damental points, write in exact consistency with each 
other, as, also, with the father of the history. Moreover 
these writings are in harmony with known circumstan- 
ces ; witness the existence, tiie ceremonies, and present 
state of tiie nation of Israel 

Thus also of the New Testament histories: We have 
four narratives of our Lord's life and ministry, all con- 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 163 

If the relation be long, it is very difficult, if 
not impracticable to fabricate it so completely 
in all its parts as to preserve consistency. 
Hence consistency confirms the relation ; and 
if the subject be examined in this view, the 
deception, if any exist, will generally be de- 
tected. 

3. The light which is thrown upon the 
subject by subsequent circumstances,"^ should 

sistent, all harmonious, written at difFerent times, and, 
probably, each writer had seen the work of his prede- 
cessor ; yet no imputation is ever uttered of falsehood, 
or misrepresentatit)n ; and all the varieties observable, 
are such as arose out of the circumstances of those for 
whose use the several narrativts were primarily writ- 
ten ; or from a desire to supply what was deficient. 
Thus, John's gospel is supplemental to all the others, 
and yet is entirely consistent with them ; and thus, also, 
in relating the events connected with Christ's resurrec- 
tion, each records, from his own knowledge, what might 
supply the lack of the others; and the whole testimony 
is to be gained from a comparison of all the histories. 
Again, these liistories and that of the Arts correspond 
with * known circumstances :' viz. the existence nf the 
Christian Church, and its ordinances, as standing mon- 
uments whose existence can only be accounted for, on 
the supposition of the truth of the histories. See Les- 
lie's ^ Short and Easy Method with the Deists. ' — Ed. 

* If we apply this rule for judging of testimony, to 
the declarations of the apostles that Christ arose from 
the dead, we shall see that their declarations were es- 
tablished by subsequent circumstances. They declared 
he was risen, their enemies asserted that they had sto- 
len his body. If the assertion of the apostles were true, 
we should <;xpect them to confront their adversaries, 
and repeat, boldly and constantly, their assertion ; for 
experience teaches us that truth is bold, persevering 



164 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

also be regarded. For, when these circum- 
stances are such, as from experience they 
might be expected to be, on a supposition 
that the fact asserted were true, they confirm 
the assertion ; otherwise they lessen its cred- 
ibility. The influence of these circumstan- 
ces, both in support of the evidence of testi- 

and consistent. If, on the contrary, the charge of their 
enemies were well founded, we should expect the 
apostles to avoid them ; and to waive, in their discourses, 
the subject of their Master's resurrection ; to succumb 
to their powerful opponents ; or, at least, to blunt the 
edge of their accusations. We should, moreover, expect 
their enemies to urge home upon them the charge of 
violating the sacredness of the sepulchre ; and, by pro- 
ducing the dead body, if they possessed it, to prove at 
once the falseliood of the assertion that he was risen, 
and that of his claims to the Messiahship, which he 
had made to rest on his resurrection. This they would 
be the more anxious to do, because it wouhl effectually 
repel the charge of murder from them ; and prove that 
since he was an imposter, they had only acted accord- 
ing to the laws in destroying him ; since the blasphemer 
was, by the law, required to be put to death. But what 
were the facts of the case ? — the ' subsequent circumstarf- 
ces ?' We find the apostles in the city, in the templey 
and BKFORK THE COUNCIL, assertiug the resurrcclion of 
their master without contradiction by their adversaries : 
— we find them directly charging, not common murder^ 
but, the murder of God's anointed (Acts 7 : 52) on their 
rulers, and these rulers taking no measures to disprove 
the charge, but only to silence those who made it ; — and 
we see the reiterated declaration that ^ Christ was risen' 
made before the very persons who accused those who 
made it, of having stolen the body; and these persons 
never daring to attempt their conviction. Who can 
resist the evidence these ^ circumstances' afford of the 
reality of the fact which the apostles asserted ? — Ed. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 165 

mony, and in opposition to it, is various, ac- 
cording as such circumstances do more or less 
constantly follow such a fact, as is asserted. 
Thus, were it asserted, that a certain man had 
taken arsenic, his death, together with such 
appearances of his body, as are usual in cases 
of this nature, would be a strong confirmation 
of the assertion ; but his continuing to live, 
and to enjoy health, would be a contradiction 
of it. Or, were it asserted, that an appren- 
tice had robbed his master, his appearing on 
a sudden possessed of considerably more 
money than usual, would render the asser- 
tion probable. 

4. The competency of the witness to judge 
of the fact which he relates,* is another point 

* The competency of the apostles to testify to the 
reality of the miracles wrought by Jesus, will not be 
questioned, when it is remembered that those miracles 
were wrought in the face of day; and were always 
such as their own senses enabled them to judge of. 
But we prefer, as heretofore, to confine ourselves, prin- 
cipally, to that one miracle on which Christianity may 
be said to rest ; viz. the resurrection of Jesus from the 
dead. Can there be any doubt as to the competency 
of the apostles to determine the identity of an individ- 
ual with whom they had resided above three years .'' 
They were the witnesses chosen before of God to bear 
this testimony, just because of their competency ; and 
this was the reason why the risen Saviour was shown 
* not unto all the people,' because a mixed multitude 
could not so confidently affirm his identity. They 
could indeed have testified to having seen a living per- 
son, said to have been Jesus who was crucified ) and 
this would have been all; but those on whose testimo- 



166 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

to be considered. That competency depends 
partly on his abilities, and partly on the op- 
portunities which he may be presumed to 
have had of seeing, or hearing what he states. 
Our determination of both these must be reg- 
ulated by the nature of the subject, and the 
character and situation of the witness. 

5. If the fact be stated to have happened, 
a considerable time ago,^ it should be exam- 
ined, whether it is probable that the witness 
should recollect it clearly ; or whether he has 
used any means to assist his memory, as wri- 
ting it down, or frequently mentioning it, or 
connecting it with other circumstances more 

ny our faith rests, had not only a three years' residence 
with him before he suffered, but an intercourse with him 
for forty days after he arose ; and could affirm there- 
fore, that ' he showed himself aVive after his passion by 
many infallible proofs.' Their ' competency' to testify 
is, therefore, unquestionable. — Ed. 

* The apostles bore their testimony to the fact of the 
Saviour's resurrection openly before the whole Jewish 
nation, only fifty days after his crucifixion and forty- 
seven after tfie event took place. The testimony was 
borne, too, where the event occurred, and while it was 
fresh in the memory of every one that ho had been put 
to death among them as a malefactor. Moreover, they 
could not have forgotten any of the circumstances, for, 
during forty of these days, they had held occasional 
intercourse with the risen Kedeemer personally ', and 
besides, we can scarcely conceive of any other tJieme 
of discourse among them in their converse with each 
other. There was every thing therefore to render the 
recollection of every circumstance both vivid and ex- 
act. — Ed» 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 167 

easily remembered. This consideration is 
more especially deserving of attention, when 
the subject of the evidence is such, as is like- 
ly to escape the recollection ; as for instance, 
words spoken, especially a long discourse. 

6, We should inquire, w^hether the witness 
be a man of general veracity.* Though all 
men profess to regard truth, yet they respect 
it in very different degrees. Some men could 
scarcely be prevailed upon to violate it on any 
consideration ; w^hile others are induced to 
sacrifice it to interest, to party, to a false del- 
icacy, to vanity, or even to a compliment. 
Others again, though they would scruple to 
affirm what they knew to be wholly false, yet 
delight in telling extraordinary stories, and 
indulge themselves in exaggerating and em- 
bellishing the real facts which they relate. 
When they engage in relating an anecdote^ 
and have forgotten any of its circumstances,. 



* As to the^ general veracity' of the inspired writers^ 
they were men- of a nation who accounted all falsehood 
detestable, and as rendering him who practised it liable 
to endless perdition ; and especially if he practised it 
in the name of God, which, upon the supposition that 
they uttered fiilsehocd, they must have done. The 
presumption,, then, is in favor of their veracity in all 
the assertions, which they declare themselves author- 
ized of God to make. But moreover,, their veracity 
has never been questioned. Had they uttered falsehood 
it could easily have been shown by their enemies, but 
no imputation of falsehood, no suspicion of their ve* 
racity has descended to us. — Ed. 



168 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

unwilling to injure their narrative by omis* 
sions, they supply the defects of their memo- 
ry by invention. Thus, though they, perhaps, 
entertain no direct deliberate design to de- 
ceive, yet the impression which they make 
on the minds of their hearers, is inconsistent 
with a correct view of the fact. It is evident, 
that the credit which can safely be given to 
any man's testimony, must be regulated by 
the regard which he may be presumed to 
have for truth ; and the degree of that regard 
can be known only by an acquaintance with 
his general character. 

7. It should also be considered, whether 
there be reason to presume that the witness 
spoke his real judgment"^ of the fact in ques- 

* That when the apostles asserted that fundamental 
fact, the resurrection of Jesus, they expressed their 
* real judgment' is evident, from their general veracity ; 
(see preceding note) from the unvarying reiteration of 
their assertion to Jews and Gentiles, learned and un- 
learned, to kings and rulers and to the common people ; 
and also, from their own distinct assertions, in connex- 
ions which render this point quite unquestionable. 
Thus, when in writing to the Corinthians, this was the 
subject of his discourse, Paul virtually asserts his de- 
liberate belief cf Christ's resurrection, by enumerating 
the consequences of the supposition that it were other- 
wise. ' If Christ be not risen, our preaching is vain, 
your faith is also vain, ye are yet in your sins ; yea, 
and we are found false loitnesses of God ; because we 
have testified of God that he raised up Christ, whom 
he raised not up' on the supposition that his apostles 
had a meaning different from that which their words 
express. See 1 Cor. 15 : 14 — 17. — Ed. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 169 

tion. For, there are subjects and occasions, 
on which even men of general veracity, as- 
sume the liberty of deviating from truth, and 
that liberty is, though tacitly, yet so generally 
allowed by the world, that scarcely any loss 
of character is sustained thereby. The world 
is a great theatre, men are players, each act- 
ing a part. On this stage they speak rather 
according to their assumed character, than 
according to their real judgment. And though 
this license is used more frequently, as to 
opinions, than as to the statement of facts, yet 
it is not strictly confined to opinions. And 
should we charge any man with a disregard to 
truth on this account, we should probably be 
despised for illiberality, or ignorance of the 
world. For the same man, when he had laid 
aside the mask, and retired within the circle 
of his private connexions, would shew that, 
under his real character, he felt the obliga- 
tions of veracity ; and would give a very dif- 
ferent view of the fact from what he had giv- 
en on the stage. Whether men be at liberty, 
on any occasion, thus to suspend, by common 
consent, the operation of the laws of truth, is 
a question of morality, and not of moral evi- 
dence ; and therefore, falls not within the 
province of this tract. But, as the liberty is 
assumed, it is necessary to guard against the 
errors which would arise from ignorance of 
the practice. For, it is evident, that unless 
15 



170 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

we distinguish between the occasions, on 
which men regard themselves as bound to 
speak the truth, and those on which they do 
not, we must be continually exposed to error 
in believing their testimony. This distinction 
can be made only by attentive observation, 
or acquaintance with the world. 

8. Whether the witness be a man of in- 
tegrity,* or of an unprincipled character, 
should also be considered. For, if the gen- 
eral tenor of a man's conduct shew, that he 
has no regard to the obligations of morality, 
it may be presumed, that he will not hesitate, 
on suitable occasions, to violate the truth. 

9. It should be inquired, whether the in- 
terestf of the witness is likely to be affected 

" Of all the writers of the sacred volume, witliout 
exception, and of ail the authorized witnesses of the 
Saviour's resurrection^ we are warranted in saying, 
' Tliey wf re holy men who spake as they were moved 
by the Holy Ghost.' The strain of their writings is 
sufficient pledge of their integrity.' — Ei>. 

t The temporal interest of the apostles of Christ 
could not be subserved by the testimony they bore re- 
specting him. On the contrary, the testimony declared 
virtually the futility of the hopes of temporal interest 
which they had previously entertained. They had 
hoped f)r offices of trust, and profit, and honor, in a 
temporal kingdom of Messiah, but correct views of the 
nature of his kingdom dissipated these illusions, and 
conviiiced them that their hopes were as empty as the 
wind. Yet with a knowledge that the testimony was 
unpopular and unprofitable, they continued to bear it. 
What but truth could have sustained them ? — Ed. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 171 

by the decision of the point in question. For, 
experience shows, that, under the bias of in- 
terest^ men scarcely ever judge correctly, or 
give a fair and impartial evidence. They are 
then induced to suppress some circumstances, 
to soften others, and to give to the whole mat- 
ter such a turn, as is most favourable to them- 
selves. This, therefore, is the principal cir- 
cumstance which renders testimony suspic- 
ious. Hence, it is a wise rule in our law, to 
reject the evidence of all those who are inter- 
ested in the decision of a cause. 

10. As the testimony of an interested per- 
son, in his own favour, is suspicious, that tes- 
timony, which makes against his interest,* is 

* Not only did the testimony of the apostles to the 
resurrection of Christ not promote their interest, but it 
was manifestly inimical to it It made them to be ac- 
counted ' the filth of the earth, and offscouring of all 
things;' it was for this that ' in every city bonds and 
afilictions awaited them ;' it was for this that they 
* hungered, and thirsted, and were naked, and buffeted, 
and had no certain dwelling place' and ^ stood in jeop- 
ardy every hour,' — it was for this tliat the friendship 
of I he High Priest, and the suffrages of the whole na- 
tion towards Paul were changed into the most outra- 
geous and unrelenting persecution, so that he was con- 
strained to appeal to a heathen emperor from the injus- 
tice of Gods High Priest ! So true is the language of 
the poet, ' starving their gains, and martyrdom their 
price.' Safely may we challenge universal history to 
produce a single instance of men willingly enduring 
such a complication of evils in the endeavour to estab- 
lish a known falsehood. We repeat, that nothing but 
truth could have sustained them. — Ed. 



172 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

worthy of great credit ; for, there then ap- 
pears no other reason for his giving such evi- 
dence, than the force of truth. Here, how- 
ever, it should be carefully ascertained, that 
his evidence is really opposite to his interests; 
and, in some cases, this is attended with dif- 
ficulty. For that, which is opposite to a 
man's general interest, may tend to promote 
some particular purpose, which he has at that 
time in view. Nor, should the rule be ex- 
tended without caution to what opposes the 
interests of the witness's party. For, in par- 
ties, secret enmities and separate interests 
arise, which make an individual sometimes 
willing, for private purposes, to cast a re- 
proach upon his partizans. Hence, what is 
regarded as the concession of an opponent, 
and therefore indubitable, may, sometimes, be 
fabricated, for the purpose of promoting that 
interest of the witness, which, at that particu- 
lar time, influences his mind. Most frequent- 
ly, however, the influence of party prejudice 
operates in the same way with that of private 
interest. And, hence arises the difiiculty of 
obtaining a fair representation of facts, in 
times of great political animosity. 

11. The manner in which the evidence is 
given, may afford some assistance in judging 
of the veracity of the witness. There is a 
simplicity and firmness^ equally remote from 

* The effect of this * simplicity and firmness' in the 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 173 

hesitation, and an assumed confidence, with 
which men generally speak the truth. This, 
though difficult to be described, may be learnt 
by observation. 

12. The occasion on which a testimony is 
given, may, sometimes, render it suspicous. 
Thus, should a man inform me, unasked, and 
without any assignable reason, that a person 
just dead, and from whom I had no expecta- 
tion, had not left me any thing in his will, I 
should be apt to suspect his assertion. But, 
if there were any apparent reason why he 
should give me this information, provided it 
were true, no such suspicion would be excit- 
ed by it. 

13. It should be considered, whether the 
evidence for the fact rests on the testimony 
of only one witness, or of more. For, as has 
been already observed, the concurrence of 

first preachers of Christianity was felt by their hearers 
on the day of Pentecost. And the same characteris- 
tics distinguished their testimony , wherever it was borne. 
*The boldness of Peter and John' attracted the atten- 
tion of the council, and the same characteristic, in Ste- 
phen's invective, enraged them to madness. *■ Paul and 
Barnabas waxed hold,' at Antioch ; Paul preached hold- 
ly at Damascus, and again at Jerusalem, and again for 
three months at Ephesus ; and in one word, '■ all the 
apostles spake the word of God with boldness.' See 
Acts 4 : 13, 31 ; 9 : 27, 29 ; 13 : 46 ; 19 : 8, cum multis 
aliis. Could impostors without rank, wealth, influence, 
or learning, and surrounded by learned, powerful, in- 
fluential, and dignified enemies, have done thus to give 
currency to a lief It is impossible.— Ed. 



174 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

independent witnesses, increases the weight 
of their evidence, and that in a much greater 
degree than in the proportion of their num- 
bers.^ Here, also, the nature of the subject 
should be attended to. For, if it be such, as 
would probably be mentioned by several per- 
sons, on a supposition that it were true, then 
its being asserted by only one, detracts from 
its credibility. But, on the other hand, if the 
fact be of so very private a nature, that if it 
had happened, it would, probably, have been 
known only by one person ; then, though the 
evidence of a single witness be of less weight 
than that of more, his testimony is not ren- 
dered suspicious by his being alone. For, as 
strong evidence as the nature of the case ad- 
mits, is hjere produced. The degree of our 
assent, however, should be carefully propor- 
tioned to the weight of the evidence. In 
judging whether the nature of the case admit 
of the testimony of only one witness, we should 
consider, whether the representation of it 
bears the marks of simplicity, or those of art 
and contrivance, so to construct it, as to ex- 
clude the evidence of all others, and to make 
it rest on the testimony of the witness alone. 
For such marks of art and contrivance, would 
evidently render it suspicious. 

14. Is the subject of such a nature, and so 
circumstanced as to admit of an easy confuta- 

* See Note on page 81. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 175 

tion,* if it be false ? This consideration, also, 
is of great importance; for, otherwise, the law 
of reputation, the great principle of human 
conduct, opposes no barrier against falsehood; 
but the witness is at liberty to make what mis- 
representations he pleases, and thereby to 
gratify any secret passion, or to promote any 

* flow easily might the alleged miracles of Moses 
and Ctirist and liie apostles have been disproved had 
they been false ! They were wrought in the presence 
of enemies, who wanted neither sagacity nor inclina- 
tion to disprove them ; yet this is their testimony, 
* This is tl)e finger of God.' Exodus 8 : 19. * This man 
doetli many miracles.' John 11 : 47. 'A notable mira- 
cle hath been wrought by them,' Acts 4:16. How 
easily, too, might the resurrection of Jesus have been 
disproved, had It not occurred. Nothing was necessary 
but to produce the body ; and that, if the seal, and 
stone, and watch, could make it sure, they must have 
had in their possession. But if" it were stolen, why was 
no examination of the soldiers had ! Surely this would 
have been easy ! Why no attempt to convict the 
apostles of the iheft ? There could be no difficulty in 
this! Herod acted differently by the four quaternions 
of soldiers who kept Peter } for though there was no 
reason to believe that they had facilitated his escape, 
they were put to death ; and thus Herod acquitted him- 
self, bef»>re the Jews, of any collusion with the keep- 
ers. But any attempt like this, on the part of the rulers 
towards those who kept Christ's sepulchre, would only 
have increased the number of witnesses of the resur- 
rection, five-fold ; for the soldiers, sixty in number, 
were eye witnesses of that event, and would have testi- 
fied to it, had their life been endangered through the 
imputation of having slept on guard. Thus the ease 
with which it could have been disproved, if untrue, ren- 
ders the probability that it did occur, immensely the 
stronger, because it has never been disproved. — Ed, 



176 SPECrAL DIRECTIONS 

private interest, without danger of disgrace. 
For the same reason it should be considered, 
whether the situation of* the witness be such, 
as to secure him from shame, if his falsehood 
be detected, for this would weaken the cred- 
ibility of his testimony, 

15. A vague account of a fact, is not as 
worthy of credit, as a relation which contains 
all the particulars^ of time, place, persons, 
and the like. Because, as all these particulars 
afford means of detection, if the relation be 
false, it may be presumed that the relater is 
satisfied that his account will bear examina- 
tion. For the same reason, quotations are 
entitled to credit, in proportion as the means 
of examining them are afforded by a state- 

* How wide]\^ remote from ' vagneness' are the 
scriptural accounts oC the miracles of Moses, Christ 
and the apostles. They are remarkably particular and 
specific ; being deficient in none of those characteris- 
tics of a true narrative, which a sagacious writer (Bp. 
Wilson) has embodied in the folloiving hexameter; 

' GLuis ? duid ? Ubi ? Gluibus auxiliis ? Cur ? Cluomoclo ? Q.uando ?' 

These questions, as he observes, may be considered 
as constituting a test by which to try any system. No 
narrator of falsehood will encompass his relation with 
80 many means of detection as the particulars which 
should reply to these questions will present: i. e. He 
will never tell us tcho is the agent, and what his act, 
and where the scene, and icith what assistances^ or 
means, it was performed, and for 2chat purpose, and in 
what manner, and ichcn. But the inspired writers 
scarcely ever relate a miracle, without being so cir- 
cumstantial as to inform us on all these points.— Ed. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 177 

ment, not only of the book, but of the vol- 
ume, and the page, whence they are taken, 
and, even of the library where the book, if 
scarce, may be found. 

16. If, while the witness speaks positively 
as to some particulars, he acknowledges him- 
self to be ignorant of others, or to be only 
imperfectly acquainted with them ; this ac- 
knowledgment tends to confirm his evidence,* 
as to those which he positively affirms. Be- 
cause, it carries with it the appearance of 
caution, not to exceed his knowledge, and 
shows that he is not prepared to affirm any 
thing that may be asked him, to make out the 
story. 

17. Of the statement of ancient facts, it 
should be inquired, what reception they met 
with when they were first made. If they were 

* This tacit acknowledgment appears sometimes to 
be made by the inspired writers relative to the facts 
which tiiey record : and it in no way invalidates their 
claims to inspiration. The evangelists were inspired 
to record, without error, what they knew of the facts 
connected with the life, and death, and resurrection of 
Jesus. Now some had personal knowledge of some 
things, and others ofother things ; hence, as each makes 
his own record, and omits some things which others re- 
late, he tacitly declares that his knowledge did not ex- 
tend to those points. Thus Matthew, Mark, and Luke, 
omit many things which John supplies ; and, as to the 
resurrection of Christ and his several appearances, the 
variety in the evangelical record is to be attributed to 
the caution our author here mentions ; and instead of 
being considered defects, should recommend the Gos- 
pels to us, as faithful narratives. — Ed. 
16 



178 SPECIAL DIRECTIOJTS: 

generally believed, by those who might have 
confuted them, had they been false, and if 
they were disputed by none, they may gene- 
rally be considered, as well established. If 
they were disputed at first, but, on examina- 
tion, were admitted, they are confirmed by 
their trial. But, if they continued to be dis- 
credited,"^ they are to be suspected } and, 

* It must be acknowledged that the Christian re- 
ligion, which was first promulgated to the nation of 
Israel, has by that nation generally been * discredited' 
even to this day. Yet the manifest causes of their re- 
jection of it, are such as not to warrant us in refusing 
it our belief. That nation have always looked for out- 
ward splendor, and worldly triumph, in the kingdom 
of their Messiah ; and hence its real character offends 
their 'prejudices.' The great majority of them, also, 
never gave the claims of the Christian religion on their 
belief, a serious and calm examination. The very 
name of * Jesus of Nazareth' inflames their * passions,' 
and incapacitates them for calm investigation, and 
thus perpetuates that ' ignorance' on the subject, which, 
like a veil, is spread over the minds of the whole peo- 
ple. The Christian religion was, at first, disbelieved 
among them through the influence of ' interest ;' strong 
as was the light of evidence in its favor, if they should 
receive it (i. e. if the rulers at Jerusalem should do so) 
they must, in the same breath, admit that the}^ had im- 
brued their hands in the blood of their Messiah. The 
thousands who believed on the day of Pentecost, were 
among the common people, with few, if any excep- 
tions ; of course they were less implicated in the death 
of Jesus than the rulers were, and ' interest' presented 
a much weaker barrier in the way of their believing. 
It was thus, also, at places remote from. Jerusalem, 
where, to believe in Jesus, was not, by necessary im- 
plication, to plead guilty to his murder. At such pla- 
ces, the appeal to their own scriptures was usually 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 179 

unless the unbelievers may fairly be presumed 
to have been influenced by ignorance, inter- 
est, prejudice, or passion, they should be re- 
jected. A comparison, therefore, should be 
made between the believers and unbelievers, 
in respect to ability and impartiality, and its 
result should determine our judgment. These 
are the general principles upon which our as- 
sent to ancient facts, may be regulated. But, 
to estiinate more correctly the influence which 
the reception of any account by those to whom 
it was originally presented, ought to have on 
our belief, we should further inquire, whether 
that reception proceeded on due examination, 
and on just principles, or may be fairly at- 
tributed to ignorance, credulity, negligence, 
or prejudice. Thus, where the parties, who 
originally received the account, gave them 
only a careless, or, as it has been termed, a 

followed by the conviction of the heavers that he was 
the Messiah. On the whole, therefore, thougli the re- 
ligion of Christ was not received by those to whom it 
was first preached, their rejection of it should not 
weaken our faith in it, inasmuch as their unbelief can 
all be clearly traced to either ignorance, prejudice, 
passion, or interest ; or to the united operation of some, 
or all of them. But if we except the Jews, and inrjuire 
the reception which the gospel of Christ met with in 
other nations, when it was first preached among them, 
the Acts of the apostles furnish a triumphant answer. 
See especially the narratives of its reception by the 
Samaritans, the proselyted Gentiles, and finally, the 
idolatrous Gentiles. Acts 8: 6— 8. 11:21. 13:46-48. 
—Ed. 



180 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

mere otiose* assent, that assent ought not to 
influence our judgment, as it should, where 
it may be presumed, that they feU the im- 
portance of ascertaining its credibility ; and 
therefore, examined it with due care, before 
they admitted it. Hence, the admission of 
stories of prodigies, unconnected with the 
faith or practice of those w^ho received them, 
is entitled to little weight ; while the recep- 
tion of accounts of miracles, wrought for the 
establishment of Christianity, ought to pro- 
duce a conviction of their truth. Because, it 
is highly probable, that the belief of the for- 
mer was not regulated by due examination : 
whereas, the greatest interests being immedi- 
ately connected with the latter, it is altogether 
improbable that they should have been ad- 
mitted, without the strictest scrutiny. For, 
it cannot be reasonably imagined, that vast 
multitudes should be induced to sacrifice their 
prejudices, and their immediate interests, in 
relinquishing the religion, in which they had 
been educated ; the religion of a long line of 
ancestors ; a religion which was the object of 
veneration, the glory of their country, and 
hitherto of themselves ; to embrace a new re- 
ligion, the object of universal contempt and 
abhorrence ; when, by so doing, they gave up 
all prospects of worldly prosperity and ease, 
exposed themselves to general scorn and 

* Paley's Evidence of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 17. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 181 

malice, and frequently to severe persecution, 
without having carefully examined the credi- 
bility of the miracles, on which its claims to 
their reception, were founded. 

Thus, also, the reception of accounts of 
miracles, wrought in confirmation"^ of opinions 
already established, is not entitled to the same 
influence on our judgment, as it is when the 
miracles were performed, to establish new 
opinions, opposite to such as have been pre- 
viously entertained ; and, especially, when 
those miracles were wrought in the presence 
of enemies. For, in the latter case, no reason 
can be assigned for their reception, but a full 
conviction of their truth. But, in the former, 
there being nothing to excite those who re- 
ceived the accounts to scrutinize them, it is 
probable they were received without due ex- 
amination ; besides, it is difficult to ascertain, 
whether or not they were really believed by 
those who contributed to propagate them, and 
were not merely pious frauds. Thus, stories 
of Popish miracles, may easily be circulated 
in Popish countries, and may be received 
without examination by the ignorant multi- 
tude ; while they would meet with no credit 
among Protestants. So, again, the reception 
of many historical facts, honourable to the 
nation among whom they were published, or 
dishonourable to their enemies ; or, credita- 

* Paley's Evidence of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 21. 



182 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

ble to that party in a state, which possessed, 
almost exclusively, the opportunity of trans- 
mitting the records of events to posterity, or 
discreditable to their opponents, ought not to 
induce us, implicitly, to decide upon their 
truth ; but, in forming our judgments of then), 
we should make due allowance for the effects 
of prejudice. Thus, for example, it may be 
reasonably presumed, that in relating the trans- 
actions between the Romans and Carthageni- 
ans, the Roman historian would be influenced 
by attachment to his own country, and hatred 
of its enemies ; and, that the same prejudice 
would induce his countrymen in general, to 
admit his accounts, though partial, since they 
were in their own favour. Of course, that 
admission is not of sufficient authority to war- 
rant our implicit credit. Had the works of 
any Carthagenian historian reached us, we 
might have seen some of the same facts stated 
less to the honour of Rome, and more to that 
of Carthage ; and yet, have found reason to 
presume, that his accounts also were fully 
admitted by the Carthagenians. On the other 
hand, when the facts related are dishonourable 
to the nation or party who yet received the 
accounts of them, that reception confirms their 
truth. Thus, as the History of the Bible, 
though it records the peculiar privileges con- 
ferred on the Jews by the Almighty, yet, as 
it relates also the base and ungrateful returns 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE, 183 

which they continuaHy made for them, their 
universal reception of it renders its truth in- 
dubitable. 

It should also be considered, whether the 
accounts of these ancient facts,* were pub- 
lished near the time and place ; when and 
wheref they are stated to have happened. 

* Paley's Evidence of Christianity, vol. ii. pp. 6 &9. 

t The sacred Scriptures possess, in a remarkable de- 
gree, this evidence of authenticity. Moses, and Joshua, 
and Samuel, and others of the Old Testament writers, 
committed their histories to writing among the people, 
and at, or immediately after, the occurrence of the tran- 
sactions related. (See note on page 166.) So also the 
evangelists wrote their histories in the very age when 
the events they record occurred ; and two of them cer- 
tainly, and all of them probably, were eye and ear wit- 
nesses of what they relate. Even the epistles contain 
internal evidence of being the works of the same age ; 
as for example, that to the Hebrews speaks of the mis- 
sion and ministry of Jesus as having occurred in ^ these 
last days.' Heb. 1 : 2. No time then had elapsed which 
could possibly give birth to doubt of the real occurrence 
of the events. Moreover, there is external evidence 
for the early existence of these books ; — for their exist- 
ence even in the apostolic age. This evidence is de- 
rived from the writings of the apostolical fathers, who 
lived in the times of the apostles, and who often qiiote 
the scriptures which we possess, as books generally 
read and received by Christians. Now this could not 
have been done, while the apostles were yet living, 
unless they wrote the books which passed under their 
names ; for they would have disclaimed them, and set 
the churches on their guard ag;iinst them. But such 
not having been the case, it is morally certain that the 
apostles wrote the epistles which we receive ; and thus, 
the antiquity of these books being proved as great as 
the apostolic times, both their genuineness and authen- 
ticity are proved also.-— Ed^ 



184 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

For, if they were not published till long after, 
they are suspicious ; because it does not ap- 
pear that they were ever heard of before ; 
because it generally seems improbable, if not 
impracticable, for the person who asserts them 
to have obtained any just grounds for his as- 
sertion ; and, because they want that confir- 
mation which should be derived from their 
reception, by persons who might have confu- 
ted them, had they been false. Thus, the 
miracles ascribed to Mahomet, by those who 
wrote several centuries after his death, which 
miracles were never heard of before, are un- 
worthy of credit. But, those secret facts of 
history, which have been published from pa- 
pers in the cabinets of princes, or in the 
possession of private families are credible,^ 

* Iftbere be any exception io the moral certainty of 
the genuineness of the apostolical epistles, it exists in 
the case of the second and third epistles of John. And 
these have those claims to our belief which our author 
licre mentions. They were letters to private persons, 
and not to tliose in otBcial stations. Hence it is natu- 
ral that the^' should be kept in the possession of their 
families long after the decease both of the writer, and 
of those to w^hom they were addressed ; and their ex- 
istence only known to those families ; and, perhaps, not 
even to them When first discovered, then, all the 
immediate vouchers for their genuineness were ^one ; 
and the church of Christ, (ever scrupulously careful not 
to admit into the Canon any but undoubtedly genuine 
writings of the apostles,) naturally hesitated to receive 
these, till they should be thoroughly tested. But these 
epistles are not without very ancient testimony to their 
genuineness. Ireneus, (A.D. 370) Clement of Alex- 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 185 

though they did not become publicly known, 
till a considerable time after the event. For, 
as from their nature, they were incapable of 
being publicly known, except from these se- 
cret papers ; and, it is highly improbable, 
that access should be had to them, till a con- 
siderable time had elapsed, they have the best 
evidence, of which the nature of the case ad- 
mits. Besides, their credibility depends, not 
merely on the historian, but on the authentic- 
ity of the papers themselves, the opportunites 
which the original writers of them possessed 
of being acquainted with the facts which they 
relate, and the degree of probability of their 
being disposed to relate them fairly. 

If the accounts were published at a distance 
from the place where the facts were stated to 
have happened, especially if that be a place 
seldom visited by foreigners, they are suspi- 
cious ; because the restraints of the law of 
reputation can then be felt but little by their 

andria, (A. D. 180) Origen, (A. D. 220) Alexander, 
bishop of Alexandria, Athanasius, Cyril of JerTJsalem, 
Epiphaniijs, Jerome, Rufinus, and others, quote and 
receive them ; though, even then, some few persons 
were still in doubt as to their genuineness. A still fur- 
ther examination however, has removed all doubts; 
and, for many eenturies, they have occupied their 
present place in the sacred Canon. This scrupulous 
care and rigid examination should even confirm our 
confidence in these epistles, for, as our author observes 
in the commencement of this Special Direction, (17.) 
* 1/ they were disputed at first, hut, on examination, 
were admitted, they are confirmed by their trial.' — Ed. 



186 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

relater ; and, their public reception cannot 
have been regulated by due examination, but 
must have arisen from the confidence reposed 
in the assertor ; which confidence may often 
be accounted for from the influence of preju- 
dice, interest, or party. Thus, the miracles 
formerly published in Europe, as having been 
performed by Popish missionaries in India, 
are unworthy of credit. 

18. The entire omission of a thing, pre- 
tended to have been public, by all other au- 
thors, who might naturally have been expected 
to mention it, renders it suspicious. And it 
is the more suspicious, in proportion as those 
other authors may be presumed to have been 
engaged by interest, by principle, or by the 
nature of their work to record it, if ihey had 
been acquainted with it. But, if a satisfac- 
tory reason can be assigned why these authors 
should omit the mention of the fact, it then 
ceases to be suspicious on that account. 

19. Hitherto we have supposed, that we 
have testimony on only one side of a ques- 
tion ; but, it often happens, that witnesses 
are produced on both sides. In this case, 
we should examine whether their evidences 
cannot be so interpreted, as to agree with 
each other. If they can, such interpretation 
should be adopted ; because, it is to be pre- 
sumed, until the contrary appear, that the 
witnesses on both shies speak truth. But, if 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 187 

their evidence cannot be reconciled, it is then 
to be observed, that one affirmative witness 
may countervail many negatives ; provided 
the fact which he affirms be of such a nature, 
that it might probably have taken place, and 
yet not have been noticed by those who deny 
it. If this cannot with probability be suppos- 
ed, and the witnesses oppose each other in 
contradictory propositions, so that those on 
one side must be true, and those on the other 
false, we must then judge according to the 
number of the witnesses on each side, their 
credit^ and the comparative probability of their 
respective testimonies. If the two latter cir- 
cumstances be equal, the superior number is 
entitled to the greater credit. If the first and 
last be equal, the side on which the witnesses 
are of the greater credit, is entitled to the 
preference. To judge of their credit we 
must apply the principles which have been 
already laid down. But, if the two former 
circumstances be equal, the testimony more 
probable in itself is to be believed. 

20. In some cases, the witnesses may 
agree as to certain circumstances, and disa- 
gree as to others. Here, the nature of these 
circumstances should be considered. If they 
be such as were not likely to excite the at- 
tention of the witnesses, and fix themselves 
in their memory, their disagreement does not 
weaken their evidence as to the principal 



188 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

facts, In which they agree ; but, on the con- 
trary, rather confirms it. For, experience 
shows, that men very rarely agree in all the 
immaterial circumstances in relating the same 
fact. And, hence, a perfect coincidence, in 
every point, carries with it the appearance of 
a preconcerted plan of deception. But, if 
the circumstances were such, that they may 
be presumed to have made a strong impres- 
sion on their minds, and to be recollected, 
then their disagreementrenders their evidence 
suspicious. In making this distinction, we 
must be governed by experience ; for, it is 
that which teaches us what circumstances do 
usually excite the attention, and fix themselves 
in the memory, and what do not. The sus- 
picion thus excited, may rise so high, as to 
justify the rejection of the evidence of both 
witnesses, especially if, on other accounts, 
their testimony appear suspicious. But, it 
would scarcely be safe, on all such occasions, 
to disbelieve both. For, one of them may 
be a man of strict veracity, and state the fact 
correctly ; while the other is a trifler with 
truth, and gives, in part, a false testimony. 
Besides, were such a rule established, it 
would render it easy for dishonest men to 
discredit any evidence which they might wish 
to be disbelieved. It would, therefore, be 
proper to consider whether one of these wit- 
nesses be, in all other respects, unobjection- 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 189 

able ; and, in that case, to believe him, and 
reject the other. 

In subjects of Remote Testimony^ the same 
observations are applicable to every witness 
through whom the testimony passes, till it 
reaches us. 

On the credit due to the evidence of Gen- 
eral Notoriety. 

The great consideration here, is, how far 
the subject is likely to be known, and what 
probability there is, that the assertions re- 
specting it, should be contradicted, if they 
were false. 

Mathematical subjects admit of .ieing cer- 
tainly known, and mistakes in them may be 
easily detected. In them, therefore, those 
conclusions which are universally believed, 
may be relied upon with safety. Events, 
also, in general, admit of being known ; and 
when they are subject to the observation of 
many persons, mis-statements in them easily 
admit of correction ; but when they can have 
been observed by only a few, their mis-state- 
ments are not easily corrected ; and, hence 
the general opinion of them, though uncon- 
tradicted, cannot be as safely trusted. On 
philosophical subjects, many opinions have 
prevailed universally, which, by subsequent 
discoveries, have appeared to be false. And, 
probably, opinions are still held on some of 



190 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

them, which will be proved to be erroneous 
by future discoveries. Here, therefore, gen- 
eral notoriety, or as it may be termed, general 
opinion, merits less credit. But, something 
may be done to regulate the degree of assent, 
by considering whether the science of the 
subject in question, he still in its infancy, or 
have made great progress towards perfection. 
These remarks will serve to show how the 
principle on which the evidence of general 
notoriety is founded, is to be applied. 

In Proverbs, and General maxims of Con- 
duct, it should be examined, whether there 
be no -ambiguity in the language in which 
they are expressed ; which may have con- 
tributed to their general belief, in a sense in 
which they are not true. It should also be 
considered, whether they depend for their 
prevalence on their intrinsic merit alone, or 
upon the credit and influence of some partic- 
ular classes of men, who are interested in 
their support ^ for then, they are less worthy 
of belief. 

As to the application of proverbs to partic- 
ular cases, the highest evidence which they 
afford, is that the event will happen most fre- 
quently, but not always as they assert. But 
then, this evidence they do afford ; and, he 
who rejects them, though he may succeed 
occasionally, will, at length, find that he has 
deceived himself. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 191 

On the credit due to Reports. 

Many of the particulars, which should reg- 
ulate our assent here, are the same with those 
contained under the head of Testimony. It 
will, therefore, be sufficient to mention them, 
without enlarging upon them. They are as 
follows : The probability or improbability of 
the fact, under the known circumstances of 
the case ; the consistency of the account in 
itself, and with subsequent circumstances ; 
the probability of the facts being known ; 
whether the account were likely to be con- 
tradicted, if false ; and whether any particu- 
lar interests may be promoted by it. Added 
to this, it should be considered, from what 
quarter the report originated, and whether it 
be propagated hymen of judgment in such 
affairs, or only by ignorant and credulous 
people. If some time have elapsed since the 
origin of the report, our judgment of its cred- 
ibility may be assisted by considering the re- 
ception with which it has continued to meet. 
If, though it prevailed strongly at first, it af- 
terwards died away, and have not revived 
since, it is suspicious. But its continuance 
in credit, or its reviving again after having 
been dropped, are circumstances in its favour. 

Though reports are seldom without some 
foundation, yet they are frequently inaccurate. 
They are subject to exaggeration and mis- 
representation. Hence, though they are en- 



192 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

titled to some degree of credit, they can sel- 
dom be relied on with safety. On subjects, 
therefore, which are important to us, they 
ought not to be neglected, but to excite us to 
ascertain, by further inquiry, what degree of 
truth there may be in them. 

On belief in Tradition. 

Our assent to this kind of evidence, should 
be regulated by nearly the same circumstances, 
which are mentioned under the foregoing head. 

On the credit due to Analogy. 

With regard to this extensive species of 
probable evidence, very few directions seem 
capable of being given. It may, however, 
be observed, that, as to those qualities which 
have no necessary connexion with each other, 
it is by experience alone, that it can be known, 
which of them do, or do not, either constantly 
or generally, co-exist in the same subject. 
Hence, experience seems the only safe ground 
of reasoning by analogy. It may, also, be 
remarked, that the greater the number of 
points of resemblance are between the subject 
in question, and that from which the analogy 
is taken, and the stronger the resemblance is 
in each of these points, the *safer will our 
conclusions be ; and, where the resemblance 
holds in only one or two points, or is in itself 
weak, the conclusion is very uncertain. 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 193 



On the credit due to inferences from Facts 
t)r Premises. 

As inferences from facts are deduced by 
analogy, what has been said above, is appli- 
cable to them. 

On presumptive evidence, Blackstone (voL 
iv. page 352) says, that ' presumptive evi- 
dence of felony should be admitted cautious- 
ly ; for, the law holds, that it is better that 
ten guilty persons should escape, than that 
one innocent should suffer.' This rule of 
law manifestly supposes, that presumptive 
evidence is attended with great uncertainty ; 
and, consequently, it ought, in other cases 
also, and not only in those of felony, to be 
admitted with caution. For, though the con- 
sequences of an error in deciding on a case 
of felony be more awful than on a question 
t)f property, and much more awful than those 
which would attend an erroneous opinion, in 
private matters ; yet, as far as respects the 
mere error itself, independent of its conse- 
quences, all the cases are equal. And, as 
the attainment of truth ought to be our object 
in all our inquiries, we ought at all times to 
be cautious in deciding on this species of ev- 
idence. Sometimes, however, it is necessary 
to found our decisions upon it, because no 
other evidence can be procured to determine 
ithe question. It iS; therefore, requisite to 
17 



194 SPECIAL DIRECTIONS 

consider how we may proceed in such cases 
with the greatest safety. 

Sir Matthew Hale, we are told by Black- 
stone, lays down two rules to be observed, in 
trials for felony. ' First, never to convict a 
man for stealing the goods of a person un- 
known, merel)' because he will give no ac- 
count how he came by them, unless an actual 
felony be proved of such goods. And, sec- 
ondly, never to convict any person of murder 
or manslaughter, till at least the body be 
found dead, on account of two instances he 
mentions, where persons were executed for 
the murder of others, who were then alive, 
but missing.' 

To these rules relating to felonies, the fol- 
lowing, of a more general nature, may be 
added. As the same circumstances may at- 
tend different facts, and it is our business to 
determine from the circumstances established 
in proof, which of those various facts did ex- 
ist, we ought in the first place, to inquire what 
facts the circumstances proved, might attend ; 
secondly, to state each of those facts distinct- 
ly ; and lastly, to compare each with every 
circumstance, in order to discover with which 
of the facts all those circumstances do most 
probably agree. The formality of this pro- 
cedure is necessary, because we are always, 
through prejudice, or by the suggestion of 
others, in danger of connecting the circum- 



RELATING TO MORAL EVIDENCE. 195 

Stances with some particular fact ; and, thus 
another fact, with which they might, perhaps, 
be connected with greater probabihty, will be 
overlooked. But, if we proceed with this 
formality, we shall be less likely to overlook 
the real fact ; and, if we thus cautiously 
compare each fact with the know^n circum- 
stances, we may find, that, though with some 
they may agree equally, yet, with one or 
more of the other circumstances, there is only 
one of the supposed facts, w^hich can well 
agree ; and, thus we may discover which the 
true fact is. 

On deducing inferences from premises, it 
is scarcely consistent with the object of this 
tract to enlarge, but the reader is referred to 
books on logic, for the rules which are nec- 
essary to be observed. And for the modes 
of proceeding in the doctrine of chances, and 
purchase of annuities, he is referred to such 
of the writers on mathematics, as have treated 
these subjects professedly ; they being en- 
tirely mathematical subjects* 



196 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 



CHAPTER V. 

ON THE KINDS OF EVIDENCE OF WHICH DIFFERENT 
SUBJECTS ADMIT, AND ON WHICH THEY ARE AC- 
TUALLY BELIEVKD. 

Many Truths are believed by most men, 
on a lower species of evidence, than that by 
which they might be proved. Hence it will 
be proper to inquire, not only of what evi- 
dence different subjects admit, but also, on 
what they are usually believed. The sub- 
jects of human knowledge are so numerous, 
that it would be impracticable to mention 
them all ; and, were it practicable it would 
be useless ; as the mention of a (ew will be 
sufficient. 

Mathematical truths, though capable of 
demonstration, are admitted by most men, 
only on general notoriety. For, they are 
nerther able to understand the demonstrations 
of them themselves, nor have they, ordinarily, 
for their truth, the evidence of those who do 
understand them ; but, finding them generally 
believed in the world, they also beheve them. 
Their belief, also, is confirmed by experience ; 
for, when they have occasion to apply them, 
they find that they lead to just conclusions. 



mFFERENir SUBJECTS ADMIT. 197 

Moral maxims and proverbs, are usually 
admitted on the same evidence. For, though 
they be deduced from the observation of life, 
yet few men possess sufficient attention or 
discernment, to form them for themselves. 
Most men ad^nit them because they are gen- 
erally believed. And though they be capable 
of confiriTiation from experience, yet, as they 
are not universally true, but true only for the 
most part, their confirmation must be drawn 
from the comparison of a great variety of 
cases, to which they apply. This comparison 
few will take the trouble to make, and, there- 
fore, they seem to be believed by most men, 
only on their general notoriety. 

Of the properties and effects of the subjects 
of natural history, as animals, vegetables, 
minerals, fossils, earths, &c. These were 
originally known by personal observation ; 
and, as the subjects still exist, they are still 
capable of being known in the same way by 
all ; and are so known by some. And when 
the subjects lie within our reiach, and require 
little pains or skill in examination, it is on 
personal observation that their properties and 
effects are believed in general. But as many 
of them lie at a great distance, and are ob- 
tained with difficulty ; and, as their examin- 
ation requires extraordinary skill and discrim-< 
ination, so their properties and effects can be 



198 EVIDENCE OF WH[CH 

personalty observed only by few. If, there- 
fore, they be believed by the bulk of mankind 
at all, they must be belreved on the credit of 
others. The highest degree of evidence 
.which can ordinarily be obtained for them, 
must be drawn from books published by nat- 
uralists, who have made personal observations 
on them. And the information possessed by 
those who have not read these books, is de- 
rived from a still lower source, as from com- 
pilations or general notoriety. 

Of the effects of certain substances on 
mankind, we have, in many cases, the evi- 
dence of personal experience, confirmed by 
the experience of others. In some cases> 
our information must be derived entirely from 
others. Often, our experience of these ef- 
fects has not been uniform ; and otiiers tes- 
tify the same. For instance, the things which 
agree with us at one time, disagree with us 
at another. Here, we suppose, either that 
the substances are dissimilar, or that our bod- 
ies are in a different state. 

Certain sciences relate to some of these 
subjects, and certain trades or professions to 
others. The learned in those sciences, and 
the members of those professions, obtafn a 
considerable part of the information which 
they possess, relative to those subjects which 
belong to their own line, by personal obsei:-- 



BlFF£REN''r SUBJECTS ADMIT. 199 

vadon ; but, for a large shar« €ven of such 
information, they must be indebted to the 
observation of otJiers. Thus, a physician, 
for instance, cannot have obtained his whole 
stock of knowledge by his own observation, 
but must have derived much of it from books 
or conversation. 

What has been said, relates only to the 
general truths belonging to the subjects above 
mentioned. The application of those truths 
to particular cases, must proceed on the prin- 
ciples of analogy. For, it is only by the re- 
semblance, which different subjects bear to 
each other in some particulars, which have 
been already ascertained, that we can infer, 
that they also resemble each other in all other 
particulars, and will be productive of the 
same effects. Thus, for example, I may 
have learned, that the metal which is called 
gold, is yellow, heavy, fixed, malleable, duc- 
tile, fusible, and soluble, in aqua regia, but 
not in aquafortis. But, if I would decide, 
whether a piece of metal, which J perceived 
to be yellow, heavy, fixed, fusible, and solu- 
ble, in aqua regia, but not in aquafortis, were 
also malleable and ductile (unless I deter- 
mined it by experiments) it would be only by 
analogy that I could presume that it was so, 
and therefore really gold. In these cases 
our reasonings rise no higher than probability, 
though it is admitted, that that probability 



20(1 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

amounts nearly to moral certainty. For, it is 
not necessary that substances^ which resemble 
each other in some properties^ should also 
resemble each other in others. It is possible^ 
for instance, that a substance may exist, which 
possesses all the other properties of gold, ex- 
cept its malleability and ductility, or which 
possesses even all the known properties of 
gold, without exception, and, together with 
them, certain other properties which would 
really change its nature, and constitute it a 
different thing. But, as neither accident nor 
research has ever presented us with such a 
substance, it is highly improbable that it 
should exist. 

Of facts, which respect the constitution of 
nature, and the changes of the heavenly bod- 
ies, the more obvious are known by personal 
observation, confirmed by the uniform expe- 
rience of all, whom we have ever heard speak 
of them. Some persons also know, that they 
depend on causes of so permanent a nature, 
that the constitution of the world must be al- 
tered or suspended, before they will cease. 
On these subjects, therefore, they have the 
highest degree of moral evidence. For, the 
ebbing and flowing of the tides, they who 
have lived always in an inland country have 
only the observation of others. But then, all 
whom they hear speak on the subject affirm 



i&rFl^EREm:' SUBJECTS ADMIT. 201 

it, and tiierefore, they firmly believe iu They 
who have lived near the sea-shore, have the 
evidence of their own experience, added to 
the observation of others. And again, other 
persons know, that it depends on causes as 
permanent as the changes of night and day, 
and liave the same species and degree of ev- 
idence with that above mentioned. 

Present facts, such as the existence of 
certain cities or buildings, of certain institu- 
tions, t)f countries, seas, or mountains, fee* 
admit of personal observation, testimony, or 
general notoriety. But the personal obser- 
vation of these, as they are specific facts, be- 
longs to a higher species of evidence. When 
the things lie at a convenient distance, they 
are actually known by many on this evidence* 
But, when they lie at a great distance, they 
are known by most men, on no higher evi- 
dence than testimony ; or, more frequently 
by general notoriety. Few men, for instance, 
have ever been in China, fewer still at Pekin> 
The greater part of mankind have, probably, 
never been informed, by eye-witnesses, of 
their existence, and therefore, must believe it 
on general notoriety. 

Of the hand-writing of persons, we judge 
by analogy. For, from the resemblance 
which the writing in question bears to the 
18 



202 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

writing of a certain person which v/e have 
seen before, we infer that it was written by 
him. The resemblance, on which we judge, 
is not so much in the shape of each particular 
letter, as in a certain general character of the 
writing, which can hardly be described. Our 
ability to decide here with safety is confirmed, 
or weakened > according to the experience 
which we have had of the correctness or in- 
correctness of our decisions in former cases. 
Nearly the same remark may be made of 
determining, that certain pictures are the 
work of a certain master ; or, that a certain 
building was planned by a certain architect. 
Here the decision is founded on the resem- 
blance which the works in question bear to 
the works of the same kind, which we have 
seen before ; and, here too, the resemblance 
consists in tlie general style, rather than in 
the particular parts. 

Of the effects of institutions on the charac- 
ter, manners, and happiness of mankind, or 
of peace and war ; riches and poverty, fee. 
By comparing the state of one people, where 
these prevail, with that of another, where they 
do not ; or, where their opposites prevail, a 
tolerable judgment may be formed of their 
effects. If we would collect general truths 
on these subjects, we can do it only by a 
careful study of history, and even by a com- 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 203 

parison of different histories. The evidence 
attainable here, is of the nature of personal 
observation, exercised upon that species of 
testimony which is called historic evidence. 
Certain general opinions on these points are 
also current in the world, and which are be- 
lieved by individuals on the authority of that 
general currency. These are, perhaps, more 
numerous than those which are formed by 
personal investigation. Some of them may 
be true, but many are probably false. 

Of the knowledge of men's motives and in- 
tentions. The proper evidence of these is 
testimony. But, where a man does not re- 
veal them to us by his words, we can collect 
them only by inference from his conduct. 
And, here an important question occurj : 
Whether the intentions and motives of men 
can be safely inferred from their actions ? 
This is affirmed by some, but denied by 
others. It is obvious, however, that in the 
administration of justice in this country, it 
is taken for granted, that they may be safely 
inferred ; for, in most criminal cases, the in- 
tention constitutes the very hinge of the ques- 
tion of guilt or innocence ; and, that intention 
must be decided upon by the jury from the 
conduct. But, if it cannot be inferred, how 
can they safely give a verdict? And, it 
should be observed, that stronger evidence is 



S04 EVIDENCE OF WHICM 

requisite for a legal decision, especially in 
criminal cases, than for an opinion in private 
life. This is, indeed, only an ' Argumentum 
ad verecundiam- ;' but, when all the circum- 
stances of the case are duly considered, it 
will appear to be as strong an one of the kind, 
as can be adduced. It may, however, be 
confirmed by observation or experience, the 
great principle of moral evidence. For, ob- 
servation and experience will point out to us 
certain circumstances in a man's conduct, 
which will indicate his motives and intentions, 
however he may attempt to disguise them by 
words. And, doubtless, the most strenuous 
opposer of this doctrine, if placed in certain 
situations, where his passions were greatly 
agitated, would find that he himself could in- 
terpret a man's intentions by his conduct. 
If, for instance, he were passing through a 
wood alone, in the dusk of the evening, with 
a large sum of money about him, which he 
had just received in the presence of several 
people, and should observe one of those peo- 
ple watching his approach, half concealed 
behind one of the trees, with a pistol in his 
hand, his fears would soon teach him, that 
the man intended to rob him. Or, if a per- 
son, whom he had greatly offended, should, 
with strong marks of rage in his countenance, 
seize up a weapon, or draw his sword, or pull 
out a pistol, he would have little doubt that 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 205 

he meant to kill him. In some few cases, 
passions are more faithful advisers than rea- 
son ; for, they sometime set aside the soph- 
istries with which interest or prejudice had 
deluded us. There can be as little doubt 
that a man, who, with weapons concealed 
about him, waits for his enemy, or industri- 
ously seeks him out, and kills him, was ac- 
tuated by malice prepense. It will be said, 
perhaps, that these are strong cases. But, if 
these be admitted, it must then be acknowl- 
edged, that there are cases in which the mo- 
tives and intentions may be inferred by the 
actions : and the only questions then will be, 
under what circumstances, and how far the 
indications of the conduct can be trusted. If 
observation and experience be fairly consult- 
ed, it will be found, that their information is 
not confined to such cases as those above- 
mentioned. By comparing the conduct of 
men, known to be actuated by certain motives 
or intentions, with that of others not so actu- 
ated ; or, by reflecting on our own conduct, 
when we were under similar influences, we 
shall discover marks which may be safely trust- 
ed ; and to which we can scarcely help attend- 
ing when we are not interested to the contrary. 
In the application of these marks, we reason 
by analogy. If it be said, that no indications, 
learnt from experience, can afford us a cer- 
tain knowledge of motives and intentions, it 



20G EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

may be replied, that human affairs do not 
admit of certainty, but of probability only ; 
and that the probability here is often as great 
as the events of life usually afford. When 
experience teaches us, that the same marks 
in the conduct may arise from two different 
motives, there we cannot safely infer from 
those marks, which of them exists ; but, must 
determine this from other circumstances. 
Thus, in the application of the old maxim, 
' He confesses the fault who avoids the trial,' 
there is often great danger of error ; for a 
man may avoid the trial from another motive, 
besides consciousness of guilt ; as, because 
he is convinced that such is the temper of the 
times, or such the character of his judges, 
that he cannot obtain impartial justice. For, 
there have been times in which to be brought 
to trial, whether guilty or not, was almost a 
certain prelude to being convicted. It was 
so in the famous circuit of Judge Jefferies, 
and during the reign of Robespierre. 

The knowledge of human nature, L e. a 
knowledge of the dispositions and characters 
of men, of their capacities, of the confidence 
which may be safely placed in them, or the 
expectations which may be formed of theni 
in certain circumstances, though it admits of 
personal observation, and the observation of 
others, is yet usually grounded on general 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 207 

notoriety. Few men, comparatively, possess 
sufJScient discrimination, or are sufficiently 
attentive to attain it for themselves. The 
greater part have not even learnt it from those 
who have attained it by their own observation ; 
but acquire what they possess of it, from the 
maxims which pass current in the world. 

Our transactions witli- men are regulated 
much by their characters, (for which charac- 
ters we have, often, no other ground than 
general opinion,) and much, perhaps most, 
by confidence. We purchase and consume 
articles of food and medicine, of which we 
are not sufficient judges to know, that they 
have not been adulterated by ingredients of a 
pernicious nature. Yet we know, that the 
articles with which they might be adulterated, 
are often so inferior in value, as to render 
adulteration profitable : that many tradesmen 
are not so delicate, as to refrain from adul- 
teration, when it is profitable : that it is easily 
practised, and in each particular case, not 
likely to be detected. On the other hand, 
we trust, that though articles be often so 
adulterated, as to render them less salutary, 
or even injurious ; yet it is only in a slight 
degree: that scarcely any man would be so 
wicked, as to render them absolutely destruc- 
tive : that the practice could not be often 
i'^j)ealed, without being suspected, and per- 



208 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

hapSj detected : that the discovery would be 
attended with iafamj and ruin. More than 
all this, we see others buy and consume these 
articles, without suffering material injury : 
nay, we ourselves have been acctistomed so 
to do, from a period prior to that in which 
we were able to reason on the subject ; and 
yet^ have felt no harm. We, therefore per- 
sts:t in doing it, without fearing any. Thus, 
in cases where our health, and even our lives 
are at stake, we act on a confidence, built on 
a sort of general experience, without any 
positive evidence, arising from testimony, or 
our own skill. It may be said, that we do 
this-, because it is the less of two evils : for, 
no man could provide all his food, and pre- 
pare it himself; or wait till he had ascertained 
that it was innocent before he would eat it ; 
if, therefore, he did not act on this confidence, 
he must starve. But, I answer, that we act 
thus in many cases not to preserve life, but 
merely to gratify our palate. And, in acting 
on this principle of confidence, we act rea- 
sonably. For, though instances of people's 
being injured, or even poisoned, occur ; yet^ 
in comparison with the instances in which 
they thus trust to others with safety, they are 
as nothing. Hence, it appears, that the prob- 
ability of our security in so doing, immensely 
exceeds the probability of injury. And, this 
is as good evidence as human life admits | 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 209 

absolute certainty being unattainable. On 
this principle, too, we trust our lives in the 
hands of physicians and apothecaries, and 
often without any direct evidence of their 
skill or integrity. So also we trust our for- 
tunes in the hands of attornies ; and a con- 
siderable part of our property in the hands of 
our servants. And, from this last circum- 
stance, a confirmation, that this principle of 
confidence is regulated by experience, may 
be drawn. For, those articles of our prop- 
erty, which we know, either from our own ob- 
servation, or the experience of others, that 
servants are likely to purloin, we secure from 
them ; while we leave open to them those 
which we know, by experience, they are not 
likely to plunder. It is, also on the same 
principle, (though the remark may not be ex- 
actly in its place,) that they are to be vindi- 
cated from the charge of imprudence, who 
venture themselves at sea^ or even on horse-* 
back, or in a carriage. Accidents in all 
these do occur ; yet, they are not frequent 
enough to render the practice imprudent. 
If the instances in which they occurred, 
bore a large proportion to those in which 
they do not, it would be imprudent thus to 
expose ourselves tQ dunger, without a strong 
R^ce§gity, 



210 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

Of transient facts or events which we did 
not see, the proper evidence is testimony. If 
they be recent, personal witnesses of them 
may be produced ; and then they may be 
established by viva voce testimony. But, if 
they be of a greater date, we must be content 
with the evidence of written testimony. In 
some cases, the testimony of a fact long past, 
may be confirmed by an observation of pres- 
ent circumstances. Thus, the deluge is con- 
firmed by layers of sea-shells, which are found 
in high situations, at a distance from the sea, 
and deep in the earth. Volcanoes admit of 
confirmation from the lava and ashes. That 
certain large cities have existed and been 
destroyed, may be confirmed by the ruins 
which still remain. That camps have been 
pitched, and battles fought in particular places, 
may be confirmed by the appearance of the 
ground, and by the bones which are still found 
there. Some events admit of a confirmation 
by other writings, either public or private, 
besides those in which they are fully describ- 
ed, and from w^hich our first information of 
them was obtained. The weight of this con- 
firmation varies, according to the nature of 
these writings. Public records'^ are of the 

* The piinf'ipal facts relative to the Lord Jesus Christ 
arc not only confirmed to us by uninspired history, as 
that of Josephus, &c. but by the very strong and unex» 
ceptionabje evidence of public records; or, at least, by 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 211 

highest authority. Deeds, bonds, receipts, 
are of undoubted weight, especially if the 
hand-writing of the parties, who executed or 
witnessed them, can be ascertained. But, 
then, these confirmations are rarely obtained ; 
and, therefore, such events are generally be- 
lieved on no higher evidence than written 

the testimonies of unexceptionable witnesses, that such 
records existed, and by their appeal to them, as docu- 
ments well known to exist by those to wliom the ap- 
peals were made ; and who, indeed, themselves were 
the depositaries of these records. Thus, Ensebius 
says, ' Our Saviour's resurrection being much talked of 
throuirhout Palestine, Pilate informed the emperor of 
it, as likewise of his miracles, of which he had heard ; 
and that, being raised after he had been put to death, 
he was already believed by many to be a god.' These 
despatches from the Procurators in the provinces, to 
the Emperor and Senate, were called their' Acts,' and 
those of Piiate were called ' Acta Pilati.' Justin Mar- 
tyr, therefore, in his first Apology for the Christians, 
which was presented to the emperor Antoninus Pius, 
and the senate of Rome, about A. D. 140, having men- 
tioned the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, and some of its 
circumstances, adds, ' And that these things were so 
done, you may know from the Acts made in the time 
of Pontius Pilatk.' In or near the year 200, Tertul- 
lian, in liis Apology for Christianity, writes thus, 'Of 
all these things relating to Jesus Christ, Pilate him- 
self, in his conscience already a Christian, sent an 
account to T'iberius, then emperor.' He adds, still 
further, ' Search your own commentaries (or public 
records) you will there find, &c.' It is incredible that 
such writers should have made such appeals, especially 
to the very persons in whose custody these monuments 
v/ere, had not the montmients existed ; and equally so 
that they should exist, and the facts which they record 
never have occurred. — Ep. 



212 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

testimony. They are most frequently be- 
lieved, on even lower evidence than this. 
For, written testimony is properly the evi- 
dence of a person, who himself observed the 
events, which he relates. But, such evidence 
can seldom be had. For, most events which 
have been long past, we must be content with 
a testimony, which has passed through several 
hands, before it reached us; and, very rarely 
can we ascertain the channel through which 
it came ; for, we can seldom learn how the 
WTiter became acquainted with the events 
which he relates. And, even this degree of 
evidence is not possessed by most men, who 
yet believe the event ; for, they have never 
read the works of the original writer, in which 
they are recorded ; but, have obtained their 
information from a mere compilation. 

When a recent event becomes the subject 
of examination in a court of judicature, it 
admits of the highest evidence which testimo- 
ny can afford. For, the witnesses are then 
sworn to speak the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth. They give their evidence in 
the face of the court. They are cross-ex- 
pmined by the counsel of the adverse party, 
who are qualified, by long practice, to detect 
deceptions, and discover the truth. The 
authenticity also of every paper brought in 
^yidence, may be examined, and the force of 



Df^rERENT SUMECtS AbMtT. 213 

its proof fully established. When a fact of 
an olde!* dale becomes the subject of a law 
suit, the only evidence of which it can admit, 
are written memorials. For instance, when 
the title of an estate is called in question, 
deeds are capable of being produced in evi- 
dence. But, as the parties who executed 
them, and the Witnesses to their execution 
have been long dead, the hand-writing of 
neither of them can be proved ; and there- 
fore, the authenticity of the deed can be 
proved only by the appearance of its antiquity. 
Where the right is claimed by descent, it ad- 
mits of being proved by parish registers, and 
sometimes by sepulchral monuments ; or, in 
some cases, by records in the herald's office ; 
or, perhaps, by family registers ; all of which 
are of great authority. Possession, added to 
either of these, is deemed satisfactory. 

Recent public events, such as battles, 
seiges, &lc. admit of the evidence of gazettes, 
and of general notoriety. These gazettes 
come to the public under the authority of 
Ministers of State; and the credit due to 
them must be regulated by the judgment 
which is formed of the ability of the Ministers 
to know the fact, and tlieir disposition to 
communicate it fairly. In respect to the for- 
mer, their information is conveyed officially 
by those who are personally acquainted with 



214 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

the facts, who are responsible for conveying 
the truth, and act under a conviction, that 
they will probably be detected, and punished, 
if they attempt to deceive. As to this point, 
therefore^ there can be no reasonable doubt. 
In respect to the latter, the judgment should 
be formed by experience. If, on a fair in- 
vestigation, it. appears, that persons in their 
stations have been accustomed to give correct 
information to the public on such subjects, it 
is then entitled to credit, but not otherwise. 

Of the evidence of which History admits. 

Though many historic facts resemble those, 
which have been already mentioned, in the 
evidence of which they admit ; yet the im- 
portance of history renders it worthy of a 
separate discussion, especially as its credibil- 
ity has been disputed in almost unqualified 
terms. "^ As far as any historian relates only 

* It is to be regretted, that the c>l)iections to the cred- 
ibility of history, are not proposed with more cuution 
and precision, than they usually are. From the un- 
qualified terms in which they are often ur^ed, all his- 
toric evidence seems in dana^er ofbein*!^ called in ques- 
tion. Of the extent of the mischief likely to result from 
such statements, their proposers are little aware. They 
do not consider, how great a part of the evidence of 
revealed religion, is of the nature of historic evidence; 
and, therefore, what would he its fate, if that species 
of evidence should be regarded as unworthy of credit.'* 
* It is obvious,' says Bish(>p Butler, ^ that Christianity, 
and the proof of it, are both historical.' Analogy, part 
ii. chap. 8. 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 215 

such facts, as he himself observed, the evi- 
dence is of the same kind with written testi- 
mony ; only, as politics are more likely to 
warp the judgment, than almost any other 
subject, extraordinary caution may be neces- 
sary in giving credit to his relations. No 
historian, however, relates only such facts as 
he observed himself; for, though some may 
say of their subject, ' quorum magna pars fui,' 
they must mention many things which they 
neither did, nor saw, nor heard, but which 
they learned from others ; and indeed, such 
facts must generally, if not always, make up 
the greater part of their history. For these, 
iheir evidence is only a testimony ; that what 
they relate, is the judgment which they have 
formed from the use of the means which they 
possessed. Before we can tell, therefore, 
what degree of reliance is to be placed on 
their accounts, we must inquire what means 
of information they can possess. These will 
differ, according to the nature of the facts, 
and the circumstances of the historian. If 
the facts be of a public nature, their truth is 
generally capable of being ascertained with 
ease. By public facts, I mean such as Min- 
isters of State either wish to be publicly 
known, or, at least, have no desire to conceal. 
For these, they have generally the evidence 
of proclamations, gazettes, or other public 
papers, or general notoriety. And, as the 



Sl6 EVIDENCE OF WHlCit 

publicity of such facts exposes every account 
of them to animadversion, and to correction, 
if they be at all erroneous, a just view of them 
may be easily attained. This is, especially 
the case, if the historian resides in the country 
of which he writes ; but it holds also to a 
considerable degree, when he does not ; for* 
so great an intercourse prevails between the 
different nations of Europe, especially in the 
times of peace, that, what is publicly known 
in one, soon becomes known in others. As 
to such public facts, therefore, historians are 
entitled to full credit, as fi\r as relates to their 
means of information. The same publicity 
of the facts which they record, secures also 
their fidelity in relating them, as it exposes 
them to detection and shame, if they endeav- 
our to deceive. 

The only difficulty, therefore, relates to 
facts of a secret nature, such as the intrigues 
of courts, and of parties, debates, and resolu- 
tions of Privy Councils, motives for peace or 
war, secret alliances, and secret^ articles in 
treaties, corruption of public officers, or of 
popular leaders, &lc. Of such facts, positive 
and direct evidence of testimony can very 
rarely be obtained, till a length of time has 
elapsed. The only information, therefore, 
which a contemporary historian can obtain of 

* These secret articles are often, perhnps generally, 
revealed by the circumstances which time discloses. 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 217 

them, must be by remote testimony, report^ 
or inference, drawn from such facts as are of 
a more public nature. It sometimes happens, 
that some of the parties concerned, have re- 
vealed them in confidence to their friends, 
and they again, still in confidence, to their 
friends ; till at length they have become 
knov^n to numbers. If the hfstorian be of 
the higher ranks of life, he often becomes 
thus acquainted with these secret facts, either 
by remote testimony, or credible report ; if 
not by a general notoriety within the higher 
circles. And, even an historian of an inferior 
rank, may become thus acquainted w^ith them ; 
for, in the present state of society, there is 
such an intercourse between the different 
ranks, that what is known in one, is soon 
known in all. When none of the parties have 
themselves betrayed the secret, information 
may have been obtained from secretaries or 
clerks, to whom much must necessarily be 
revealed to carry the plans into execution. 
And when the facts are likely to have great 
influence on the public funds, it is probable, 
that persons so much interested in knowing 
them, as stock-jobbers are, and so able to pay 
largely for information, will not fail of obtain- 
ing it. If, however, nothing transpires in 
either of these ways, there remains only in- 
ferences from more public facts. These, it 
must be admitted, do not afford such satis- 
19 



218 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

factory evidence, as the more direct sources 
of information; but, it may be doubted, 
whether they do not furnish a better ground 
for our judgment, than politicians are willing 
to allow, at least when they are used against 
themselves, or their partizans. An attentive 
study of human nature ; an accurate obser- 
valion of the conduct of men under certain 
circumstances, or influenced by certain views 
and motives ; a careful application of the 
knowledge, thus acquired, to particular cases 
as they occur ; together with a comparison 
of the different parts of the conduct of the 
men in question, to discover their general 
objects ; and a due consideration of their cir- 
cumstances, will enable a man of judgment 
and penetration to form a tolerably just opin- 
ion of many of these secret facts. And, if 
the light, which subsequent facts throw upon 
the question, be properly applied, that judg- 
ment may be corrected or confirmed. The 
historian may also, in forming his judgment, 
avail himself of the assistance of politicians of 
the opposite party, whose abilities and skill in 
politics qualify them to draw their inferences 
more correctly than other men. Opinions, 
thus formed, will, however, be more true in 
generals^ than in particulars. Thus, it may 
be safely inferred, that disgust has been taken, 
when the particular occasion may be unknown. 
We may conclude, that a certain resolMtioa; 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 21^ 

has been adopted, when we know neither the 
reasons on which it was founded, nor the 
parties who supported or opposed it. Or, 
we may infer, that a particular man has been 
corrupted, when we are ignorant of the nature 
of the bribe, or the channel through which it 
was conveyed. They who endeavour to dis- 
credit all historical information, founded upon 
inference, have, probably, been indisposed to 
give it sufficient credit for its correctness in 
generals^ on account of their disgust whh its 
errors in particulars."^ After all, however, 
the assent which is due to those facts of his- 
tory, which rest on such evidence, is lower 
than that, which should be given to such as 
are of a more public nature. 

In respect to public facts, a contemporary 
historian has some advantages over one who 
records events, which happened some time 
ago. For, he is likely to have a clearer view 
of the connexion of causes and effects, and a 
more extensive knowledge of circumstances, 
as far as they are generally known. He has, 
also, better opportunities of gaining informal 

* If a man wishes to obtain satisfactory ground for 
the decision of this question, let I»im collect the opin- 
ions which Ijave, from time to time, been entertained 
of secret facts, and compare them with the information 
which has since been o[)tained of their respective sub? 
jects ; as, for instance, the opinions which were enter- 
tained of Charles the Second, and iiis Ministers, should 
he compared with the information furuishjed by SiiP 
Jol^ri Dalrjmj>le's Meijipirs, 



220 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

tion from others who rhay be better acquainted 
with any particular circumstances than he is. 
But, in respect to secret facts, he, who writes 
the history of a period some time past, has 
the advantage. For, the private letters and 
papers which are in the cabinets of princes, 
and in the hands of private families, are often, 
after a time, made public ; and, then the se- 
cret transactions and motives of polhicians 
are ascertained. Thus, the papers contained 
in the Memoirs published by Sir J. Dalrym- 
ple, have thrown considerable light on the 
Histories of Charles the 2d. James the 2d. 
and William the 3d. Added to this, he is 
generally able to form a more correct judg- 
ment of the evidence on which the facts are 
founded, as well as of the nature of the facts 
themselves, than a man who writes while 
party prejudices still prevail."^ 

The evidence of memoirs, written by per- 
sons who had a considerable share in the 
transactions which they relate, has been con* 
sidered as superior to that of history ; and, 
no doubt it is so, in many respects 5 but the 
preference which has been given to it, seems 

* Many persons may be able to estimate the magni- 
tude of this advantage, by considering how different 
were their views of political transactions, when they 
took place ; from what they have since formed on an 
impartial review of them, or on reading the history of 
them. 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 221 

too unqualified. Such a writer must, of 
course, be better acquainted with facts, cir- 
cumstances, and characters, than a private 
historian can be. For, he must have better 
fifieatis of information of the proceedings of 
his own court, and of others, of the circum- 
stances under which treaties were made, and 
of the secret articles annexed to them. He 
knows the conferences and councils of his 
own party, and the professed views of its 
members ; but, their real views he can know 
only by inference, as well as others. The 
views and councils of his opponents can be 
known to him only by testimony or inference. 
And, the testimony, which he can obtain of 
them, must be more or less suspicious, being 
that of spies and traitors to their party, per- 
sons who have often an interest in deceiving 
him. But, whatever advantages he may pos- 
sess, great allowance ought to be made for 
the influence of prejudice in forming his judg- 
ments, and of partiality in relating them. 
For, as he had a large share in the transac- 
tions which he records, he must be considered 
as a man pleading his own cause. Hence, 
we should be as cautious in giving credit to 
his relations, as we are to persons in private 
life, who state to us their own case. And, 
indeed, if the, conduct of politicians be fairly 
considered, it will, probably, appear that a 
more than ordinary caution is requisite in be- 



222 EVIDENCE OF WHlCff 

lievlng their statements. The evidence of a 
mere observer, an impartial person, as far a& 
he possesses the means of information, is de- 
cidedly more safe, than of one concerned in 
the transactions, and interested in the judg- 
ment of mankind respecting them. This de- 
tracts more from the evidence of memoirs, 
than their advocates are willing to allow. 

The history of periods, long past, admits 
of the evidence of contemporary historians,^ 
of public records, and public account-books,, 
and occasionally of public monuments. Some- 
times it admits of the evidence of historians, 
who wrote subsequent to the period described, 
and who had the use of materialsf which 
have long since perished. Often, however, 
it admits of no other evidence than tradition ; 
and that tradition so corrupted, by the desire 
which every nation has to aggrandize its 
origin, that the truth can scarcely be separat- 
ed from the falsehood. 

The evidence of Parliamentary Reports is 
also of the nature of written testimony ; for 
they are composed by persons who heard the 
debates, and purport to be the substance of 
what they heard. As to the possibility of a 
man's giving, from memory, a tolerably accu- 

* See Note on p. 210. 

T Thus of Eusebius and other ancient historian?. 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 223 

rate account of the debates which he has 
beard, k is a well-known fact. And, as to 
the probability of finding pci^ons capaple of 
doing it, no reasonable doubt can be enter- 
tained ; because many persons who have 
taken due pains to acquire an ability to do it, 
have succeeded. And, that the persons em- 
ployed in reporting these debates are capable 
of d-oing it with tolerable accurac}', is highly 
probable ; since otherwise, they would not 
be continued in that en^ployment. It is, in- 
deed, possible, that some questions may be 
discussed in parliament, or some arguments 
urged, which they may not be able to com- 
prehend ; and these they would be likely to 
misrepresent. But, this cannot happen often ; 
for the questions w^hich are usually discussed 
there, and the arguments which are urged, 
are generally level to the capacity of a man 
of ordinary education ; or, indeed, they would 
not be suited to their purpose. Besides, by 
being the subjects of frequent conversation, 
they are altogether within tbeir reach. The 
partiality of the reporters is, therefore, the 
principal circumstance, which can render 
their account suspicious. It is said, however, 
that this does not extend to misrepresentation, 
but only to the passing over the arguments of 
their political opponents too slightly, or, al- 
most omitting their speeches ; while they give 
those of their own party at length. And thi^ 



224 EVIDENCE OF WHICfl 

view of the case is highly probable. Because^ 
if palpable misrepresentations were made, as 
they would easily admit of correction, so, no 
doubt, they would be corrected, on account 
of the interest and power of those members, 
whose speeches were misrepresented, to vin- 
dicate their own characters. Besides, if mis- 
representations were material and frequent, 
as they must be known, it is not to be con- 
ceived that the houses of parliament would 
suffer their debates to be published ; or that 
they would continue to be read with that at- 
tention and belief which they certainly obtain. 
It is remarkable too, that not only the public 
give credit to them, but even the principal 
speakers themselves consult the volumes of 
debates, when questions are coming on, which 
have been discussed before ; in order to see 
the arguments which were then urged by the 
respective speakers.^ 

It should be observed, however, that he 
who wishes to form a just view of the debates 
from the newspapers, ought to read a paper 

* This question has lately been examined by Mr. 
Coxe, in his Memoirs of Sir Robert VValpole, under 
favourable circumstances, for an accurate decision. 
After a careful comparison of the debates, published 
during the period of which he writes, and the notes 
which had been written by Members of Parliament, 
together with other direct evidence on the question, he 
decides the point in favour of the authenticity of the 
debates. 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 225 

of each party ; for then he would see in one, 
what was omitted, fmm party motives, by the 
other. 

On what evidence can the authenticity of 
Books be established ? We very seldom at- 
tain direct and immediate testimony for this 
point; i. e. we rarely hear the author say, 
that he wrote the book in question. If we 
are informed by a person who did hear him 
make such a declaration, we have then the 
testimony only at second hand. But, we 
have seldom even this evidence. Indeed, it 
rarely happens that we can trace it through 
two, three, or more steps, or even trace at all, 
the testimony to this fact; and therefore, we 
usually believe it only on general notoriety, 
or even report. If the book bear on its title- 
page, the name of a living author, it may 
generally be believed to be his ; because, if 
any credit be obtained by it, it is improbable 
that the real author would give the merit of 
his performance to another ; and, if any dis- 
grace be incurred by it, the reputed author 
w^ould, probably, disavow it publicly ;, and, 
perhaps, seek a legal remedy for the injury. 
Yet, if report is to be believed, books have 
been published, not only with fictitious names, 
but even with the names of living persons, 
who yet never wrote them, but sold to the 
booksellers the liberty of using their names, 
20 



226 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

But then, this practice is supposed -to be 
confined to booksellers of a certain descrip- 
tion ; and therefore, it does not lessen the 
belief, that other booksellers do fairly give to 
the public the real names of the authors, 
whose books they publish. When a book is 
anonymous, the only ground, in general, for 
imputing it to a certain author, is report. If 
this report be credited by men reputed intel- 
ligent in things of this kind ; if the reputed 
author be supposed capable of writing the 
book, (for which capacity there is often no 
other evidence than report,) if the report be 
contradicted by nobody, it may generally be 
safely believed. Sometimes, too, the style 
of the work, the method of treating the sub- 
ject, and the sentiments enforced, will afford 
to some persons a probable ground of at- 
tributing the book to a certain author.^ But 
then this supposes them to be acquainted 

* It is upon evidence of this sort, in part,that, in these 
day?,ihe genuineness of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as 
the work of Paul, and of the second and third of John, 
as his productions, is admitted. Neither of them bears 
the nnme of the writer. But the similarity of the style 
to that (>f other known writings of the same authors, the 
sentiments enforced, and (particularly with reference 
to the Epistle to the Hebrews) the method of treating 
the subject, so exactly accord both with other writings 
by the same hand, and with one deeply and accurately 
skilled in Levitical learning, as to forbid us to doubt 
the genuineness of the work. See especially Prof. 
Stuart's Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
—Ed. 



Bri'FERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 227 

With Other works of that author, and with his 
sentiments on that subject, or others nearly 
allied lo it ; and moreover, that they possess 
considerable judgment in composition. Of 
course, this mode of ascertaining the author 
of a book, niust be confined to few persons. 
In such cases, and many others of a similar 
kind, the report is some evidence on one side, 
which there is nothing on the other to coun- 
terbalance. Consequently, the preponderant 
cy of the evidence is on the side of the report, 
and should produce some degree of assent. 

The evidence for the authenticity of an- 
cient books is rather different, and seems to 
be of the following kinds. First, that as far 
as we can learn the book is generally believed 
to have been written by the person whose 
nanie it bears ; secondly, that it is imputed 
to him in books, supposed to have been writ- 
ten at, or near the time, when the reputed 
author is said to have lived. It is observable, 
that this is supporting one presumption by 
another ; for, it may be asked, how do you 
know that the authors, whose testimony you 
cite, did live at that time, and write the books, 
which you impute to them ? But then, the 
coincidence of several presumptions, provided 
they be independent of each other, do afford 
very considerable probability. Thirdly, that 
as far as we can learn, it has never been dis- 
puted to be the work of the reputed author. 



228 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

It is presumed here, that if it had been dis- 
puted, some record of that circumstance 
would have come down to us. Or, fourthly, 
that if it ever were disputed, its pretensions 
were examuied, and yet it still continued to 
be attributed to the same author. This af- 
fords considerable confirmation, and the near- 
er the time of its examination was to its sup- 
posed publication, the greater is that confir- 
mation."^ Fifthly, that the internal evidence 
of the book agrees with the most correct 
ideas, which we can form, of the reputed 
author, and of thetime and place, when and 
where he is said to have written it } at least, 
that no incongruity appears, either in style, 
or in any other circumstance. For, a con- 
sistency in all the various circumstances of 
style, opinions, manners, customs, forms of 
government, persons, geography, &:c. afford 
a strong presumption, that a work is genuine. 
Because, It is highly improbable, that an au- 
thor should have so thoroughly acquainetd 
himself w^ith all these circumstances of the 
time and place, in Vv^hieh he would have his 
spurious book be supposed to have been writ- 
ten, and keep them so constantly in his mind, 
as never to make any one mistake, capable 
of being detected by the learned ; and, at the 
same tin^, avoid tfo introduction of any cir- 
Qumstan^^s of more modern tkrtes, with which 

^ See Natr© on pagQ 18t, 



DIFFERENT SOBJEC'rS ADMIT. 229 

his mind is s<y Tniich more familiar. It may^ 
indeed, be physically possible to do this; but 
It is certainly highly improbable. And it 
should always be recollected, that our opin- 
ions of human affairs are to be regi^lated, not 
by physical possibilities, but by probabilities. 
Experience shows, that whatever abilities 
may be displayed in delusions, yet there is 
almost always some unguarded circumstance, 
which exposes them to detection. We find 
this in cases comparatively simple ; and there- 
fore, may more reasonably expect it in so 
compHcated a case, as that before us. 

Of what evidence do Miracles admit ? 

A mira^ile is an event, which happens con- 
trary to tlie established course of nature. To 
an eye-witness, a miracle admits of the evi- 
dence of sense. The witness, however, must 
be supposed to be acquainted with the course 
of nature, so as to be able to judge, thai the 
event in question is contrary thereto. In re- 
gard to the miracles recorded in scriplnrej 
this cannot be doubted. For no man of or- 
dinary understanding, could be incapable of 
ascertaining, that the event was contrary to 
the established course of nature, when dis- 
eases were healed by a word, when sight was 
imparted to the blind, hearing to the deaf, 
the powers of speech to the dumb, merely at 
commsind^ and without the use of any other 



280 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

means ; especially when a corpse, which had 
begun to putrify, was restored lo life by the 
speaking of a word. 

To other men, miracles, like other events, 
admit of the evidence of testimony. As we 
cannot doubt the competency of the witnesses 
to ascertain the facts, their credibility is the 
only point to be considered ; and this must 
be determined upon the principles, on which 
the credibility of testimony, in general, de- 
pends. An objection, however, has been 
brought against the credibility of miracles, 
which merits particular notice. The objec- 
tion in suhstance is, that a miracle being a 
violation of the laws of nature, which univer- 
sal"^ experience has proved to be invariable, 
its improbability cannot be surmounted by 
any human testimony whatever ; because it is 
more probable, that that testimony should be 
false, than that a constant law of nature should 
have been violated. The evidence which we 
have for the existence of a law of nature, and 
for the application of that law to particular 
cases, has been mentioned before. It was 
then observed, that as the constancy of these 
laws depends entirely on ihe will of God, so 

* Such an objection is a petitio principii ; it first 
assu7nes that the event neve7' has occurred, and then 
argues from that assumption that ft has not: lor what 
is meant by its being contrary to universal experience^ 
but that no person, at any time or in any place has ex^ 
perienced it ? And xyis is the point in dispute»-r-ED« 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 231 

no argument from that constancy can be of 
any weight, when there is reason to conclude 
that it is his will, that they should be sus- 
pended or altered. This observation would, 
of course, be denied by a man who holds, 
that the course of nature is governed by a 
principle of necessity, independently of the 
will, or agency of God. But, he who holds 
that God governs the world, will admit the 
observation. Whh him, therefore, the only 
question would be, whether any occasion may 
arise, which, it may reasonably be concluded, 
would induce God to alter or suspend any of 
the constant operations of nature- And, if it 
can be shown that such occasions have arisen, 
all the objections from the most constant 
course of nature, would be of no real weight ; 
their sound would then be more formidable 
than their meaning. This latter question 
must be determined by arguments of a differ- 
ent kind from the constant experience of 
natural things. It should then be inquired, 
whether it can be presumed, that any occasion 
should occur, in which it may be important 
that God should reveal his will to men, to 
correct their mistakes, to reform their vices, 
or to give them any new instruction. The 
view, which will be entertained of the exist- 
ence of such an occasion, and of its impor- 
tance, will depend on the judgment which has 
been formed of the moral state of mankind. 



232 EVIDENCE OF WHICH 

and of the happiness or misery which may- 
await men in the next world. If it be admit- 
ted, that such occasions may occur, it should 
then be inquired, how such a revelation can 
be made, so as to excite the attention of men, 
and warrant their reception of it as from God, 
Now, in what other way, discoverable by us, 
can this be done, than by accompanying it 
with miracles? Hence, miracles may be ex- 
pected to attend a divine revelation. Con- 
sequently, they are not events so improbable, 
as to surmount the evidence of testimony, if 
that testimony be in itself unexceptionable. 

On a review of this chapter, it will probably 
appear surprising, on how small evidence 
most subjects are believed. This is men- 
tioned, riot to excite or encourage scepticism, 
nor should it have that effect. For, if expe- 
rience shows, that the instances in which we 
are deceived by believing on this evidence, 
small as it may be, bear an inconsiderable 
proportion to those in which we decide rightly 
by it, it has a just claim on our assent. For, 
experience must be the only criterion of the 
safety or danger of the practice. This re- 
view will, also, show the inconsistency of 
refusing to believe certain things, which, per- 
haps, interest, or a regard to party, may in- 
cline us to reject, because stronger evidence 
is not brought fpr them, than, in the nattire 



DIFFERENT SUBJECTS ADMIT. 233 

of the thing, they admit; while we are in the 
constant practice of believing so many other 
things, and those often of very great impor- 
tance, on such slight evidence. We ought 
to impress it on our minds, that, though we 
do rightly in requiring the strongest evidence 
which the subject can afford ; yet, we ought 
always to be satisfied with the strongest of 
which, under all its circumstances, it admits. 



CONCLUSION. 

A FEW remarks shall conchide this tract. 

1. From the whole of this work it will ap- 
pear, that experience is the great test of 
probability, and the grand principle on which 
all moral reasoning must proceed, either in 
the attainment of knowledge, or in the regu- 
lation of practice. But then, it should be 
observed, that experience furnishes only the 
materials of knowledge ; and, that great skill 
is necessary to make a proper use of them. 
The object of this tract is to facilitate the ac- 
quiretnent of that skill, by showing how our 
observations are to be conducted in attaining 
a knowledge of things ; and, how experfence 



234 CONCLUSION. 

is to be employed in determining the proba- 
bility of events, and in regulating our credit 
in the testimony and observations of others. 

2. As experience is the great foundation 
of moral evidence, a skilful use of moral rea- 
soning cannot be acquired, till a later period 
of life than such a use of demonstration ; be- 
cause, a considerable time must have elapsed, 
before we are furnished with proper materials 
to form our judgments. Hence arises the 
necessity of submitting to the judgment of 
those of our elders, who have no interest but 
in our welfare. And, hence, young men, 
even of great abilities, both natural and ac- 
quired, who reject the counsel of their seniors, 
often make such serious mistakes, as lay the 
foundation of bitter, but unavailing repentance. 
An indisposition to avail ourselves of the ex- 
perience of others is, probably, one of the 
principal causes of the miseries of human life. 

3. It should be remembered, that errors 
in judgment on practical questions, are not 
innocent, unless they are inevitable. For, 
we have received our talents from our Creator 
for the direction of our conduct, and are re- 
sponsible to him for a fair use of them. But, 
we do not use them fairly, when we assume 
the liberty of forming our judgments accord- 
ing to our inclinations, or present interests ; 
when we neglect or pervert those rules for 
distinguishing truth from error, which are 



CONCLUSION. 235 

established on the general experience of 
mankind ; or, when we implicitly adopt the 
opinions, or follow the advice of those, who 
are as uninformed as we are, or are interested 
to deceive us. We can never, indeed, be 
said to use them fairly, unless we improve the 
opportunities which we enjoy, to prepare our 
minds for a just decision of practical ques- 
tions ; and, when we proceed to decide them, 
apply fairly and steadily those principles of 
reasoning, which alone can conduct us to a 
right conclusion. 

4. Lastly, the soundest principles of mo- 
rality are of little use, without a just applica- 
tion of them ; and to apply them justly, it is 
necessary to form an accurate view of facts 
and circumstances. Such a view w^e cannot 
form without a competent knowledge, and a 
fair application of the principles of moral ev- 
idence. But, if a man be ignorant of these 
principles, or, if knowing them, he neglect or 
pervert them, so as to give credit to mere asser- 
tions, or ex parte evidence on one side, while 
he withholds his assent from the strongest evi- 
dence, which the nature of the subject admits, 
on the other ; if, like a disputant for victory, 
and not an inquirer after truth, he allow him- 
self to dispute, or explain away, maxims 
founded on general observation, or notorious 
truths, merely on account of the difficulty 
which there naust always b^ of collecting 



^36 CONCLUSION. 

compulsive proof of them, the best moral 
principles will not preserve him from a con- 
duct injurious to society, and the more inju- 
rious, in proportipn to the weight of his char- 
acter. 



APPENDIX. 



ON DISPUTING FOR VICTORY, AND NOT FOR TRUTH, 

Whenever a man engages in a debate, 
without proposing to himself the establishment 
of some point, which he really believes to be 
true ; or, whenever he attempts to prove that 
some truth is an error, or some error is true, 
he is disputing for victory and not for truth. 
Sometimes, men contend in order to obtain 
the reputation of able disputants. On other 
occasions, victory is only a means, but the 
support or defence of a party "^ is the ultimate 
end proposed. In both cases, truth is equally 
disregarded, and the powers of reason equally 
perverted. The methods, also which are 
used in both, are nearly the same. A few 
of the most common of these methods, it may 
be useful to enumerate. All of them it would 
be scarcely possible to mention 5 because, 

* This is most likely to happen, when parties run 
high ; and therefore, it ofter^ happens on the com- 
mencfcment of a war. Hence, Dr. Johnson says, 
* Among the calamities of war, may be justly number- 
ed the diminution of the love of truth, by the falsehoods 
which interest dictates, and credulity encourages." 
Idler, vol, i. page 169. 



238 ON DISPUTrNG FOR VICTORY, 

every sophism, which is capable of being 
employed on the subject in question, is occa- 
sionally resorted to by these disputants. But, 
a brief description of a few may be useful, 
both to show more clearly the nature of the 
practice, and to put the reader upon his guard 
against its delusions. 

Disputants for victory, and not for truth, 
often deny such positions of their opponent, 
as though true, do not admit of specific proof. 
Of this kind are those, which are founded on 
observation or experience, or general notori- 
ety. They dispute facts, which they do not 
disbelieve^ and take the chance of their op- 
ponent's not being furnished with positive 
proof of them. They explain away those 
maxims, which are founded on the general 
experience of mankind, and are delivered in 
proverbial expressions. They demand a 
species,"^ or degree of proof, of which the 
subject does not admit. Thus, on practical 
questions, they dispute conclusions proved by 
strong probable arguments, and withhold their 
assent, because they cannot be demonstrated. 
On the other hand, they require possibilities 
to be admitted by their opponent, in opposi- 
tion to strong probabilities. They demand 

* Thus, mathematical evidence is demanded on 
moral subjects ; and a position required to be shown 
impossible to be false, which, in its nature, only admits 
of being shown true to a moral certainty. — Ed. 



AND NOT FOR TRUTH. 239 

the admission of mere ex parte evidence, and 
that, often of a very suspicious kind, in their 
favour ; while they reject legitimate evidence 
on the subject against them. They lay hold 
of an occasional word, dropped by their op- 
ponent, either to divert the discussion from 
the subject in question, or to give a false sense 
to an argument. They cite their opponent's 
words unfairly, or give them a different mean- 
ing from what he intended by them. They 
endeavour to evade the question, by substitut- 
ing some other question instead of it. They" 
avail themselves of a mistake in some of the 
circumstances of a fact, to make the whole 
of it appear false, though the substance of the 
statement be true. They endeavour to con- 
found the principles, either of evidence, or of 
morality, on which the decision of the ques- 
tion must depend. In a word, they show, that 
they consider themselves entitled to take ev- 
ery advantage, however unfair, to establish 
their cause. Such disputants must, of course, 
have a great advantage over a fair and honest 
reasoner, whose only object is to discover 
and establish the truth. For he cannot allow 
himself to take any unfair advantage, or to 
use any methods, which would be likely to 
mislead. It would be inconsistent with the 
end, which he proposes to himself, to urge 
any argument or objection, which he does 
not believe to be well founded ; or to give it 



240 ON DISPUTING FOR VICTORY, 

greater weight than in his judgment, it really 
deserves. He would rather, even supply any 
defect which he might perceive in his oppo- 
nent's statement of facts or arguments, where- 
by they had less force than they ouglit to have, 
that he might contribute all in his power to a 
right decision of the question. Which of 
these characters is the more honourable and 
useful, cannot be doubted. But it is not suf- 
ficient to say, that disputing for victory is not 
so honourable or useful, as fairly inquiring 
after truth. It may further be shown, that 
the practice is immoral. 

The powers of reason and speech, are given 
to men for the attainment and communication 
of truth y and are perverted when they are 
used to deceive. This is acknowledged in 
the case of lying ; and, there seems no rea- 
son why it should not be acknowledged in 
this case also. For, the essence of a lie is 
the intention tp deceive. The means em- 
ployed are immaterial, whether they be words^ 
or signs, or arguments. Now, in this ease, 
there is an intention to deceive. For, the 
disputant does intend to make it believed^ 
that some error is a truth, or some truth an 
error ; or, that conclusive arguments are not 
conclusive, or vice versa : moreover, he en- 
deavours to persuade his hearers, that he be- 
lieves them so to be. And, if he be success- 
ful in liis endeavours, they are really deceiv- 



AND NOT FOR TRUTH. 241 

ed, no less than if they believed any other 
falsehood. 

When the defence of a party is the ulti- 
mate object, he who adopts this practice, does 
actually propose to himself deception, as a 
means of accomplishing his end. Here, 
therefore, the intention to deceive is manifest. 
Upon what principles, then, this practice can 
be justified, it is difficult to conceive. For, 
however important the interests and reputa- 
tion of any man's party may be in his es- 
teem, he cannot be justifiable in promoting 
them by means of deception ; unless it can 
be proved, that the end will sanction the 
means; or, that it is lawful to do evil, that 
good may come. But, when victory, or the 
reputation of being an able disputant, is the 
ultimate object, it may be said, perhaps, that 
the disputant has no real wish to impress on 
the mind of his opponent, or others, a belief 
of false arguments, or a false conclusion ; but 
only to display superior talents of reasoning 
for his credit or amusement. But, I answer, 
that though reputation or entertainment be 
his ultimate end, yet, in order to accomplish 
it, he does represent falsehood as truth, or 
truth as falsehood ; and endeavour to make 
them believed so to be, at least, for the time ; 
otherwise, he could not succeed. But, no 
man can have a right to promote his reputa- 
tion or his amusement, by such means ; any 
21 



242 ON DISPUTING FOR VICTORS, 

more than he can have a right to tell lies for 
a similar purpose. Our right to amuse our- 
selves, or to display our talents, can extend 
only to things which are in themselves inno- 
cent ; which deception cannot be. To grat^ 
ify ourselves in this way, then, must be wrong. 
If the disputant were always careful to correct 
the delusions, before he left the company, it 
may be questioned whether his conduct would 
even then be innocent. It would be like in- 
dulging oneself in telling marvellous stories, 
and, afier having amused oneself in such a 
license for a considerable time, telling the 
company, that they were falsehoods. Would 
this practice be deemed justifiable ? But, the 
truth is, that these disputants are rarely, if 
ever, careful thus to undo the mischief which 
they have done. On the contrary, they gen- 
erally leave the false impressions which they 
have made, in full force on the minds of their 
hearers. 

We are told in scripture, that ' for every 
idle word we must give an account in the day 
of judgment.' And surely words employed 
to deceive, must be idle words, in a very bad 
sense. 

Added to all this, the consequences of the 
practice of thus disputing for victory, and not 
for truth, are injurious. They are so to the 
disputant himself. For such a conduct tends 
to weaken the influence of sound arguments 



AND NOT FOR TRUTH. 243 

upon his judgment, and to generate scepti- 
cism. As the accustoming ourselves to ex- 
amine carefully the weight of arguments, and 
to allow them due influence on our minds, 
tends to strengthen our judgment ; so, the 
using ourselves to start objections against ar- 
guments, instead of soberly estimating their 
force, must promote scepticism ; for, our 
minds are subject to the influence of habits, 
as well as our bodies. Experience, also, 
shows that persons, who addict themselves to 
this practice, do often turn out sceptics. 

If a man propose the defence of a party by 
these means, he hereby fortifies himself in the 
wrong ; for, if his party were right, they 
would not need such a defence. It can 
hardly be supposed, that he can have the 
same sense of doing wrong, in any particular 
thing, which he has been accustomed to de- 
fend victoriously, as he would have, if he had . 
been usually defeated in his attempts to main- 
tain it. Certainly, the law of reputation can- 
not operate upon him in the one case, as it 
would in the other. He also precludes him- 
self from the advantage which he might enjoy 
for the detection of his errors, not only on the 
point in question, but in others connected with 
it. For, his friends, were they not silenced 
by his sophistries, might point out to him his 
mistakes, and the erroneous principles on 
which they are founded ; both of which, as 



244 ON DISPUTING FOR VICTORY, 

observers, they are more likely to discover 
than he. 

To the hearers, also, the practice is injuri- 
ous. If they do not detect his fallacies, they 
are really deceived ; and the mischievous 
consequences of this deception will be in pro- 
portion to the importance of the subject. If 
they perceive that, though victory is obtained, 
yet it is not on the side of truth, they are led 
to regard the art of reasoning, like the art of 
fencing ; that is, as entirely dependent on 
the skill of the disputant ; but, as having no 
natural tendency to the discovery of truth. 
For, they suppose, that, if a more skilful dis- 
putant were to take the opposite side of the 
question, he would be able to confute all the 
former arguments, and to establish an oppo- 
site conclusion. Thus, the faculty which 
God bestowed upon man to discover truth, 
and to direct his conduct, is brought into dis- 
repute ; and its influence on mankind is 
weakened, if not destroyed. Can it be justi- 
fiable, then, to render useless, or even to im- 
pair the use of so important a faculty, by 
amusing ourselves, or promoting the interests 
of a party. 

Besides, as, in this practice, some false 
rule of reasoning must always be laid down, 
either formally, or by implication ; or some 
just rule be rejected or perverted, it must 
always tend to pervert men's principles of 



AND NOT FOR TRUTH. 245 

reasoning, and to confound those rules by 
which truth is to be distinguished from error. 
For instance, should a man maintain that 
probabilities ought not to influence our judg- 
ment, or our conduct ; but, that we have a 
right to demand certainty, before we act or 
believe, it is evident, that he would be culpa- 
ble. For, he would be endeavouring to 
propagate a doctrine, which would make men 
infidels in religion, and would confound the 
principles on which they must act in common 
life. Now, where is the great difference, 
whether he maintains this doctrine formally, 
in words ; or, whether he assumes it as a 
principle, on which he grounds his arguments, 
and thus enforces it by his own example ? 

If he adopt this practice to support a party, 
he is endeavouring to prevail on others, to 
support what is wrong. For, as was observ^- 
ed before, if his party were right, they could 
not need such a defence. This he cannot 
do innocently ; unless it can be proved that 
guilt and innocence have no relation to party 
matters. 

Another evil, attending this practice of dis- 
puting for victory and not for truth, is its^ 
tendency to excite anger. A man can b^ar, 
much more patiently, to be shown that he is 
wrong, if he be really so ; than to have the 
victory wrested out of his hands by a sophism, 
or a perversion of the rules of evidence. 



246 ON DISPUTING FOR VICTORY. 

Nothing, indeed, is more likely to irritate and 
disgust, than a conduct so unfair. Hence, 
also, disputation itself, is brought into disre- 
pute, and men account debating an evil, be- 
cause they observe, that it generally ends in 
a quarrel. But, this it would rarely do, if 
this unfair way of reasoning were laid aside. 

What has been said, has been urged with a 
view to show the immorality of this practice ; 
but lis folly J also, may be shown. And, as it 
is feared, that this consideration will weigh 
more with many, than its immorality, it is 
necessary to add a few words on this topic. 

If the reputation of being an able disputant 
be his object, it may be questioned, whether 
it is not in general defeated. For, with men, 
at least of sound judgment, the notion of an 
able disputant includes that of a fair reasoner ; 
but, the notion of a disputant for victory, re- 
sembles that of a person who cheats at play, 
and is, in consequence, despised. If the 
reputation of a party be his object, it is gen- 
erally frustrated ; because, the 'delusion will 
rarely be of long continuance, but will most 
frequently be detected by reflection, and by 
subsequent information ; and, when it is de- 
tected, it excites a presumption, that his party 
is in the wrong. 

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